MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Volume 88

Winter 2004

Number 3

THE TROUBLE WITH "FIGHTING WORDS":
CHAPLINSKY v. NEW HAMPSHIRE IS A

THREAT TO FIRST AMENDMENT VALUES
AND SHOULD BE OVERRULED
BURTON CAINE*

I. Introduction ..........................................................................................................
443
II. Chaplinsky Was Wrongly Decided, and the Fighting Words
Doctrine Is Ill-C onceived ....................................................................................
445
A . Indictm ent and Conviction ..............................................................................
446
B. Facts and Opinion of the New Hampshire Supreme Court .............................. 446
C. Opinion of the United States Supreme Court ...................................................
448
1. Possible Interpretations of "Fighting Words" ..............................................
450
2. A dditional Chills on Free Speech .................................................................
452
D. Chaplinsky Violates the First Amendment .....................................................
452
1. The Categorical Approach Contradicts the First Amendment ............... 456
2. Categories of Speech Declared Unprotected Fail First
Amendment Standards for Vagueness and Overbreadth .............................. 459
a. "[A]ny offensive, derisive, or annoying word......................................... 460
i. V agueness ..............................................................................................
4 60
ii. O verbreadth ..........................................................................................
463
b. Vagueness and Overbreadth in Other Speech
Justice M urphy Interdicts ........................................................................
467
3. Chaplinsky Was Wrong in Limiting the First Amendment Solely
to the Search for Truth, Communication of Information, or Opinion ........... 486
4. Government Has No Right to Criminalize Speech to Promote
"the Social Interest in Order and M orality .................................................
492
*

Professor of Law, Temple University Beasley School of Law, J.D. Harvard 1952.

I am

deeply indebted to Professor James Strazzella for his advice, encouragement, and support, and to
Edmond J. Ghisu, Esquire, who as a student did the original research and then as a practicing lawyer
did the final editing and always had penetrating comments of great value. Finally, several students
assisted in research, editing, and cite-checking, among whom were Scott C. Elwell (who prepared
the Appendix to this Article), Karen Krazler, Viktoria Christiansen, Cheri Maddren, Stephanie Ross,
and Chris Jahnke.

MARQUETTE LA W REVIEW

[88:441

a. M orality ....................................................................................................
b. Chaplinsky's Words Pale by Comparison to Language the
C ourt Routinely Protects .........................................................................
c. There W as No Possibility of Disorder .....................................................
5. The Government Has No Right to Criminalize Speech Because
It Can Be Said in Another (Less Offensive) Way .......................................
a. The First Amendment Guarantees to the Speaker the Right
to Choose What W ords Shall Be Used .....................................................
b. The Fighting Words Doctrine Purporting to Punish
Offending Speech Has the Effect of Censoring Ideas ..............................
6. The "Fighting Words" Statute Violates Brandenburgv. Ohio ....................
7. Chaplinsky Punishes the Speaker for the Possible Violent
R eaction of the A udience ............................................................................
8. The Court's Reliance upon Chafee is Misplaced .........................................
9. The Right to Criticize the Government is the Core Value of the First
Amendment and is Protected No Matter How Offensive the Language ......
10. Denial of the Defense of Provocation Is Irrational, Has No
Basis in First Amendment Law, and Undermines It ..................................
11. The Effect of the United States Supreme Court Rewriting the Statute
to Add a New Criminal Offense of Speaking Words That By Their
Very Utterance Inflict Injury Defeats The New Hampshire Court's
Rationale, Is Constitutionally Inconsistent, and Is Ex Post Facto .............
a. Defeat of the New Hampshire Supreme Court's Rationale ......................
b. Constitutional Inconsistency ....................................................................
c. E x Post F acto ...........................................................................................
E. The U.S. Supreme Court Should Have Reversed the New Hampshire
Supreme Court on Other Grounds, Thus Avoiding the Fighting
Words Issue ....................................................................................................
1. In tent .............................................................................................................
2. The Court Should Not Have Permitted the New Hampshire
Supreme Court to Rewrite the Statute Converting It from a
Punishment of Speech to a Prevention of Violence .....................................
IlI. Although the Court Has Never Upheld a Conviction for Fighting
Words Since Chaplinsky,There Is Danger That the Case Will Deter
Speech, Largely Criticizing the Police and the Government .............................
A. No Fighting Words Convictions Upheld .........................
B. No Consensus On What the Doctrine Is .........................................................
C. Language Protected Is Vastly More Offensive Than the Mild Protest In
Chaplinsky ......................................................................................................
D. Danger of Not Overruling Chaplinsky .............................................................
1. Threat of Prosecution For Criticizing the Police and the Government .........
2. States Cannot Be Relied Upon to Obey Supreme Court to
P rotect Speech ..............................................................................................
3. The Practical Lesson Chaplinsky Teaches: Don't Talk Back
to the C op s! ..................................................................................................
IV . C onclusion ........................................................................................................

4 92
493
497
500
501
503
503
506
509
516
519

523
523
527
529

530
53 0

533
536
536
537
545
547
547
548
550
55 1

2004]

FIGHTING WORDS

APPENDIX

I. Federal Courts Largely Follow the Supreme Court in Not Upholding
Convictions for Fighting Words, but State Courts Do, Mainly to Punish
Racial M inorities for Talking Back to the Police ................................
553
A . Introduction and O verview ...........................................
553
B. Breakdown of Fighting Words Cases by Addressee ...........................
558
1. Confrontations with police officers .....................................
558
a. The Federal Police C ases ..........................................
558
b. The State Police C ases ............................................
560
2. Confrontations with other individuals ...................................
562
I. INTRODUCTION

More than sixty years ago, the United States Supreme Court in Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire' declared that "fighting words" is a category of speech for
which the First Amendment offers no protection.2 The Chaplinsky decision
was a tragedy for the jurisprudence of Freedom of Speech in two respects.
The first was the Court's decision to carve out, in wholesale fashion, vast
categories of exceptions 3 to the First Amendment's otherwise unqualified
protection of speech.4 The second was the Court's decision to proclaim as the
1. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
2. The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom
of speech." U.S. CONST. amend I. The Fourteenth Amendment makes the First Amendment
applicable to the states. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
3. Although the "fighting words" category was created to penalize the speech in Chaplinsky,
Justice Murphy did not stop there and condemned with broad strokes other categories of speech, such
as the lewd, the obscene, and the profane. Professor Kalven characterized the Chaplinsky approach
as the "two level" theory of speech under which speech is either protected or not under the First
Amendment according to the Court's assessment of its relative "value." Harry Kalven, The
Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 10 (1960); see GEOFFREY R. STONE ET
AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT 80 (1999); KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 995, 1041 (Foundation Press 15th ed. 2004).
4. Justice Black came closest to absolutism in the protection of speech when he rejected the
technique of "balancing" free speech against other values. He wrote that the authors of the First
Amendment clearly intended by their language to protect all speech, and by their stance did all the
balancing that was intended. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 336 U.S. 36, 61 (1961) (Black, J.,
dissenting). Earlier in his career on the Supreme Court, Justice Black rejected the view of Justice
Frankfurter that historically, protection of expression was limited by English judicial practice.
Justice Black wrote in Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941), that the First Amendment was
designed to achieve the opposite result: "No purpose in ratifying the Bill of Rights was clearer than
that of securing for the people of the United States much greater freedom of... expression.., than
the people of Great Britain had ever enjoyed." Id.at 265. Benno Schmidt termed Black's opinion in
that case "a judicial Declaration of Independence for the First Amendment." See William COHEN &
DAVIt DANELSKI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 307 (4th ed.1997). On point also is the more recent
hapless protest of Judge Buckwalter in American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp 824,
858 (E.D. PA 1996) ("The prohibition against Government's regulation of speech cannot be set forth
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first of these exceptions "fighting words," a category so ill-conceived that not
once in the ensuing sixty-two years has the United States Supreme Court
upheld a conviction based on it. 5 This Article is devoted principally to this
second tragedy-the exclusion of speech branded "fighting words" from the
realm of expression protected by the First Amendment.
There is no constitutional basis for denying protection to fighting words,
either alone or as a subcategory of speech claimed to be unworthy of First
Amendment protection.
The Chaplinsky opinion, plagued with vague
language regarding categories and characteristics of expression that
purportedly do not qualify for First Amendment protection, violates
established First Amendment standards in several regards. Perhaps most
importantly, what the Court in Chaplinsky labels as fighting words is, in
reality, "political" speech or speech on public issues, which deserves the
utmost protection in the American democracy.
There are other aspects of Chaplinsky that demand repudiation. At the
most basic level, the Supreme Court could have reversed the state court
conviction in Chaplinsky on other grounds, thus avoiding the issue of fighting
words altogether. And while the Chaplinsky opinion purports to follow the
well-settled law of accepting a state court's interpretation of an applicable
state statute as the basis for judging the statute constitutional, the Supreme
Court in Chaplinsky flagrantly contradicts the state court's interpretation of
the statute at issue in a manner that actually undermines the statute's,
constitutionality. Included in this Article is an intensive analysis of the
Chaplinsky opinion with the aim of showing that
it cannot stand even on the
6
basis contended by its author, Justice Murphy.
any clearer than in the language of the First Amendment itself .... [I]t may come as a surprise...
that ...[o]ur cherished freedom of speech does not cover as broad a spectrum as one may have
gleaned from a simple reading of the Amendment.").
5. In contrast, the continued vitality at the state level, as shown below, makes it imperative to
overrule Chaplinsky now.
6. Typical criticism of Chaplinsky focuses more on the implications of the fighting words
principle announced by the Court rather than the opinion itself. See, e.g.,
Stephen W. Gard, Fighting
Words as Free Speech, 58 WASH.U. L.Q. 531 (1980):
[The fighting words doctrine is]nothing more than a quaint remnant of an earlier morality
that has no place in a democratic society dedicated to the principle of free expression. The
doctrine which operates, at best, to penalize individuals for failing to show others the
respect society deems proper and, at worst, to penalize individuals for vehement criticism
of government officials, is simply not constitutionally justifiable.
Id. at 536; see also Mark C. Rutzick, Offensive Language and the Evolution of First Amendment
Protection, 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1 (1974).
While I agree with both scholars and others that Chaplinsky ought to be overruled, I must note
that the Supreme Court has paid little attention to their plea. I hope to add my voice, adding an indepth analysis of the opinion demonstrating that it is so deeply flawed that it cannot stand, and
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While the Supreme Court since Chaplinsky has never again upheld a
conviction for fighting words, the Court and various justices, in concurring
and dissenting opinions, have cited the fighting words doctrine as virtually a
minefield for free speech interdiction.7 More significantly, as the survey
attached to this Article as the Appendix demonstrates, while the lower federal
courts generally follow the Supreme Court's lead in not upholding convictions
for fighting words, the state courts have not been as reticent and have
stretched the fighting words doctrine beyond all recognition, primarily to
protect the police from
criticism, with all of the inherent dangers that such an
8
approach presents.
In short, the fighting words doctrine was ill-conceived, is in disarray, and
poses a potent danger to speech that should command premier protection.
Accordingly, Chaplinsky should be overruled, and "fighting words" returned
to the protection of the First Amendment, which knows no such
excommunication. 9

II.

CHAPLINSKY WAS WRONGLY DECIDED, AND THE FIGHTING WORDS

DOCTRINE IS ILL-CONCEIVED

The Supreme Court opinion in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshirel° was
delivered by Justice Murphy on behalf of a unanimous court. Written in a
style of simplicity and hinting of no problems of analysis, the text presents a
host of problems, not the least of which is a maddening level of imprecision
that serves only to chill freedom of expression.

perhaps even to present a more convincing case after more than an additional two decades of
experience with what I agree is an intolerable blot on free speech jurisprudence.
7. The most recent illustration is Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court in Virginia v. Black,
538 U.S. 343 (2003), holding that cross-burning with intent to threaten bodily harm is not protected
expression. The Chaplinsky fighting words doctrine was cited in dictum for the proposition that not
all speech is protected. Id. at 358. Whether Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court can be read to
create a new category of speech
not protected by the First Amendment-perhaps called

"intimidation"-and in that sense, is an affirmation or extension of Chaplinsky-isnot the subject of
this Article.
8. See also Part III.D.2, infra, citing the recent case of State v. Robinson, 82 P.3d 27 (Mont.
2003), cert. denied, 124 S.Ct. 2106 (2004), where the Montana courts convicted the defendant for
fighting words and for cursing the police and refused to follow U.S. v. Poocha, 259 F.3d 1077 (9th
Cir. 2001), protecting such speech.
9. Some judges and scholars believe that the fighting words doctrine should be expanded to
punish more speech. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting);
Kent Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets: Are They ProtectedFree Speech? 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 287

(1990). See also questions posed in SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 3, at 1043. In my view, they
proceed in the wrong direction.
10. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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A. Indictment and Conviction
Walter Chaplinsky was a minister of the Jehovah's Witnesses sect who
was convicted of violating a New Hampshire statute providing:
No person shall address any offensive, derisive, or annoying word to
any other person who is lawfully in any street or other public place,
nor call him by any offensive or derisive name, nor make any noise or
exclamation in his presence and hearing with intent to deride, offend
or annoy him, or to prevent him from pursuing his lawful business or
occupation. 1
Chaplinsky's conduct, for which he was convicted, consisted solely of
words; that is, his conduct consisted of addressing the following to one
Bowering, City Marshal of Rochester, New Hampshire, on a public street in
2 and the
the city: "You are a God damned racketeer and a damned Fascist
'3
Fascists.'
of
agents
or
Fascists
are
Rochester
of
whole government
B. Facts and Opinion of the New Hampshire Supreme Court
The facts were as follows: 14 Walter Chaplinsky, a preacher of Jehovah's
11.

Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569 (quoting ch. 378, § 2, of the Public Laws of New Hampshire)._
12. The United States Supreme Court capitalized "Fascists" following the practice of the
Supreme Court of New Hampshire. I argue below that this was a material error contributing to an
erroneous decision in the case. It certainly was not the intent of Chaplinsky to accuse Rochester city
officials of being card-carrying members of the Fascist Party of Italy or elsewhere. If the conviction
was based on that assumption, it was palpable error. The defendant clearly intended to criticize
public officials for refusing to carry out their constitutional duty to protect his First Amendment right
of free speech, and in that respect, the government was acting like "fascists" who likewise deny
protection for this fundamental right. In Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 911 (1972), the
Court did not capitalize "fascists" where defendant called the police "m[other] flucking] fascist pig
cops." Id. at 911. The words were held protected by the First Amendment. Accordingly, I will
capitalize "fascist" only when quoting from the Chaplinsky opinions.
13. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569.
14. See generally id. at 569-70. The facts in more explicit detail are set forth in Chaplinsky's
brief in the U.S. Supreme Court and relate mainly to the assault upon him by people in the street in
the presence of the police and some with police assistance. Chaplinsky's brief also includes the exact
words exchanged between Chaplinsky and the police. Because both the New Hampshire Supreme
Court and the United States Supreme Court deemed irrelevant all provocation by the police and all
assaults upon Chaplinsky by either the police or townsfolk, there was no denial of Chaplinsky's
version of the facts, and at times, explicit acceptance with the assertion that they relate to
provocation, which provides no excuse for the defendant's words. I disagree and contend that police
provocation and violence are essential to understand the gravity of the menace to freedom of
expression by the fighting words doctrine. Accordingly, I am relying primarily upon the facts as set
forth by the New Hampshire Supreme Court and United States Supreme Court, but supplemented by
facts from Chaplinsky's brief in the United States Supreme Court that were not denied by either
court. References to Chaplinsky's brief are taken from 39 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF
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Witnesses, was distributing literature of his sect on the streets of Rochester,
New Hampshire, on a Saturday afternoon in 1940. Chaplinsky himself, or
both Chaplinsky and the literature, referred to organized religion as "a
racket." 15 The crowd was hostile and complained to City Marshal Bowering,
the chief of police, who responded that Chaplinsky was engaged in lawful
activity.' 6 He also warned Chaplinsky that those listening to him were
offended by his language and were getting restless.' 7 Later, Bowering,
accompanied by a man named Bowman, came through the crowd and
accosted Chaplinsky. Bowman punched Chaplinsky, who pleaded with
Bowering, "Marshal, I want you to arrest this man." 18 Bowering answered, "I
will if I feel like it." 19
Bowering and Bowman left, and Chaplinsky continued to offer magazines
containing the message of God's Kingdom. 20 Bowman returned with a
flagstaff as a spear and lunged at Chaplinsky in an effort to run through him.
Then came an assault by a deputy sheriff who called Chaplinsky, "You son of
a bitch.",2 1 In the course of Chaplinsky's travail, the crowd produced an
American flag and demanded that he salute it. 22 He refused and was assaulted
with the complicity of Bowering and the deputy sheriff.23 Bowering later

called Chaplinsky an "unpatriotic dog. 24
Bowering left the scene to return with the deputy sheriff who assaulted
Chaplinsky; then Bowering led Chaplinsky to the police station, shoving him
along roughly. Bowering said that he was responding to a report of a riot or
disturbance. 25 Again, Chaplinsky requested police protection, asking, "Will
you please arrest the ones who started this fight?" 26 Bowering responded,

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Philip Kurland & Gerhard

Casper eds., 1975) [hereinafter CIAPLINSKY'S BRIEF].
15. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 570.
16. Id.
17. Id.

18. CHAPLINSKY'S BRIEF, supra note 14, at 46.
19. Id.

20. Id.
21. Id. at 47.
22. Id. at 46.
23. CHAPLINSKY'S BRIEF, supra note 14, at 47.

24. Id.
25. The implications were that this was in reaction to Chaplinsky's speech, and therefore, in this
sense, he caused a breach of the peace. Yet, for this infraction, he was never charged. Although it
would seem that the purpose of the police leading Chaplinsky to the station was a breach of the
peace, that charge was abandoned when the verbal encounter with Bowering provided a more fertile
ground for prosecution.
26. CHAPLINSKY'S BRIEF, supra note 14, at 47.
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"Shut up, you damned bastard and come along. 27 Provoked and angered by
Marshal Bowering's words, by the refusal of the police to protect his
constitutional right to speak, as well as by the blows he had received from the
crowd, Chaplinsky replied, "You are a God damned racketeer" and "a damned
the whole government of Rochester are Fascists or agents of
Fascist and
28
Fascists.

'

Chaplinsky was indicted for violating Section 2 of Chapter 378 of the
Public Laws of New Hampshire by addressing the words quoted above to
Bowering, the City Marshal, and the complainant. The indictment did not
charge Chaplinsky with intent to offend, deride, or annoy Bowering. Nor did
it charge that Bowering was provoked or that he responded with violence, nor
that a reasonable person would be provoked to violence. Neither violence nor
breach of the peace, or the potential for either, was mentioned in the
indictment. Nor was there any such proof. As Justice Black later pointed out
in Beauharnais v. Illinois,29 the Jehovah's Witness preacher was convicted
only of name-calling.
Chaplinsky challenged the constitutionality of the New Hampshire statute,
asserting "infringement of the fundamental liberties of speech, press and
worship. 30 He also charged that City Marshal Bowering called him "a
damned bastard," which provoked him into responding in kind. 31 The New
Hampshire courts ruled against Chaplinsky on all points and held that under
the statute, neither truth nor provocation was a defense.32
33
Chaplinsky was convicted and sentenced to six months in prison.
C. Opinion of the United States Supreme Court
The United States Supreme Court upheld Chaplinsky's conviction in an
27. Id.
28. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569.
29. 343 U.S. 250, 272 (1952).
30. State v. Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d 754, 759 (1941).
31. CHAPLINSKY'S BRIEF, supra note 14, at 47.
32. Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d at 759. In affirming the conviction, the New Hampshire Supreme
Court found it irrelevant to determine whether Chaplinsky was provoked:
Chaplinsky could no more defend unlawful speech on the ground of provocation than could
one of the street-crowd have defended a charge of calling Chaplinsky names on the ground
that the name-caller had been incensed by Chaplinsky's teachings. The defendant was held
to the same duties as those who disagreed with him or with whom he disagreed. The rules
of fair conduct in public speech in the street apply indiscriminately to all-whether the
speaker be a preacher, an official or a mere bystander.
Id. The words themselves, said the New Hampshire court, "were offensive as a matter of law," and
therefore it was unnecessary to submit the question of provocation to the jury. Id. at 762.
33. CHAPLNSKY'S BRIEF, supra note 14, at 9.
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opinion by Justice Murphy that largely relied upon the New Hampshire
Supreme Court opinion, from which it quoted extensively.34 Justice Murphy
noted that the New Hampshire statute specified two offenses: 1) "words or
names addressed to another in a public place;" and 2) "noises and
exclamations. 35 Apparently sensitive to the contention that the second
offense was virtually the avatar of unconstitutional vagueness and
overbreadth, the Court sought refuge in the state court ruling that the two
sections were severable, and, even if the second was unconstitutional, the
first-, under which Chaplinsky was convicted-was uninfected.3 6 Justice
Murphy ignored the statutory language of the first crucial offense-which
punished only speech without any potential for violence-and purported to
rely entirely upon the interpretation of the state court that "the statute's
purpose was to preserve the public peace, no words being 'forbidden except
such as have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the persons to
whom, individually, the remark is addressed."' 37 On this ground, Justice
Murphy affirmed the state court's holding that the statute was not
unconstitutionally vague because the defendant had notice of its meaning.
34. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 574.
35. Id.at 572.
36. The statute would seem to provide for three offenses: 1)addressing to any person in a
public place (but not necessarily "in his presence and hearing") any "offensive, derisive, or annoying
word" pertaining to anybody, the addressee or another; 2) calling him (i.e., such person not
necessarily in a public place, and not necessarily "in his presence and hearing") any "offensive or
derisive [but not 'annoying'] name;" and 3) making noise or exclamation in his presence and hearing
(but "not directed to the person derided but with the intent to deride, offend, or annoy him, or prevent
him from pursuing his business or occupation." Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d at 757. The first offense
pertains to words, whereas the second pertains to names. Neither specifies, as does the third offense,
that the words or names must be uttered "in his presence and hearing," and presumably they do not.
The inclusion of the second offense shows that the first was intended to punish words that do not
insult the hearer, which are "offensive, derisive, or annoying" to the hearer by reason of insulting
others, i.e., the government of Rochester. Chaplinsky was convicted of addressing to the City
Marshal offensive, derisive, and annoying words and names. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569. Thus, the
Court found that Chaplinsky was charged with violating only the first part of the statute, meaning the
first and second offenses above. Although the New Hampshire court seems to indicate that intent to
deride pertains only to 3), that seems to be a weird construction of the statute and the plain sense is
to require such intent for all three offenses. The United States Supreme Court makes none of the
distinctions or analyses set forth here. The Court rejects the contention of vagueness without
discussing it but with the conclusion that the statute is "limited to ... the use in a public place of
words likely to cause a breach of the peace" and is "carefully drawn so as not unduly to impair liberty
of expression." Id.at 573-74. 1 suggest that the statute merits no such encomium. The legislative
enactment was so poorly drawn and posed such peril to First Amendment freedom of speech that I
contend that the New Hampshire Supreme Court essentially rewrote it, and the United States
Supreme Court pretended not to notice that the First Amendment was hoodwinked.
37. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573 (citing State v. Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d 754, 758 (N.H. 1941)). In
another quotation from the New Hampshire court, Justice Murphy says on the same page cited that
the statute "does no more than prohibit the face-to-face words plainly likely to cause a breach of the
peace by the addressee." Id.
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Furthermore, Justice Murphy said that, even without that explicit state court
interpretation, the defendant "need not have been a prophet to understand
what the statute condemned" because New Hampshire decisions uniformly
limited the statute to provocation to violence. 38 Yet, Justice Murphy added to
the state court's definition of fighting words as its first, and apparently, its
39
primary meaning, "[words] which by their very utterance inflict injury",
that is, speech with no potential for violence. Justice Murphy does not say
which of the alternative criminal provisions Chaplinsky violated.
Presumably, he violated the first, or why would Justice Murphy have added it
and placed it first?
For this and other reasons, the Court's opinion is hardly a model of
clarity. It behooves us to pinpoint exactly what Chaplinsky holds.40 In view
of the imprecision of an opinion strewn with rambling and loose language, it
is not easy to determine the specific parameters of "fighting words," the new
category of speech stripped of First Amendment protection. This looseness is
the basis for the argument discussed below that the fighting words doctrine is
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.
1. Possible Interpretations of "Fighting Words"
The following are some of the possibilities suggested by the text of the
Court's opinion for defining fighting words:
a. Words addressed to another individual face-to-face in a public place
"which by their very utterance inflict injury ' 41 upon the addressee.
b. Words addressed to another individual face-to-face in a public place
"which by their very utterance inflict injury" upon another person, institution,
or place.42
c. Words addressed to another individual face-to-face in a public place
' 43
which "have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the person

38. Id.at 574, n.8.
39. Id.at 572.
40. As will be seen in Part III.B, infra, subsequent cases and opinions even from Supreme
Court Justices differ as to what Chaplinsky holds.
41. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. The "injury" is undefined and there is no clue as to its
meaning except that it precludes violence or the possibility of violence. Despite Justice Murphy's
statement that he was adopting the New Hampshire court's interpretation of the fighting words
statute to be limited to violence, he did not adopt it, because that court did not include words which
"by their very uttering inflict injury"-and in effect precluded it. Justice Murphy added the clause
without saying so. See Part II.D.2, infra.
42. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. In Chaplinsky, for example, the defendant was convicted of
inflicting injury upon the government of Rochester, New Hampshire, and its officials.
43. See id.at 573.
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addressed by reason of insult to the addressee."
d. Words addressed to another individual face-to-face in a public place
which "have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the person,"
addressed by reason of insult to persons other than the addressee.4 5
e. Words addressed to another individual face-to-face in a public place
which are "no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight
be derived from them
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may
', 46
order.
in
interest
social
the
by
outweighed
clearly
is
f. Words addressed to another individual face-to-face in a public place
which are "no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight
from them
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be' derived
47
morality.
...
in
interest
social
the
by
is clearly outweighed
g. "Epithets ' 48 addressed to another individual face-to-face in a public
place.
h. Words addressed to another individual face-to-face in a public place,
which amount to "personal abuse. ' 49
i. Words addressed to another individual face-to-face in a public place that
do not convey information.5 °
j. Words addressed to another individual face-to-face in a public place that
do not convey opinion. 51
Not included in any of the above ten possible interpretations would be
addresses to crowds or to more than one individual targeted for insult;
communications by telephone, letter, public media, or third persons; and
insults, which provoke a violent response but should not. The possible
applications of the fighting words category must be increased by multiples of
44. Id. Because there was no charge, evidence, or finding that there was a tendency to cause
violence by the City Marshal, or that he reacted with violence or potential violence, or that he
restrained himself from provocation to violence, this possibility must be held in reserve for another
case.
45. Id. at 573. Other illustrations include insult to one's family, friends, religion, or political
party.
46. Id. at 572.
47. Id. "Morality" is undefined but would seem to exclude violence or potential violence. This
is confirmed by the contrast with "order" if that term is meant to reject "disorder" in the sense of
violence. But, because "order" is also undefined, one cannot be sure.
48. Id at 572. Undefined.
49. Id. Again, undefined. Presumably, abuse may be couched in the finest language, such as,
"Sir, with all due respect, your conduct is infinitely more deleterious to a democratic society than the
worst of Bull O'Connor!" Or, "Sir, you are a disgrace to your uniform." It may also be more
effective in inflicting a penetrating insult than "fascist." See Part II.D.5, infra.
50. Id. at 572.
51. Id. at 572. Because Chaplinsky surely conveyed his opinion to the City Marshal, one must
assume that Justice Murphy meant to say opinion of a kind and in a manner acceptable to society.
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ten if "fighting words" should be applied to include these additional
categories, as implied by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and
O'Connor in the flag-burning case,52 or perhaps Justice O'Connor in the
cross-burning case.53
2. Additional Chills on Free Speech
Chaplinsky chills more speech than just fighting words. How much more
is not clear. Perhaps the decision is best understood as a proscription of broad
categories of expression, of which fighting words is only one illustration. For
example, Justice Murphy's opinion suggests that constitutional protection is
reserved only for speech "essential... [to the] exposition of ideas" and
expression in pursuit of "truth., 54 Other phrases in the opinion must be
characterized as additional limitations or abridgements of speech. Nothing in
the First Amendment so limits protection of speech, and for that reason the
first part of the next Section of this Article is labeled, "The Categorical
Approach Contradicts the First Amendment." The pursuit-of-truth limitation,
for example, sounds the death knell for freedom of the individual to say
anything and pronounces the government the judge of what is true-and by
that measure, what is permitted to be said. Nothing could be more inimical to
First Amendment freedom, which reserves that judgment to the individual and
denies the government the role of the imprimatur of truth.55
D. Chaplinsky Violates the FirstAmendment
Chaplinsky and the fighting words doctrine it spawned were born in the
t&e-A-tete between an unpopular speaker and a hostile police chief and favor
52. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 421-35 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., White, J., and
O'Connor, J., dissenting).
53. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
54. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
55. As Justice Brennan stated, the search-for-truth category has uniformly been rejected. New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964) ("Authoritative interpretations of the First
Amendment guarantees have consistently refused to recognize an exception for any test of truth.").
Cantwell, which Chaplinsky cites, also rejects the truth test. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971); infra note 56. Denying a defense of truth is an anomaly in that in the case of libel, to which
fighting words bear a close resemblance, truth is a complete defense. Where the victim is a public
official, as in the Chaplinsky and New York Times cases, the First Amendment protects even untrue
statements unless uttered with "actual malice." New York Times, 376 U.S. 254. And the burden of
proving falsity is upon the plaintiff, here the government. Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 475
U.S. 767 (1986). Because Chaplinsky was a criminal prosecution, the burden to prove falsity should
have fallen upon the government beyond a reasonable doubt. It is more than curious that the
complaining police chief in New York Times lost on First Amendment grounds even though the jury
found that he was injured to the extent of $500,000, while the complaining police chief in Chaplinsky
prevailed even though there was no evidence that he was injured in the slightest.
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the wrong person constitutionally speaking.5 6 That is, only one person was
attempting to exercise a First Amendment right-the Jehovah's Witness
preacher. As Justice Stevens confirmed recently in Watchtower Bible & Tract
Society v. Stratton,5 7 this religious sect has been prominent for more than half
a century in challenging official efforts to restrict its expression for the
obvious and unstated reason that its preaching offends many listeners. Justice
Stevens also noted that Jehovah's Witnesses take literally the mandate of the
Scripture, "'Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature.'
Mark 16:15.... Moreover, because they lack significant financial resources,
the ability of the Witnesses to proselytize is seriously diminished by
regulations that burden their efforts." 58 There, the restriction inhibited doorto-door canvassing.59 In Chaplinsky, the restriction was governmental denial
of First Amendment protection and even governmental complicity in violence
with clear provocation to respond in like language.
Of the many astounding aspects of Justice Murphy's opinion, perhaps the
most shocking, is that none of this commands constitutional attention. This is
hardly the lesson to teach the police in the sensitive area of freedom of
expression. In the words of Justice Powell in Houston v. Hill, it "'contains an
obvious invitation to discriminatory enforcement,'''6 granting the police
discretion to arrest on the basis of the content of speech, which is particularly
repugnant given "'the eternal temptation ...to arrest the speaker rather than
to correct the conditions about which he complains.",' 6 1 The law surely cannot
turn on whether a derelict public servant is provoked whenever a person
insists on the constitutional protection to which he is entitled. Nor should it
turn on what language the aggrieved speaker uses to express his anger when
his cause is constitutionally just. It may be human nature for a government
official to attempt to deflect a charge of malfeasance by caviling at the
language used, but that cannot be an acceptable model in a democratic society
where individual rights are a higher priority than discomfort of an insouciant
public official. The Constitution must give priority to liberties of the
56. See supra Part II.B; but see SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 3, at 1042, where the
question is posed, "Should a speaker be freer to insult such an officer than to insult an 'average
addressee'?" The implication seems to be that there is no First Amendment right to insult either. I
disagree and argue that there is a right to insult both. But if a choice must be made, there is an
important constitutional right to chose to insult the government and its omnipresent vicar, the police.
57. 536 U.S. 150 (2002) (holding invalid under the First Amendment a municipal permit
requirement for all door-to-door solicitors and proselytizers because, even though it was

nondiscriminatory, it inhibited too much speech).
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.at 161.
Id.
482 U.S. 451, 465 n.15 (1987) (citing Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611,615-16 (1971)).
Id. (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 65 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
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individual and not surrender to the sensitivity of an "eggshell '62 police chief.
This is particularly true when Bowering not only assaulted, insulted, and
provoked Chaplinsky for attempting to exercise his constitutional rights, but
also made it clear that any further attempt would incur dire consequences for
him.
The comment of the New Hampshire Supreme Court on the point was
constitutionally unreal. In rejecting Chaplinsky's predicament of hostile
police conduct that virtually prevented him from speaking, the New
Hampshire court said, "those facts, if true, would not have justified the
offensive manner in which he sought to bring the Marshal to what Chaplinsky
may have regarded as a sense of his duty. 6 3 It was not a useful or proper
comment for bringing truth to light. In rejecting both provocation and truth as
defenses, the New Hampshire Supreme Court said that Chaplinsky was as
unjustified in his offensive response as would be the street crowd "calling
Chaplinsky names on the ground that the name-caller had been incensed by
Chaplinsky's teachings .... The rules of fair conduct in public speech in the
street apply indiscriminately 64
to all-whether the speaker be a preacher, an
official or a mere by-stander.,
Nor was there any evidence that City Marshal Bowering was provoked to
violence or that any mythical reasonable man would have been so provoked.
There was no evidence that Bowering assaulted Chaplinsky in response to
"offensive" words, and presumably he did not.65 The closest the New
Hampshire court came to the point was, as stated above, its declaration that
Chaplinsky's words were offensive as a matter of law. 66 It is important to
reiterate that the United States Supreme Court affirmed, stating, "Argument is
unnecessary to demonstrate that the appellations 'damned racketeer' and
'damned Fascists' are epithets likely to provoke67the average person to
retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace.,
These "rules," the United States Supreme Court should have said, might
62. In Washegesic v. Bloomingdale Pub. Schools, 33 F.3d 679, 684 (6th Cir. 1994) (Guy, J.,
concurring), what Judge Guy said could easily apply to the Rochester City Marshal: "What is
established is a class of 'eggshell' plaintiffs of a delicacy never before known to the law. I can well
understand that someone.., in some sense could be offended by this portrait, but 'injured' is another
matter."
63. Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d at 758.
64. Id. at 759.
65. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
66. Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d at 758.
67. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 574. As discussed elsewhere in this Article, even conceding that
the fighting words doctrine is valid, the standard should be the average police officer. In that event,
it borders on the absurd that the average police officer would be provoked to violence against the
speaker. See Lewis v. New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
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be more suited to a church sermon, if that, but describe a make-believe world
unknown to raucous street debate 68 to which we as a nation are profoundly
committed. 69 They make the give-and-take of street talk a free-speech
minefield, and the caution imposed is designed to condemn the First
Amendment to the reliquary and summon up the ghost of Justice Brennan,
who inveighed, "our Constitution is a living reality, not parchment preserved
under glass."70
First, the official is charged with the duty to protect constitutional rights,
and dereliction of that duty, whether actively or passively, cannot be tolerated
in a society dedicated to exaltation of liberty of the individual. Putting an
official in the same category as "a mere bystander" is to ignore the obligations
the Constitution imposes upon government to protect freedom of speech.
Second, to impose upon a speaker the obligation to react as a saint when
provoked and assaulted by the canaille assisted by the police chief would have
startled the Founding Fathers, and especially James Madison, the author of the
First Amendment. 71 Third, although the New Hampshire Supreme Court says
that infractions by officials and the unruly crowd should be vigorously
prosecuted, there is not even a hint that anyone was prosecuted-let alone
imprisoned--except Chaplinsky, the only player on the scene attempting to
exercise the constitutional right of freedom of speech.
Despite the importance of the issue, as was said above, Justice Murphy
was content to stand on the hollow phrases of the New Hampshire court and
was completely silent on the issues it trumpeted. In Dombrowski v. Pfister,7 2
68. A typical contemporary illustration is the muscular exchange of views on the streets of
Philadelphia on August 17, 2001, when supporters and opponents of Mumia Abu-Jamal clashed on
whether his conviction for killing a police officer was tainted and a new trial should be granted, or
whether he should be executed. Jacqueline Soteropoulos & Joseph A. Slobodzian, Abu-Jamal Team
Pursues Appeal As ProtestersConverge on Phila., PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Aug. 18, 2001, at B2.
The Philadelphia Inquirer reported that his supporters "launched into an obscenity-laced tirade
against a group of construction workers . . . who displayed signs reading. .. 'Fry Mumia, Die
Mumia,' and... drivers . .. made obscene gestures at [supporters] that were returned in kind." Id.
For the death penalty, a man in the crowd shouted at Rev. Jesse Jackson, "Why don't you go back and
take care of your illegitimate kids?" and in turn was shouted down by the crowd. Id Justice
Murphy's opinion would convict all for fighting words, but the judgment of history would be upon
his head.
69. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
70. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 290 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(quoting Stanley v. Northeast Indep. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 972 (5th Cir. 1972)).
71. Jefferson also, for sure. The Sedition Act punishing criticism of government officials,
enacted in 1798 during the presidency of John Adams, was repealed during the Jefferson
administration and all fines were remitted. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 276. In John Adams,
David McCullough writes that Adams "claim[ed] absurdly that since Jefferson had signed it, too, as
Vice President, he shared in the responsibility for it." DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 607
(2001).
72. 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965).
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the American credo was recited that official conduct that chills free speech
violates the First Amendment. The facts in Chaplinsky present the most
egregious illustration. Even if some circumstances can be imagined that
would give rise to a concept as repressive of freedom as fighting words,
Chaplinsky is surely not the case-not in this land of liberty.
1. The Categorical Approach Contradicts the First Amendment
Chaplinsky invented the theory that entire categories of speech are denied
First Amendment protection. It permits no analysis and no reasoning and
contradicts the absolutist language of the First Amendment that the
government "shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech.,

73

It

marks for extinction even speech that is the core value of the First
Amendment and a quintessential value of representative democracy. 74 It is
the antithesis of intelligence in an area where intelligent inquiry is
quintessential. The sin of the case cannot be used to support its ipsi dixit. The
distinction is constitutional casuistry at its worst. What Justice Kennedy said
about the First Amendment public forum doctrine, where the question is
where one may speak, applies with even greater force here where the question
is whether one may speak at all. Justice Kennedy said that "[o]ur public
forum doctrine ought not to be a jurisprudence of categories rather than ideas
or convert what was once an analysis protective of expression
into one which
75
fiat.,
by
speech
restrict
to
authority
government
grants the
Justice Brennan in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan76 taught that no word
is a talisman-there libel, here fighting words-and cannot preclude the
crucial First Amendment analysis. 77 There the analysis focused on the core
value of criticizing public officials that could not be sabotaged by the
interposition of an arbitrary barrier to reasoning.
The same considerations
apply here, with the added frustration that fighting words, if that is what they
were, were provoked by the government itself motivated by the intention to
fend off the criticism that government was derelict in defending the
73. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
74. See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 27, 75, 77, 84, 107-08 (1948)
(stating that speech on public issues must be absolutely protected as the basic principle of
representative government); New York Times, 376 U.S. 254 (stating that criticism of government is
the core value of the First Amendment); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an
Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245 (1961). Both are implicated in Chaplinsky and both are extirpated
by the categorization technique.
75. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 693-94 (1992) (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
76. 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
77. Id.
78. Id.
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Constitution. In both cases, the police chief was the target and the vicar of
government.
The mischievous suggestion that entire classes of expression can be
categorized away on the say-so of judges has bred a ferocious band of
lobbyists demanding that speech that violates their particular sensibilities or
political constituencies should also be deported from First Amendment
territory. With Chaplinsky as their Bible and the limitless possibilities it
offers for quoting its scripture to exclude expression from Annoying-to-Zany,
no censor need be turned away disappointed. 79 Further exploration of these
topics is outside the scope of this Article.
To support the thesis of categorical exclusions, Justice Murphy says that
freedom of speech is not absolute,80 citing cases from Schenck v. United
States81 to Cantwell v. Connecticut.82
None supports the categorical
approach.83
The gravamen of Justice Murphy's constitutional analysis is the highly
problematic assertion that:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech,
79. See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, Responding to Abusive Speech on Campus: A Model Statute,
RECONSTRUCTION, Winter 1990; Thomas C. Grey, Civil Rights vs. Civil Liberties: The Case of
Discriminatory Verbal Harassment, 8 SOC. PHIL. & POL. 81 (1991); see also SULLIVAN &
GUNTHER, supra note 3, at 1075 (discussing hate speech and the subordination of women).
80. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942). Whether speech advocating immediate and serious
violence and posing a clear and present danger of such violence may be considered an exception, or
is so intimately connected to violence as to be considered conduct and not speech, is not relevant to
this discussion because it does not fall within the fighting words category as enunciated in
Chaplinsky. In this illustration, the speaker chooses to unleash violence and in that respect should be
considered responsible for it. Where the potential for violence comes from a hostile listener, the
speaker must be protected because the speaker, not the enemy of speech, is protected by the First
Amendment.
81. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
82. 310 U.S. 296 (1940); see also Chaplinsky,315 U.S. 568 at 571 n.2.
83. Six of the seven cases cited in Chaplinsky concern advocacy by the speaker of unlawful
action. The seventh-Cantwell-is the only one that deals with antagonistic reaction to the
speaker-in both cases Jehovah's Witnesses addressing hostile audiences-and in Cantwell the
speaker is protected. Chaplinsky a fortiori should have been protected because the situation was
much less incendiary. Cantwell was speaking to a crowd whose religious sensibilities were so
rubbed raw that they contemplated violence against him. Chaplinsky, in contrast, involved pleading
with the City Marshal to do his duty and protect his speech. The reasons Justice Roberts assigned for
reversing the conviction of Cantwell were ignored in Chaplinsky; namely, that the First Amendment
protects speech that includes "vilification of men ... and even false statement." Cantwell, 310 U.S.
at 310. At least four of the cited cases, and possibly the fifth (Brandeis' concurring opinion in
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927)), protect the speech. The common feature in all
seven is that none involves a conviction for words whose very utterance allegedly inflicts injury or
which provokes a breach of the peace by the addressee, and the phrase "fighting words" is never
mentioned.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

the prevention and punishment of which have never been
raise any Constitutional problem. These include the
obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury
incite an immediate breach of peace.84

[88:441

thought to
lewd and
"fighting"
or tend to

There is hardly an idea expressed in this passage that was not subject to
serious question as of the time it was written, and none of it has stood the test
of time. 85 Equally questionable is the next sentence in the opinion, designed
to provide the rationale for excluding fighting words from First Amendment
protection: "It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential
part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such social value as a step to truth
that any benefit that may be derived 86from them is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality."
Nor is it made clear whether this language is merely a rationale for
excluding fighting words from First Amendment protection, or whether it is a
rule of law applicable generally.8 7 If the latter, the effect on freedom of
speech is devastating-and tantamount to a repeal of the First Amendment.
All expression may be 88offensive to someone, and all messages can be
conveyed in another way.
The question is whether the First Amendment gives the individual the
right to make the choice or whether censorship by government is the ultimate
design of the Constitution. Justice Harlan firmly rejected the Chaplinsky
model and came down resoundingly on the side of the individual in Cohen v.
84. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72 (footnotes omitted).
85. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), for example, rejected the categorical
approach in holding that "libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It
must be measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment." Id at 269; see also Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (holding that the government is prohibited from prescribing the form
and content of the message, and necessarily rejecting the categorical approach).
86. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
87. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 3, at 1075 (reporting that some have argued that
Chaplinsky is not limited to fighting words but limits a vast "new category of unprotected speech,"
one in which words are "of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be
derived from them is clearly outweighed by [social interests]"). E.g., Richard Delgado, Words That
Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R. & C.L. L.
REV. 133 (1982).
88. A cartoon in The New Yorker magazine on July 9, 2001, is right on point. A mother is
chastising her little boy for the language used in expressing his negative reaction to a painting in an
art museum. She admonishes, "Instead of 'It sucks' you could say, 'It doesn't speak to me."' The
teaching of Justice Harlan obviously appealed to the child and his recitation was wisdom out of the
mouth of babes! Cohen- v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 23 (1971). Justice Brennan observed that all
speech can be said in another way but rejects that as a requirement for First Amendment protection.
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 777 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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8 9 when he said, "Governmental bodies may not prescribe
California,
the form
or content of individual expression." 90 In an observation prized for its
wisdom, Justice Harlan wrote, "[W]ords are often chosen as much for their
emotive as their cognitive force ...which, practically speaking, may often be
,,91
the more important element of the overall message ....
The Chaplinsky opinion cited no cases for either passage quoted above,
namely, the "fighting words" doctrine, or the "no essential part of any
exposition of ideas" stricture. The lack of citation to case law undermines, if
it does not contradict outright, the Court's claim that fighting words fall
within "well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention
and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any [c]onstitutional
problem," and that "[i]t has been well observed that such utterances are no
essential part of any exposition of ideas. 92
After such a doctrinal proclamation of First Amendment history, one
would have expected an encyclopedic list of citations to cases. Instead, both
propositions of law rely solely upon Professor Zachariah Chafee's Free
Speech in the United States.93 The opinion also relies entirely upon Chafee in
justifying the denial of First Amendment protection to the category or
categories of words for which the Court gropes. The passages of Chafee
relied upon by the Court provide scant support, and properly
understood, they
94
provide none-and even refute the Court's interpretation.

2. Categories of Speech Declared Unprotected Fail First Amendment
Standards for Vagueness and Overbreadth
Even assuming that the First Amendment permits categories of speech to
be stripped of constitutional protection, the definitions of such categories have
to be clear and comprehensible to the ordinary person.95 The First
Amendment also requires that restrictions on speech be narrowly drawn to
apply only to speech not protected.96 The rationale of the doctrine of
overbreadth is that speech is so fundamental and precious a principle in our
constitutional democracy that restrictions must be valid as applied to all, not
just to a particular, defendant. Free speech is not only a basic right, but a
fragile one, and speakers should not be deterred from expressing their views
89.
90.
91.
92.

403 U.S. 15 (1971).
Id.at 23.
Id. at 26.
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72.

93. ZACHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941).

94. See infra Part II.D.8.
95. Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971).
96. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
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for fear of prosecution. The Court has admonished that "[b]ecause First
Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may
regulate in the area only with narrow specificity., 97 This breathing98 room is a
fundamental feature of the jurisprudence of freedom of expression.
Applying these principles to the Chaplinsky opinion-whether limited to
the fighting words doctrine or not (and in many places it is difficult to tell)
leaves no room for doubt that its restrictions on expression are too vague and
overbroad to pass constitutional standards.
Defendant Chaplinsky maintained without success that the New
Hampshire statute was unconstitutionally vague in its original legislative cast,
which punished offensive speech and was unconstitutionally vague when the
state courts recast it into a prevention of violence. 99 Justice Murphy's opinion
for the United States Supreme Court is such a "hodge-podge"' 00 and creates so
much doubt and confusion as to the categories of expression that are
unprotected that even if the restrictions on speech imposed by New
Hampshire law were not unconstitutionally vague and overbroad before
Justice Murphy issued his opinion, they were surely so as a result of it.
The vagueness and overbreadth arguments deal with two points. First, the
language of the New Hampshire statute criminalizes "any offensive, derisive,
or annoying word to any other person." Second, passages from Justice
Murphy's opinion have strewn the First Amendment path with revealed and
hidden explosives and provided prosecutors with handy opportunities for
jailing unpopular views.
a. "[A]ny offensive, derisive, or annoying word."
The New Hampshire statute that Chaplinsky was convicted of violating
made it a crime to "address any offensive, derisive, or annoying word to any
other person who is lawfully in any street."''
i. Vagueness
Justice Murphy rejected the contention that the statute was vague, and he
implicitly rejected the contention that it was overbroad.10 2 In the guise of
97. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,433 (1963).
98. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
99. I maintain that it was improper to permit the state court to recast the statute, and the United

States Supreme Court should have ignored it and declared that what the legislature ordained was
plainly unconstitutional. See infra Part II.E.
100. Justice Douglas's characterization of "obscenity," by which he meant void-for-vagueness.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 43 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
101. The full text is quoted in Part ILA, supra.
102. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573. Overbreadth was not specifically mentioned in the
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"interpreting" the statute, the New Hampshire Court ignored the words that
03
the legislature wrote and rewrote the statute as a provocation to violence.1
One could take this as a concession that the legislative text could not be
defended upon First Amendment attack. Had the Court read the statute for
what it said, it would have been compelled to invalidate it on grounds of
vagueness and overbreadth. The phrase "any offensive, derisive, or annoying
word" is facially unconstitutional whether the words are taken as a whole,
individually, or in combination. Justice Murphy barely mentions these
statutory words' 4 except to say that when limited to provoking a fight in the
minds of "men of common intelligence," the problems 0of
vagueness and
5
overbreadth are solved. I suggest that this is plainly wrong.1
Nor is the Court relieved of the obligation to perceive the statute's
meaning and ascertain whether it is comprehensible or smacks of overbreadth.
The statute says "any offensive, derisive or annoying word," and because
"derisive or annoying" could be either disjunctive (which they are in form) or
conjunctive (which conceivably they are in context), 0 6 it is baffling whether
the words stand alone or modify or influence the meaning of one another,
whatever that meaning might be. "Derisive" and "annoying" are not
synonyms. The words are rarely paired and could easily be opposites. Edna
St. Vincent Millay wrote of the annoyance of flattery: "People fall in love
with me ...and annoy me and distress me and flatter me....,,07 Even praise
opinions but in essence it was, so close are the two concepts. The same reasoning here goes to both.
103. The judicially created statute punished words that incite a violent reaction and declared

that the standard was what "men of common intelligence" would decide. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at
573. This is dealt with below especially in considering whether such a standard is constitutionally
stable or is merely a paraphrase designed to escape the obvious "criticism of its circularity."
"Looking to an 'objective observer' cannot substitute for a constitutional standard. [It] serves merely
to avoid stating what considerations inform the judgment that a statute is constitutional or
unconstitutional." Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 S. CT. REV. 1,48
(1985).
104. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72, where Justice Murphy announces his new theory that
"certain ...classes of speech" are not entitled to First Amendment protection. He lists 'the profane,
the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words,' none of which is in the New Hampshire statute
that specifies only speech that is 'offensive, derisive or annoying,' which Murphy omits. Id. Only
in the passage of the opinion quoting from the New Hampshire decision do the three statutory words
appear at all, and there are redefined to limit them to incitements to violence.
105. Although the dogma is that the Supreme Court accepts the interpretation of a state statute
as authoritatively construed by the Supreme Court of the state, where the language of the statute is
clear on its face, the Court will read it for what it says. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 528
(1972). This is especially true where the state court is intent on abridging freedom of speech
guaranteed by the First Amendment. See infra,Part II.E.
106. The complaint charged in the conjunctive that the words used were "offensive, derisive
and annoying words and names." Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569.
107. J.D. McClatchy, Like a Moth to the Flame, N.Y. TIMEs BOOK REVIEW, Sept. 16, 2001, at
12 (reviewing NANCY MILFORD, SAVAGE BEAUTY (2001)).
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and love-drenched Shakespearean sonnets can be annoying to one not
interested. This shows that the speaker with the best of intentions may not
know what words might annoy another. They can also be derisive, provided
that a juror knows the meaning of the word without any guidance from the
New Hampshire statute or the Supreme Court in Chaplinsky.
Adding to the confusion, according to Justice Murphy, both halves of the
odd coupling "derisive or annoying" have to "plainly [tend] to excite the
addressee to a breach of the peace,"' 10 8 while what he terms "other disorderly
words, including profanity, obscenity, and threats," do not. 10 9 No explanation
is provided, adding to the uncertainty of meaning. Thus, vagueness and
overbreadth abound.
As the Supreme Court held in Coates v. Cincinnati,1 0 a statute whose
meaning cannot be comprehended with reasonable certainty is too vague to
"Annoying" was held to be
pass First Amendment muster."'
unconstitutionally vague for the simple reason that "no standard of conduct is
specified at all." ' 1 2 It is incomprehensible that Chaplinsky could have escaped
the same common sense conclusion. Who could possibly understand what
will "annoy" another? Protesting an unlawful arrest would surely annoy the
arresting officer as it did in Norwell v. Cincinnati,"3 but the Supreme Court
reversed the conviction in that case, even though defendant was "loud and
boisterous."' 14
It is a rare contest to ascertain which of the three words is more or most
vague, and Justice Murphy makes matters worse by not even identifying
which of the three adjectival crimes Chaplinsky is guilty of transgressing.
Where Justice Murphy announces his new theory that "certain... classes of
speech" are not entitled to First Amendment protection, he lists "the profane,
the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words," none of which is in the
New Hampshire statute." 5 The New Hampshire statute specifies only speech
116
that is "offensive, derisive or annoying," which Justice Murphy omits.
Only in the passage of the opinion quoting from the New Hampshire decision
108. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573.
109. Id.
110. 402 U.S. 611 (1971).

111. Id.
112. Id. at 614.
113. 414 U.S. 14, 15 (1973).
114. Id. Defendant was convicted of "wilfully conduct[ing] himself in a disorderly manner,
with intent to annoy some person." Id. at 14. In reversing, per curiam, the Court said that
"[r]egardless of what the motivation may have been behind the expression in the case, it is clear that
there was no abusive language or fighting words." Id. at 16.
115. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
116. Id.
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do the three words from the New Hampshire statute appear at all, and there
the words are redefined to limit them to incitements to violence.
The First and Fourteenth Amendments' command of Due Process
coalesce in that a statute cannot stand unless it gives precise notice of what is
forbidden. The description "offensive, derisive, or annoying word" gives no
such notice and is wholly dependent upon the reaction of the addressee. It
does not matter whether the hearer is average, reasonable, intelligent, or
otherwise. Annoyance is a personal reaction. The same may be said of words
that deride or offend. An "'objective observer' [standard is not] likely to
prove illuminating" because it "depends entirely on the observer's view ....
Looking to an 'objective observer' cannot substitute for a constitutional
standard."'1 17 In the First Amendment realm, it amounts to community
censorship and the death of free speech for minorities-the whole point of the
constitutional liberty.
ii. Overbreadth

The statute as written also suffers from overbreadth. It punishes speech
that is constitutionally protected, even if it also interdicts speech that is not.
In Gooding v. Wilson, 1i8 a Georgia statute that prohibited "opprobrious words
or abusive language, tending to cause a breach of the peace" was invalidated
on grounds of overbreadth. The standard, according to Gooding, is that "the
statute must... punish only unprotected speech and not be susceptible of
application to protected expression." ' 1 9 This doctrine is so vital to freedom of
expression that overbreadth may be raised by anyone to whom the statute
could be validly applied. As Justice Brennan explained, "[tihis is deemed
necessary because persons whose expression is constitutionally protected may
well refrain from exercising their rights for fear of criminal sanctions."' 2 °
The New Hampshire statute is overbroad in many respects. It criminalizes
speech even without intent to offend, and in this respect it suffers from
overbreadth as well as vagueness.
A crucial aspect of the overbreadth argument is that clearly protected
speech critical of the government is swept up in the prohibition of words that
offend, deride, or annoy. Indeed, speech aimed at misconduct of municipal
employees will of course "offend and annoy" the culprits and may "deride"
them for their misfeasance. Political cartoons, for example, are drawn to
117. McConnell, supranote 103, at 48.
118. 405 U.S. 518 (1972). Even though Justice Brennan conceded arguendo that speech
constituting fighting words might be punished under Chaplinsky. See McConnell, supra note 103, at
52.
119. Gooding, 405 U.S. at 522.
120. Id.at 521.
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deride, as a pointed and pungent form of criticism. If this speech loses
constitutional protection because the reaction certified
that the barbs hit their
121
target, the nation has surrendered its birthright.
The New Hampshire statute is additionally overbroad in that it punishes
speech that offends not only the addressee, but as Justice Black later
recognized, others as well. 22 This includes the government. Chaplinsky was
convicted for saying to City Marshal Bowering that "the whole government of
Rochester are Fascists or agents of Fascists." 123 Criticism of the government
merits the highest degree of First Amendment protection.1 24 In addition, as
Justice Powell found in Lewis v. New Orleans, 25 the inclusion of penalties for
such third-party slurs on the police,26for example, facially invalidates the entire
statute on grounds of overbreadth.1
In Cantwell v. Connecticut,127 a conviction for offensive provocative
speech was voided in the absence of a statute narrowly drawn to define and
punish specific conduct presenting a clear and present danger to a substantial
interest of the state. Even if the overbreadth doctrine were limited to
"substantial overbreadth," as mandated by the Court in Broadrick v.
Oklahoma,'28 the New Hampshire statute was so substantially overbroad, both
on its face and as applied in Chaplinsky, that it could not have survived even
the diluted Broadricktest.
Two post-Broadrickcases illustrate the point. In Houston v. Hill, 29 the
Court reversed a conviction for speaking back to a police officer under an
ordinance prohibiting such speech.1 30 Justice Brennan stated that "[t]he
Constitution does not allow such speech to be made a crime. The freedom of
individuals verbally to oppose or challenge police action ...is one of the
121. As discussed in Part 1Il.D, infra, interactions with the police always present contentious
questions of criticizing official misconduct.
122. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 273 (1952).
123. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569. The fact that the indictment included criticism of the
government as well as the City Marshal indicates that shielding the government was also within the
scope of the statute.
124. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S 254, 269 (1964). See infra, Part Il.D.9,
discussing that the right to criticize the government is protected no matter how offensive the
language.
125. 408 U.S. 913 (1972).
126. See id at 914 (Powell, J., concurring).
127. 310 U.S. 296 (1942). Chaplinsky cites Cantwell for the dictum that personal epithets are
not protected, ignoring the holding that there is a First Amendment right to offensive utterances even
to the extent of provoking a violent response. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572
(1942).

128. 413 U.S. 601,615 (1973).
129. 482 U.S. 451 (1987).
130. Id.
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principal characteristics by which we distinguish a free nation from a police
state.' 13 1 The ordinance was "not narrowly tailored to prohibit only disorderly
conduct or fighting words" and hence was unconstitutionally overbroad.132 In
Board ofAirport Commissioners v. Jews for Jesus,133 the Court overturned as
facially void on grounds of overbreadth a resolution barring distribution of
religious 4literature on a pedestrian walkway in the Los Angeles International
13
Airport.

Impliedly conceding the validity of the vagueness and overbreadth
argument, the Court in Chaplinsky seeks salvation 135 in ruling that only words
that would register "fight" on the face of "men of common intelligence" is
what the statute sets as the standard. 136 That, too, was never charged, thus
confirming doubt that the statute was meant to include such words. Nor was
there any such finding. And since the Court rules out provocation as a
defense, when Chaplinsky replied in words-only words-to the verbal and
physical attacks upon him by the City Marshal, the mild response was enough
to send him to prison. How ironic that the speaker's words allegedly
provoking the City Marshal to respond in violence were held criminal while
the uttering of those words responding to provocation to physical violence by
the same public official was no defense! The only passage in his opinion
which speaks to the "the application of the statute to the facts,' 3 is that
"[a]rgument is unnecessary to demonstrate that the appellations 'damned
racketeer' and 'damn Fascists' are epithets likely to provoke...
retaliation."' 138 Because that too was never charged in the indictment,

39

the

relevance is doubtful. What is clear is that the indictment itself is facially
deficient for failing to charge in the words of the statute that the defendant,
131. Id at 462-63.
132. Id. at 465. In support of this argument, Brennan cited Lewis, 415 U.S. 1301, which
protected speech calling police officers "g[od] d[amn] mother fluckers]." Id. at 131 n. 1.
133. 482 U.S. 569 (1987).
134. Id.
135. Again, in the guise of "interpreting" the statute, the Court substituted a new statute of the
Court's own creation.
136. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573. I argue below that this is a judicial amendment, which
should never have been permitted and which fails to cure the defect in the statute. In any event,
Chaplinsky was never charged or convicted of provoking a fight.

137. Id. at 574.
138. Id.
139. It is disturbing that Justice Murphy is mindful of what is not charged in the indictment
only when the omission favors his narrow view of the subject and none other. He states that the
criminal complaint does not charge a violation of the second provision of the New Hampshire statute
pertaining to noises and exclamations, and therefore he omits all reference to it even though it is
obviously relevant to the interpretation of the first provision. Id. at 572 n.6. Yet, he fails to note the
omissions of intent pointed out above that go directly both to whether Chaplinsky violated the statute
as written and the constitutionality of the statute as applied to this defendant.
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with the intent specified in the statute, did address the statutory words to
another in the street. Further, the Court should have found that the speaker
was convicted of addressing "offensive, derisive, and annoying words" to the
complainant, it not being enough that the words used are likely to provoke a
fight.
In Terminiello v. Chicago,140 the Court struck down a statute that punished
speech that "stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, brings about a condition
of unrest, or creates a disturbance."' 14 1 The New Hampshire statute had less to
recommend than its counterpart in Terminiello and was a fortiori invalid.
There is no need to press the attack on the indefensible. What kept the New
Hampshire statute alive was the "interpretation" of the New Hampshire
Supreme Court, which in effect was a total rewriting of the statute, to insert
what the legislature omitted obviously by design, namely, a provision like
"which words provoke immediate violence by the addressee, and thus cause a
142
breach of the peace."'

The New Hampshire Supreme Court's "interpretation" of the statute
should have been declared unconstitutionally vague for another reason. The
"interpretation" of the statute was so contrived for the purpose of sustaining
the conviction of an unpopular speaker that the United States Supreme Court
should have rejected the effort for what it was. If legislative language can be
bent out of shape in so many directions, the statute has no fixed meaning and
deserves constitutional reprimand. The legislature required intent to do evil
and in the absence of that blame, acquittal is the proper response, not abolition
of the need for that essential element of crime. If blame need be assessed, it
should fall upon the State of New Hampshire and not on a speaker attempting
to vindicate his right of freedom of speech in the face of government
oppression.
The theory of the New Hampshire statute is that offensive language is not
protected speech. It would be a Pickwickian use of language to say that all
speech is protected except speech that offends. No constitution is needed to
protect speech to which no one objects. No First Amendment is required for
words that do not offend, deride, or annoy. Such concepts are not only in
jarring contretemps with the American tradition, but in the admonition
of
' 43
Justice Jackson, would produce "the unanimity of the graveyard.'

140. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
141. Id.at 2.
142. Where the legislature intends to prevent a breach of the peace, it says so. See, e.g.,
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
143. W. Va. State Bd. ofEduc. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943).

2004]

FIGHTING WORDS

b. Vagueness and Overbreadth in Other Speech Justice Murphy Interdicts
The following passages from Justice Murphy's opinion are so suffused
with vagueness and overbreadth that they invalidate the fighting words
doctrine on First Amendment grounds.
First passage:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech,
the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to
raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and
obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting"
words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed
that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas,
and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit
that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality. "Resort to epithets or personal abuse is
not in any proper sense communication of information or opinion
safeguarded by the Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act
would raise no question under that instrument. ' 144
Second passage:
On the authority of its earlier decisions, the state court declared that
the statute's purpose was to preserve the public peace, no words being
"forbidden except such as have a direct tendency to cause acts of
violence by the persons to whom, individually, the remark is
addressed." It was further said: "The word 'offensive' is not to be
defined in terms of what a particular addressee thinks ....

The test is

what men of common intelligence would understand would be words
likely to cause an average addressee to fight. ... The English language

has a number of words and expressions which by general consent are
'fighting words' when said without a disarming smile.... Such
words, as ordinary men know, are likely to cause a fight. So are
threatening, profane or obscene revilings. Derisive and annoying
144. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72. The last sentence is the dictum from Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1940), which protected the speech of a similar Jehovah Witness
preacher. It should be noted again that the first passage, which is the heart of the decision and the
basis for the doctrine of "fighting words"-and the notion of "lower value speech"--contains not
one single word that appears in the New Hampshire statute. The statute is limited to "any offensive,
derisive, or annoying word... [or] offensive or derisive name." Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569. And
none of the statutory words appears in that Murphy passage.
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words can be taken as coming within the purview of the statute as
heretofore interpreted only when they have this characteristic of
plainly tending to excite the addressee to a breach of the peace....
The statute, as construed, does no more than prohibit the face-to-face
words plainly likely to cause a breach of the peace by the addressee,
words whose speaking constitute a breach of the peace by the
speaker-including 'classical fighting words', [sic] words in current
use less 'classical' but equally likely to cause violence, and
' 45 other
disorderly words, including profanity, obscenity and threats."'
Unclear at the outset is whether the five categories marked for exclusion
from First Amendment protection, "the lewd and obscene, the profane, the
libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words"' 146 are all of the categories
exiled, or simply illustrations of those categories of words that are condemned
only when they have the alleged potential to provoke violence. In either
event, does the passage intend to say that there are further exclusions on an
entirely different basis, namely, lower value "utterances," which "are no
essential part of any exposition of ideas?" 147 Or, that lack of essentiality is an
absolute condemnation or is to be balanced against "the social interest in order
and morality"? 14 8 Or, is there still an additional disqualification of speech
that
149
"is not in any proper sense communication of information or opinion?"'
In the second passage, a Swiss cheese version of the New Hampshire
court's opinion, the most significant words in the passage-"threatening,
profane or obscene revilings . . . 'fighting' words . . . disorderly words,
including profanity, obscenity and threats"--do not appear in the New
Hampshire statute. 50 The words that do actually appear in the statute get by145. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573. The second passage is a selective quotation from the opinion
of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, with the obvious intent to cast upon it a mantle of
approval.
146. Id. at 572.
147. See id.; United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 319 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 421 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); infra note 424.
148. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. Justice Stevens writing for the Court in FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 746 (1978), adopts this interpretation as authority for banning the radio
broadcast of George Carlin's satire on freedom of speech without any suggestion of violence. See
infra Part II.D.4.
149. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. Besides questions ofvagueness and overbreadth raised here,
even had Murphy written with pellucid clarity, there are significant questions of whether such
exclusions of speech violate the First Amendment. In my view, as explained elsewhere, the answer
is plainly yes. In this connection, two recent Supreme Court cases omit fighting words from the
categories of unprotected expression. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S.765 (2002);
Ashcrofl v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002); infra Part III.
150. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573. Murphy's bowdlerization was for a different purpose, as
discussed in Part lI.D. 11, infra, namely to inject the phrase, "words which by their very utterance
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the-way treatment. "Offensive" 151 is mentioned only to say that the standard
is "men of common intelligence," and the most casual and offhand reference
is made to "derisive or annoying," as words likely to provoke a fight. There is
no attempt at definition.
The five categories of speech that the Court marked for exclusion from
constitutional protection are a farrago without any organizing principle. Nor
can one be sure that each of the five illustrations is a separate category, or
whether two or more fall within the same category. 152 Most important of all,
because they are introduced by the phrase "these include," presumably they
are illustrative only, and the First Amendment-deprived zone extends to
territories not specified.
Justice Murphy's first category is "lewd." If "lewd" stands alone, it is a
category without content, for I know of no such "well defined" class of
speech, 53 and neither the Court nor Chafee cites any. Because the passage
reads "the lewd and obscene," perhaps "obscene" is not meant to be a second
and separate category, but one and the same. If "lewd" is meant to be
synonymous with "obscene,"'' 54 even that was not "well defined" juridically at
least until Miller v. California155 in 1973, and many would argue that the 5-4
decision of the Supreme Court three decades56after Chaplinsky was so vagueeven weird-that it defies rational analysis.
Justice Murphy's third category is "the profane." It is separated by a
inflict injury," Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 527, and to delete the admonition of the New Hampshire court
that any such addition would render the statute unconstitutional.
151. The Supreme Court in Ashcroft held that "offensive" speech was protected by the

Constitution. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 244 (quoting Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of
N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 689 (1959)).
152. For example, "lewd and obscene," the only one with an "and" without a comma, may be
two categories; one category in the conjunctive; one category with one illustration; or, one category
in the disjunctive despite the conjunction. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
153. The Oxford English Dictionarygives seven definitions with subdivisions. Definition 2.c.
pertains to speech and gives two entries: "Rude, artless." Other definitions include "bad, vile, evil,
base, lascivious, [and] unchaste." 1 COMPACT EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1611

(1971). In the late nineteenth century, at the behest of anti-vice societies, police used "lewdness"
misdemeanors to harass homosexuals. Peter Edidin, Word for Word/Educating the Court; In
Changing the Law of the Land, Six Justices Turned to Its History, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2003, at 12.
154. "Lewd" is defined as "obscene; indecent." AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1035 (3d ed. 1992).
155. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).

156. For starters, it leaves to the jury the determination of what is patently offensive with little
guidance, just what is patently offensive in the local community. This is little more than censorship
by the majority, a concept anathema to the First Amendment protection of individual rights as against
the majority. In free speech cases, such determination is normally left to the judge to insulate
unpopular speech from the jury, the representatives of the majority. See Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494 (1951); ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 260-61 (Bradley ed.

1945).
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comma, indicating that it is a separate class. But in the second passage, in a
new category denominated "disorderly words, including profanity, obscenity
and threats,"' 57 obscene is uncoupled from lewd and catapulted into the land
of "disorderly words" in the vicinity of profanity and threats. Profane,
originally a bachelor without familial association, is now on a string with
"obscenity and threats," the first of which argues for sibling status, and
threats, which does not. The triplet occurs in adjectival form earlier in
passage two in the sentence, so are "threatening, profane or obscene
revilings," with the order reversed to put threats first, not last. Nor is there a
clue as to what "revilings" means, its provenance, or whether it is
independently proscribable or only proscribable when accompanied by the
statutory adjectives. The word does not appear in the statute. Because none
of these words, either alone or in combination with others, is ever defined,
there is not even a theory of definition, either alone or by association.
"Profane" hardly seems like a legal term, and is the antithesis of "well
defined and narrowly limited classes of speech."'' 58 No legal citation is given
by either the Court or Chafee. In Karlan v. City of Cincinnati,the jury was
instructed, "[p]rofane means serving to debase that which is holy or worthy of
reverence," and because such speech is protected by the First Amendment,
conviction was reversed. 59 Dictionaries give several meanings derived from
the Latin profanus meaning "'before [i.e., outside] the temple' hence 'not
sacred, common.,', 160 The Court never says whether anything defendant said
fits the definition of "profanity." Justice Murphy condemns "other disorderly
words, including profanity..., 'damn racketeer' and 'damn Fascists' [as] ...

157. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573.
158. "Profane" has been the Torquemata of the First Amendment inquisition. Great literature
targeted for book burning on grounds of "profanity" includes the best writing in the English
language, yet there is no rhyme or reason to what constitutes profanity. See, e.g., NICHOLAS
KAROLIDES ET AL., 100 BANNED BOOKS 288, 352, 367, 373, 379, 389, 396 (Ken Wachsberger ed.
1999). "Damn" was challenged as "obscene" in Fahrenheit 451. Id. at 376. In Walt Whitman's
Leaves of Grass, the Grand Jury declared that the poems were too obscene to be read by the jury
trying the criminal case that must take the word of the United States Attorney. See id. at 388. The
judge threw out the indictment. See id.
159. 416 U.S. 924, 930-32 (1974). Although this and companion cases were remanded,
Douglas dissented on the ground that they should be dismissed outright because they all involve
convictions for "mere utterance of words variously described as 'abusive,' 'vulgar,' 'insulting,'
'profane,' 'indecent,' 'boisterous,' and the like." Karlan, 416 U.S. at 924 (Douglas, J. dissenting).
160. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1425 (1971). The first definition is "not pertaining to
what is sacred or biblical."
The second definition is "applied to persons or things regarded as
unholy, or as desecrating what is holy or sacred: unhallowed." Definition three is characterized by
disregard or contempt of sacred things, especially in later use, by the taking of God's name in vain;
irreverent, blasphemous, ribald; impious. Webster's Third InternationalDictionary gives several
meanings, the most relevant being "cursing or vituperation by insulting or perverted utterance."
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epithets likely to provoke ...retaliation.' 6' However, he never specifically
says "damn" or any other words that are "profane." The loose use of this term
of
is characteristic of the Chaplinsky opinion in general: a condemnation
is. 162
speech that offends, but without saying precisely what the offense
Justice Murphy's fourth category is "the libelous." Libelous speech, as
Justice Brennan pointed out in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,163 cannot
automatically be excluded from First Amendment protection. The term
"libel" is no talisman, no taboo, and the expression must be analyzed to
determine whether there are constitutional interests to be served in protecting
the speech. The interest there, as in Chaplinsky, was the fundamental right to
criticize the government, and in both cases, that criticism was leveled at the
police chief.
In holding that even untrue statements of fact defaming the head of the
police department are protected speech unless made with "actual malice," the
Sullivan case must be considered as knocking out the lynchpin of Chaplinsky
by rejecting the categorization technique for denying per se First Amendment
protection. In any rational scheme of government, Chaplinsky's right to
criticize the police and the government for refusing to protect his freedom of
speech must command more First Amendment attention as against the claim
of offending the authorities by epithets than does the newspaper's use of false
accusation. If the First Amendment demands that the press should triumph
because of the importance of protecting the core constitutional right of
criticism of the government, the citizen critic afortiorishould not be defeated
in exercising that same right because of strong talk provoked by the
government's agent.
Justice Murphy's fifth and final category is "the insulting or 'fighting'
words-those that by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace."' 64 The maddening imprecision of this
language is antithetical to the First Amendment because precision of meaning
is essential to First Amendment analysis. The two instances of disjunctive161. Chaplinsy,315 U.S. at 573-74.
162. The 1930 Production Code of the Motion Pictures Producers and Distributors Association,
known as "The Hays Office," in the section prohibiting "profanity," listed, among others, the
following words as illustrations: broad (applied to a woman), cocotte, god, lord, jesus, christ (unless
used reverently), fairy (in a vulgar sense), finger (the), gawd, goose (in a vulgar sense), hot (applied
to a woman), damn, and hell (except in a Biblical or literary sense). The word "damn" later figured
in the film Gone With the Wind in which Clark Gable, as Rhett Butler, addressed to Vivian Leigh, as
Scarlet O'Hara, the infamous line, "Frankly, my dear, I don't give a damn." The Hays Office
imposed a fine of $5000. TIMOTHY JAY, CURSING INAMERICA 217-19 (1992).
163. 376 U.S. 254, 267 (1964).
164. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (quoting ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE
UNITED STATES 149 (1941)).
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that is the use of the word "or"-are virtually designed to confound the
reader. The first instance, "insulting or 'fighting' words" poses the question
whether there are two ideas or one. If one, then which one? If a combination
of both, is it enough that the words are "insulting," but do not provoke165a
violent response? Is the implication that by use of "insulting ... words,"
Justice Murphy meant to say that these are the words "which by their very
utterance inflict injury" and therefore on that account lose First Amendment
protection even without any prospect of violence? For example, if a student
said to her professor, "Sir, your lectures are pure nonsense!" that would be
insulting with little prospect of violence, but would it constitute fighting
words? Suppose instead of "nonsense," the word was "balderdash?" What
about "bullshit?" Suppose the
professor said to the student that these
166
words?
fighting
were
comments
Alternately, did Justice Murphy further mean to say that there is a separate
category termed "fighting words" which by definition must "tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace" 167 and need not be "insulting"? Perhaps
shouting, "Kill the motherfucker!" at a sporting event in response to a player
error might qualify. Alternatively, "Jesus is a fiction created by the church to
keep the masses in fear," to the priest at Christmas midnight mass may also
qualify.
Or, do the damned words have to be both "insulting" and "fighting"? For
example, a statement such as, "The Phillies drive us nuts because no matter
how well they start the season, they are such bums; either they throw the
games, or just don't give a damn!" Addressed to the monomaniacal Phillies
fan at Veterans Stadium right after a ninth inning error letting in the winning
run might well be considered both insulting and fighting. However, a change
in expression might yield either an insulting or a fighting phrase but not both.
The second instance of the disjunctive "or" may be even more frustrating
to one desperately seeking meaning: "words... which by their very utterance
165. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
166. Timothy Jay in Cursing in America, supra note 162, reports that his research as to what is
considered offensive depends on many more factors, including gender of the speaker and the one
spoken to, e.g., male-to-male, male-to-female, female-to-female, or female-to-male. The notion that
there is common agreement that "there are certain well-defined ...classes of speech" that incite
violence, if it was ever true, has long since passed into history. See LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 850 (2d ed. 1988). "Fascists," for example, which so aroused the ire of the
New Hampshire Supreme Court in 1941 that the word was pronounced evil until the end of time,
then accepted by the U.S. Supreme Court, is now a stigma on the Court, in line with the Scott v.
Sanford, 60 U.S. (How.) 393 (1857), and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), decisions. One
need only view cable television, visit the movies, or read Justice Harlan's opinion in Cohen v.
California to realize that that notion went out with the bowler hat and spats, and is unreal and
simplistic in the extreme. Or, in the street argot of our times, it is bullshit!
167. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
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inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breath of the peace" Whereas in
the first instance, "or" may mean "and," here, "or" clearly means "or." This
signals immediately that there are two different and distinct ideas here, that
words falling within the disputed definition may have two different effects or
consequences either one of which is sufficient
to condemn the speech and
68
deprive it of First Amendment protection.
The first idea, which I shall refer to as Category 5(a), 169 is that certain
words "by their very utterance inflict injury."' 170 Justice Murphy does not give
any definition or description of such words, nor does he disclose whether the
illustrations, or any of them, given earlier in the same sentence, fall within this
category. Nor does the Justice reveal whether Chaplinsky's speech is
included. 7 1 Because all five categories are only illustrations, presumably they
are not intended to be exhaustive, and there are still other examples, or
categories (one cannot be certain which), that are not mentioned but that have
to be contended with.
Because Justice Murphy agrees with the New Hampshire Supreme Court
that no defenses to the fighting words charge are permissible-even
provocation and assault by City Marshal Bowering-it would tend to suggest
that Chaplinsky's address to Bowering should be included in Category 5(a).
However, the extensive reliance on the emphasis of the New Hampshire
Supreme Court on words that "tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace," supports the idea that I identify as Category 5(b). But because there is
not the slightest hint that in fact Bowering responded with violence, or that
there was any likelihood that he would, either then or in the future, or that any
mythical "reasonable man" would do so either, that makes inclusion in the
5(b) "breach of the peace" category unconvincing. What is more convincing
is that even if provocation is legally a taboo defense, realism dictates that
anyone seeing what Chaplinsky had to endure would more likely sympathize
with him, not inflict upon him more violence and grief. That is, unless the
reaction to him was so tainted with hate that no court could blame him for any
ensuing violence.
168. But it is still unclear whether both alternatives apply to "insulting" and noninsulting
"fighting" words.
169. Later, I call these alternatives "Prong 1" and "Prong 2."
170. The opinion of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d 754 (N.H.
1941), which the United States Supreme Court purports to affirm and from which Justice Murphy
quotes extensively, omits all reference to words themselves inflicting injury. Justice Murphy makes
no comment on the omission, or his reason for adding it, and any authority therefor.
171. As will be seen, because the Court permits no defenses, even provocation by the City
Marshal, that would tend to inclusion in the category of words themselves inflicting injury.
However, because of the extensive reliance on the emphasis of the court below, words that breed
violence is a candidate, too.
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Justice Murphy confuses further whether 5(a) or 5(b) is the intended
choice. He writes, "[t]he statute... does no more than prohibit the face-toface words plainly likely to cause a breach of the peace by the addressee,
172
words whose speaking constitutes a breach of the peace by the speaker."'
Aside from the problematical grammar, the meaning appears to be that the
speaker commits a breach of the peace by merely speaking words that "by
their very utterance inflict injury,"
no matter how mild the vocabulary and
173
how dulcet the tone of voice.
It would also apply to the words of Mike Tyson to a paraplegic where
there is no possibility of a violent response. This would suggest Category 5(a).
However, in the next paragraph, again purporting to demonstrate that the
statute is narrowly drawn so as not to violate the First Amendment, Justice
Murphy says the statute punishes "the use in a public place of words likely to
cause a breach of the peace."' 174 This would fall into Category 5(b). The
"injury" alluded to by the Court in Category 5(a) is nowhere defined or
explained. Presumably, it is different from "breach of the peace" in Category
5(b) because the tendency to an immediate breach of the peace is specified
only in 5(b).
Focusing on the second passage, "annoying" is the word perhaps most
devoid of meaning and impossibly vague, as discussed above, 175 and it adds
not an iota of definiteness now that it comes repackaged with the standardless
criterion of "what men of common intelligence understand would be words
likely to cause an average addressee to fight."'176 This is the clearest
admission of vagueness and the need for remedy inspired by Justice
Cardozo's trenchant observation: "Danger invites rescue."' 177 Justice Murphy
attempts to paper over with words what words cannot do! As mentioned
above, the standard is no standard at all.178 And in the First Amendment area,
where the government is seeking to punish speech, the burden should be
higher than anywhere else-strict scrutiny, at least, if not absolute
protection. 179
172. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573 (emphasis added).
173. Id.at 572. So long as it is "said without a disarming smile." Id.at 573. That adds further
to the contention that the fighting words doctrine, as "defined" by the Court, is unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad.
174. Id.
175. See, e.g., supra notes 112-14.
176. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573.
177. Wagner v. Int'l Ry. Co., 133 N.E. 437 (N.Y. 1921).
178. See McConnell, supra note 103, at 48. The Professor, now Judge, Michael McConnell,
criticizes Justice O'Connor's standard of what "an objective observer ...would perceive," in her
opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985).
179. Based on the language of the First Amendment that the government "shall make no law..
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Allowing censors cannot be tolerated. Would juries-and even judgesbe disqualified to sit on such cases without proof that they were "men of
common intelligence"? And what would be the proof of the "average
addressee?" A specimen of the targeted group? In Chaplinsky, for example,
would it be the average police officer, as suggested by Justice Powell in Lewis
v. New Orleans,'80 or the average police chief? And is testimony required on
how frequently the addressee has heard the epithet and what percentage of
time the addressee has reacted with violence? Or was incited to act but did
not because of practiced restraint? Or had insufficient physical ability to do
so? Or was too distant because the addressee heard the insult on the
telephone, 81 or was at a distance beyond the reach of the fist' 82 or nightstick?
Or, in the case of a racial slur, who is the average racial victim? And as to the
average minority person, is it relevant that experience teaches that abuse is to
be tolerated? And
in the case of a sexual slur against a woman, who is the
83
average female?1

Giving the jury the power to determine what words will put the speaker
behind bars is about as anathema to the concept of the individual liberty to
speak as the fertility of noir imagination could conceive. As Tocqueville
observed,8 4 juries are representatives of the majority and to put them in
•abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. CONST. amend I; see also Republican Party of Minn. v.
White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (stating that unless it falls within a valid exception, speech is absolutely
protected).
180. 415 U.S. 130 (1974).
181. Professor Greenawalt would encompass within the fighting words crime provocative
speech on the telephone on the ground that the speaker should not escape punishment just because
the listener is not within striking distance. See supra note 9. 1 suggest that this not only contradicts
the basic rationale Justice Murphy asserts for the fighting words doctrine, but ratchets up an illconceived notion to its logical absurdity.
182. As in a passing vehicle? The Texas Court of Appeals, Third District, in Coggin v. State,
123 S.W.3d 82, 85 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003), ruled 2-1 that "the ancient gesture of digitus impudicus'impudent finger' to the Romans" by one motorist to another did not amount to fighting words
because it did not tend "to incite an immediate breach of the peace." Ralph Blumenthal, Texas Court
Gives Sanction to a Gesture, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 16, 2003, at A21. The same gesture in the form of a
cactus in the desert appeared on the September 20, 2003 cover of The Economist, with the caption,
"Champions of the world's poor are celebrating the collapse of global trade talks in Cancun."
183. See Cynthia Bowman, Street Harassmentand the Informal Ghettoization of Women, 106
HARV. L. REv. 517 (1993).
184. See Burton Caine, Judicial Review-Democracy Versus Constitutionality,56 TEMPLE L.
QUARTERLY 297, 325 (1983), quoting from de Tocqueville's Democracy in America, where the
author observed:
When a man or party suffers an injustice in the United States, to whom can he turn? To
public opinion? That is what forms the majority. To the legislative body? It represents the
majority and obeys it blindly. To the executive power? It is appointed by the majority and
serves as its passive instrument. To the police? They are nothing but the majority under
arms. A jury? A jury is the majority vested with the right to pronounce judgment; even the
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charge of what the minority can say-and often the most "unpopular"
minority individual-is putting individual liberty in the hands of its mortal
enemy from whom the First Amendment was supposed to provide protection.
Justice Stevens supplies a modem concurrence:
"[T]he majoritarian
process ... guarantees,
by
definition,
that
minority...
views will be
185
effectively silenced."'
Justice Murphy injected intolerable vagueness by adding the primary
definition of fighting words as "words... which by their very utterance
inflict injury.' ' 186 Not only does this not appear in the state court opinion, but
in the view of that court, it would have rendered the statute unconstitutionally
vague. Justice Murphy found it essential to adopt the New Hampshire
Supreme Court reading of the statute to sustain its constitutionality. Yet, by
injecting this incomprehensible new interpretation, 187 Justice Murphy
devastates the rule he purports to adopt!
And what does "without a disarming smile"1 88 mean? What could be
more plagued by vagueness? Is it a metaphor for requiring intent to injure, as
argued below?1 89 Something else? Are we left to Justice Potter Stewart's
confession of analytical bankruptcy: "But I know it when I see it"? 1 90 If one
hurls an ethnic epithet at another with a laugh, does that qualify as
"disarming"? Suppose it is addressed to a person of the same ethnicity but
without a smile? Is Professor Randall Kennedy correct that such an address
might be considered affectionate and a symbol of camaraderie? 19' Justice
judges in certain states are elected by the majority.
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 260-61 (Bradley ed. 1945).
185. Santa Fe Indep. Supreme Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 304 (2000).
186. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
187. That addition may prove too much. That is, in Justice Murphy's mind, the evidence
precluded the possibility of violence, or provocation, and to sustain the conviction, he needed to
invent the crime of words themselves inflicting injury, without bothering to explain what that injury
was or could be. Or, in the alternative, he read the statute to criminalize speech notwithstanding the
requirement of provocation to violence that the New Hampshire Supreme Court inserted in its effort
to save the statute from patent unconstitutionality. The point is that the entire Supreme Court opinion
is so vague, confusing, and overbroad that it chills speech and cries out for reversal.
188. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573.
189. See infra Part II.E. 1.
190. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). Confessing the
impossibility of defining the standard for condemning the depiction of "sex in a fundamentally
offensive manner," Justice Stewart said, "perhaps I could never succeed in intelligently doing so" but
"the motion picture involved in this case is not that." Id. The vagueness implicit in such facial
gestures is emphasized in the recent report of Robert McNamara, defending his actions as Secretary
of Defense during the Vietnam War: "The... saddest lesson is delivered by Mr. McNamara with a
rueful you-know-what-I-mean smile: 'You can't change human nature."' Stephen Holden, Revisiting
McNamara and the War He Headed, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2003, at B9.
191. See RANDALL KENNEDY, NIGGER: THE STRANGE CAREER OF A TROUBLESOME WORD
159-71 (2002); see also OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, ad loc. Nigger, and illustrations listed.
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Murphy's allusion is as "enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called upon to
interpret for Pharaoh,"'' 92 the smile on the face of the Mona Lisa, and as with
the Leonardo da Vinci painting, it is no laughing matter. This is surely one of
the most mischievous and bedeviling phrases to appear in a ruling from the
highest tribunal in the land.
It is rare to find such a ragged miscellany of words in any Supreme Court
opinion. And the effect is to give "ordinary men" a hunting license to
assassinate the First Amendment. There is little wonder that the United States
Supreme Court has not sustained a conviction for fighting words since 1942,
and then only once. Holmes said that "a page of history is worth a volume of
logic.' ' 193 He meant that logic can be sunk by history. Chaplinsky fulfills the
adage by saying that the individual's right to freedom of speech can be sunk
by popular prejudice-the danger the First Amendment was crafted to
prevent.
In view of the wanton disorder revealed by the Murphy opinion, the new
"objective" standard does not cure any defect but simply emphasizes the need
for overruling the decision and returning to First Amendment precincts.
"[A]n 'objective observer' cannot substitute for a constitutional standard"
since it "depends entirely on the observer's view ...and we would know
nothing more than [that the observer] will decide cases the way [he] think[s]
they should be decided."'' 94195 Obviously, this does not cure the defects of
vagueness and overbreadth.
Gooding v. Wilson'96 struck down a Georgia statute that two Justices
found to be in the Chaplinsky mold' 97 on grounds of overbreadth and

vagueness. 198 In language most relevant here, Justice Brennan said "that
broad standard effectively 'licenses the jury to create its own standard in each
case."' 199 Even more ominous, as Justice Douglas emphasized in invalidating
the "vagrancy" ordinance in Papachristouv. City of Jacksonville,200 the lack
192. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
193. See N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
194. See McConnell, supra note 103.
195. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573. As explained elsewhere, employing a hostile response to
cure inherently vague and limitless words converts First Amendment protection into a trap.
196. 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
197. See id at 528 (Burger, J., and Blackmun, J., dissenting).

198. Gooding,405 U.S. 518.
199. Id. at 528 (quoting Hemdon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 263 (1937)).
200. 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1972). Justice Jackson wrote:
Where, as here there are no standards governing the exercise of discretion granted by the
ordinance, the scheme permits and encourages an arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement
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of standards gives the police free reign to prosecute unpopular groups. Both
defects are virtually conceded by both courts in Chaplinsky by reason of the
extensive maneuvers they employ to circumvent these constitutional
bulwarks.
As noted above, Justice Murphy focuses on words that "have a direct
tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to whom, individually, the
remark is addressed., 20 Causing a breach of the peace by the addressee, for
all of the difficulties it raises, 20 2 is at least in some measure comprehensible.
"[W]ords whose speaking constitutes a breach of the peace,, 20 3 is not. The
Court never says that Chaplinsky committed a breach of the peace by calling
the City of Rochester and its police chief "damned Fascists," but because it
appears to be one of the alternative possible theories adumbrated by the
opinion, one must assume that Chaplinsky committed a breach of peace and
such theory would posit that the defendant, besieged by the crowd that the
police actively refused to discourage, shouted in an excited tone of voice in an
already explosive situation. Otherwise, mention of breach of the peace is also
puzzling.
The illustrations given by Justice Murphy create more problems because
twice the Court uses "including" to emphasize they are selective only and
there is no clue what else may be embraced. Also, there are no definitions of
terms such as "classical fighting words '20 4 and "words in current use less
'classical' but equally likely to cause violence. 20 5 Added confusion comes
20 6
with "other disorderly words, including profanity, obscenity and threats.,
"Disorderly" is more commonly used to describe conduct, not language, as,
for example, words screamed out in the silence of a sanctuary during
meditation. There is no hint of that here. The phrase is virtually an
oxymoron. In what sense are profanity, obscenity, and threats "disorderly"?
The three words do not seem to have enough in common to earn inclusion in
any single category and surely not one with no fixed boundary. Profanity is
not a legal term but instead seems to be a lay term for "obscenity," and in that
sense, seems to be contradictory. "Obscenity and threats" struggle for entry
into the legal lexicon.
of law. It furnishes a convenient tool for "harsh and discriminatory enforcement by local
prosecuting officials, against particular groups deemed to merit their displeasure."
Id.at 170 (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940)).
201. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573.
202. Such as limitation of freedom of speech because of a hostile audience. See Terminiello v.
City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
203. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573.

204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
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Are these "other disorderly words" undefined fighting words?
Presumably not because they are listed under a different rubric-"disorderly."
One who could claim that reference is not vague is not attuned to the meaning
of the word.
Moreover, as indicated above and as argued elsewhere in this Article,
"profanity" has no agreed-upon meaning.207 "Obscenity" before Miller v.
California20 8 threw what "Justice Harlan called 'the intractable obscenity
problem"' to the juries to determine the contemporary standards of each state
under guidelines that basically make the people of each region censors.20 9
The conviction was reversed because California had no standards. There were
three dissents to the new definition of obscenity; among them was a dissent by
Justice Douglas, who wrote, "[o]bscenity-which even we cannot define with
precision-is a hodge-podge. To send men to jail for violating standards they
cannot understand, construe, and apply is a monstrous thing to do in a Nation
dedicated to fair trials and due process., 2 10 During the thirty-one years
between Chaplinsky and Miller, in the absence of a solution to the problem of
vagueness, convictions for "obscenity" were routinely reversed.
The Miller majority understood that it was not solving the problem of
vagueness in the definition of obscenity but hoped that by requiring as a
matter of constitutional law that individual states define with the utmost
precision what was interdicted, it would make the problem go away. This
subsequent history confirms that Chaplinsky was less than candid in
pretending that it solved the problem of vagueness even as to the definition of
"obscenity." The "hodge-podge" Justice Douglas referred to aptly fits the
definition of fighting words in Chaplinsky.21 1 It seems obvious on the face of
it that under the Chaplinsky standard, whatever words an average person
believes are sufficiently offensive to lead the average person to fight are
simply not tolerable in a society that is dedicated to the proposition that any
chilling effect on the exercise of freedom of speech is unconstitutional.2 12
The book Cursing in America 21 is an in depth psycholinguistic study of
what speech offends and under what circumstances, with myriads of charts
and tables that confirm the complexities of the task of making any
interpretation without carefully evaluating dozens of factors never even
considered in Chaplinsky. Despite the wealth of scientific evidence, the
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

See supra notes 158-62.
413 U.S. 15 (1973).
Id.at 16.
Id.at 43-44 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 539 (1985).
See Reno v,ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
JAY, supra note 162.
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author of Cursing in America maps out essential areas for still further study.
In comparison, the Supreme Court opinion in Chaplinsky underwhelms.214
To the extent that Chaplinsky holds that offensive speech is not
constitutionally protected-and a fair analysis of the opinion leads to that
conclusion-the answer comes from the First Amendment itself, which
215
protects all speech without limitation. In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,
a recent First Amendment ruling, Justice Kennedy said, "the fact that' 2society
16
may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it.
The more offensive the speech, the more the need for protection from the
majority which is offended by it. No First Amendment is needed to protect
popular speech, that is, what the people like. All countries do that. This
country was supposed to be different in that even the most vile and
reprehensible speech is protected. The First Amendment is not for the
protection of the ugly and the scurrilous, but because the alternative of not
protecting it is worse. That is, censorship requires censors, and they
determine who shall be permitted to speak and who shall not. The only
question is who the censors are. In this case, they were the majority, exactly
what the First Amendment was designed to prohibit. The First Amendment
makes this clear. The language is susceptible to no other interpretation. To
deny that result is to subvert the greatest protection for expression ever
devised by any society. Justice Harlan got it right when he applied this
fundamental American doctrine to permit "Fuck the Draft" in a protest against
the war in Vietnam.217 He said, "[b]ecause governmental officials cannot
make principled distinctions in this area ...
the Constitution leaves matters of
' 2 18
taste and style... largely to the individual.
The New Hampshire statute essentially punishes words and noises
intended to offend. The infelicities of language stretch the possibilities of
meaning to the point of a virtual demonstration project. The New Hampshire
Supreme Court pushed the envelope to the extent that it would criminalize
"noises or exclamations, possibly not directed to the person derided, but with
[intent to do so]. ' ' 219 A statute so rich in ambiguity spawning ingenuity of
crimes cannot pass the basic test of due process of law, let alone the First
214. For example, there are charts analyzing 2171 utterances broken down by sex of speaker or
sex of company. Included are racial, sexual, and religious epithets. Id.at 124-38. The author also
prepared a detailed study proving that "asshole" addressed by a suspect to the police was not within
the definition of fighting words, as the prosecution had charged. Id.at 200-02. On the strength of
this research, defendant was acquitted.
215. 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
216. Id.at 245 (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978)).
217. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
218. Id.
219. See supra note 36 and accompanying text for additional possible violations.
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Amendment.
No wonder then that the New Hampshire court substituted for such a
defective product a judicial construct designed to make a better effort and
sufficiently serviceable to be accepted by a gullible United States Supreme
Court in the mood for new restraints on freedom of expression. 22' The
substitution replaced a ban on offensive speech with a proscription on
provoking a breach of the peace by use of words that a mythical man of
common intelligence would find offensive enough to provoke an average
addressee to fight; the shift in emphasis and means was designed to obviate
the glaring First Amendment difficulties. Stopping here seems more liable to
emphasize the difficulties rather than solve them. 22' No matter how intelligent
or common the man and no matter how average the addressee, it cannot mask
the fact that the judgments are so subjective as to fall squarely within the
2 22 that
condemnation for vagueness of Coates v. Cincinnati
"no standard of
conduct is specified at all., 223 That may do in deciding negligence cases but
is woefully inadequate in deciding whether to imprison a speaker for
exercising cherished First Amendment rights.
Even as rewritten to add the notion of inciting a breach of the peace, the
statute suffers from the same endemic maladies. So another judicial construct
is supplied, namely, "what men of common intelligence would understand
would be words likely to cause an average addressee to fight., 224 Even if
converting the statute from a penalty for offensive speech to a prevention of
violence may serve as a deus ex machina in the hands of the New Hampshire
court and the United States Supreme Court, it does not work to sustain the
eight-word crime added by Justice Murphy after the case reached the high
court, namely, "words... which by their very utterance inflict injury. '225 The
language excludes violence or the threat of it. 226 Here, the mythical "men of
220. And inserting another of its own invention: words inflicting injury. See infra notes 18687 and accompanying text.
221. But the Court did not stop here. As discussed throughout this Article, the Court sprinkled
the path to "fighting words" with so many land mines as to varieties of speech allegedly not
protected, and whether they are or are not included within the definition of "fighting words," as to
generate new confusion amounting to vagueness of constitutional dimensions.
222. 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971).
223. Id.
224. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573.
225. Id. at 572.
226. The New Hampshire Supreme Court could not have invented a rationale for that offense
for two reasons, which are elaborated upon in Part II of this Article. First, the court conditioned its
finding of constitutionality entirely on provoking violence. Second, it never cited Professor Chafee
for anything, nor showed any recognition of any crime attributed to his work. A reasonable inference
is that both reasons are interrelated. That is, the interpretation Justice Murphy ascribes to Chafee
contradicts the New Hampshire court's insistence that more than words alone are needed to save the
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common intelligence" are without function because violence is precluded.
They are rendered hollow men indeed! 227 And in the process, no one even
attempted to define the new criminal offense or give even a clue what it could
mean. This compounds the problem of vagueness and overbreadth of the
statute beyond all possibility of redemption.
As to the second crime listed by Justice Murphy, provoking violence, the
question now is "what men of common intelligence would understand would
be words likely to cause an average addressee to fight"? 228 Should we assume

that "men of common intelligence" and "an average addressee" are the same,
although differences in language in the same sentence ordinarily would signal
differences in concept? Much as Justice Murphy struggled mightily to find
famous quip:
certainty of meaning, his labors summon up Mark Twain's
22 9
it."
understand
don't
I
more
the
it,
explain
"The more you
Although Justice Murphy saw no difficulty in empowering juries to
imprison speakers if their words caused the prescribed risk of violent reaction,
I suggest that not only is the standard no standard at all, but also is the death
knell to meaningful freedom of expression. As to the police, with whom the
"average" person has the most contact with government, Justice Murphy's
rule turns the Constitution upside down by making the "person" cower and by
permitting the official to be the intimidator. It undermines what Justice
Brennan termed the "profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that
it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks on government and public officials. 23 °
Chaplinsky's remarks to the police chief seem to be a parade example.
Justice Brennan emphasized that public officials must tolerate criticism of
their official conduct even if the words are untrue and injurious to their
reputation. Even as to others, not public officials, Justice Murphy's scheme is
a formula for trading individual liberty of expression, the gem in the diadem
statute from unconstitutionality.
227. The vagueness is compounded by the fact that this phrase dangles on the near end of a
disjunctive. Added to the problem of meaning is the speculation that whatever it was intended to
mean it is no longer a problem because the Court has abandoned it. See TRIBE, supra note 166, at 46.

228. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573.
229. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 213-14 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting). "I give up.
Now I realize fully what Mark Twain meant when he said, 'The more you explain it, the more I don't
understand it." The Supreme Court would do well to heed Justice Frankfurter's sagacious advice in
reversing his admittedly incorrect decision when he said, "Ishall not compound error by pushing that
decision still further .... Wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought not reject it merely
because it comes late." Henslee v. Union Planters Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595, 600 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
230. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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of American liberty, for censorship, the quintessential enemy of freedom. As
said above, no matter how popularly packaged, that censorship represents
what Tocqueville calls the "tyranny of the majority. ' 23 '

Modem First

Amendment observers in trenchant critiques express the same view on the
entire notion spawned by Chaplinsky of "low value speech" as tantamount to
the majority sitting in judgment of who is entitled to freedom of speech. For
example, Shaman assesses the impact of the Low Value Speech Doctrine, and
lists as the first consideration the limited judicial control "on censorship by
the majority, for it defines speech as unworthy of protection in precisely those
cases where it most seriously threatens majority values and where protection
is needed most. '232 Justice Brennan admonishes that minority rights to speak
in customary argot are threatened-a value that the First Amendment was
designed to protect. 233
The assurance of Justice Murphy that the statute is narrowly drawn to
avoid invading the territory of freedom of expression is little more than an
abdication to juries as to what speech shall be free. Since the First
Amendment is a protection of individual rights as against the people, the
majority, the rule in Chaplinsky is as anathema to free speech as the Court
234
could conceive. In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,
Justice Jackson in upholding the right under the First Amendment to refuse to
salute the flag,23 5 wrote, "[t]he very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to...
[place certain subjects] beyond the reach of majorities.. .. One's right to...
free speech ... may not be submitted to vote, [it] depend[s] on the outcome of
no elections. 23 6
It bears repetition that assigning to juries, or even to courts, the right to
determine what is offensive enough to be considered likely to incite violence
by the listener and thus stripped of First Amendment protection "would make
a shambles of the First Amendment., 237 In protecting the antiwar slogan
231. See Caine, supra note 184, at 325.
232. Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Theory of Low Value Speech, 48 SMU L. REv. 297, 339, 348
(1995); see also STONE ET. AL, supra note 3, at 280. Consideration number three is that the use of
"low value speech" is masked by a "result-oriented approach that is subject to an endless expansion
of the list of 'low' value categories 'whenever another kind of expression [gains] a renewed
disfavor."' Shaman (apparently with the authors in agreement) urges substituting "harm" as the
talisman for impermissible speech when both logic and experience would demand a return to the
language of the First Amendment, which exiles no speech on any basis. Shaman, supra at 348.
233. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 776 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
234. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
235. "President Truman likened Thomas Dewey to 'Hitler as Fascists' tool."' Elisabeth
Bumiller, If You Can't Say Anything Nice, Run for President,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2004, at Week in
Review, at 5.
236. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 638.
237. New York Times Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713, 715 (1971) (Black, J. concurring).
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"Fuck the Draft," Justice Harlan recited "the usual rule that governmental
,,238
He
bodies may not prescribe the form or content of individual expression.
' 239
word?
offensive
other
asked, "[h]ow is one to distinguish this from any
His answer has become an American classic: "[O]ne man's vulgarity is
another's lyric... because government officials cannot make principled
distinctions in this area that the Constitution leaves matters of taste and style
so largely to the individual. 2 40 Perhaps the most percipient and realistic
comment on freedom of speech for the individual in our democracy was made
by this conservative Justice when he said:
[W]ords are often chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive
force.., which practically speaking, may often be the more important
element of the overall message ....[W]e cannot indulge the facile
assumption that one can forbid particular words without also running a
substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process. Indeed,
governments might soon seize upon the censorship of particular words
as a convenient guise for banning the expression of unpopular
views. 241
"Unpopular," that is, the people are opposed to it, again emphasizes that
the First Amendment free speech clause is an individual right which is
absolute as against "the people," the majority. Often, hidden in this phrase
"expression of unpopular views," is a reference to minorities, including racial
minorities. Justice Brennan, in his dissent in FCC v. PacificaFoundation,242
was alert to the suppression of certain words as a manifestation of racial
prejudice against blacks because the language denied First Amendment
protection was common speech of African-Americans and "considered neither
obscene nor derogatory in the [black] vernacular., 243 The message was that
government considers black and other minority speech not fit for public
broadcast because many of them "talk differently from the Members of this
Court and.., do not share their fragile sensibilities." 2 " As shown in a
subsequent Section of this Article, the career of fighting words in state courts

238. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
239. Id. at 25. Although Harlan was referring to the word "fuck," Spencer Coxe, Executive
Director of the American Civil Liberties Union in Philadelphia, thought the offending word was
"Draft!"
240. Id.
241. Id.at26.

242. 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
243. Id.at 776 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
dissenting).
244. Id.at 775 (Brennan, J.,
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is marked by prejudice against black speakers to white police officers.24 5
The bom-again statute is unconstitutionally vague for another important
reason. It does not say whether it can reasonably be read to permit
Chaplinsky to be convicted without insulting Bowering, the marshal
addressed by Chaplinsky, nor making any reference to him. The statute in the
first part, the only section under which Chaplinsky was charged, requires only
that, "[n]o person shall address any offensive, derisive or annoying word to
any other person,.. . nor call him by any offensive or derisive name." 246
The first phrase does not require that the insult i.e., the "offensive,
derisive, or annoying word," relate to the addressee. In contrast, the second
phrase-"call him by any offensive or derisive name"--does. Neither
requires that the words be uttered "in his presence and hearing," as does the
provision-not charged-pertaining to noise and exclamations. 247 The first
two phrases are in the disjunctive, emphasizing the contrast between insulting
only the addressee and insulting others. Upon similar reasoning, it is not even
clear whether the statute encompasses oral, as against written address.
Thus, one could be convicted without demeaning the person addressed,
only third persons, and even the government. Thus, Chaplinsky might well
have been convicted for saying to the City Marshal the last eleven words set
forth in the indictment, i.e., "[t]he whole government of Rochester are
Fascists or agent of Fascists., 248 New Hampshire obviously so interpreted the
statute because it included these crucial words in the charge. 49
Under these circumstances, the Court permits the state to punish any
criticism of the government, or any other third person or institution, so long as
the words used are "offensive, derisive and annoying" to any hearer. Thus,
for example, "your boss is incompetent" and "your boss is viciously antiCatholic" might be considered a violation of the New Hampshire statute
because the words may be considered "offensive, derisive, and annoying"
when spoken to a devoted subordinate.
He
Justice Murphy poses no objection and apparently concurs. 250
245. See also JAY, supranote 162, at 204.
246. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 569 (1942) (emphasis added).
247. It will be recalled that the New Hampshire court said that violation could come where
noises or exclamations were not directed to the person derided, making the statute positively weird
and crying for invalidation on a common sense basis, if not by constitutional law.
248. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569.
249. The indictment also charged that defendant called Marshal Bowering "a God damned
racketeer" and "a damned Fascist." Id. Because there was no jury finding on the point, Chaplinsky
might very well have been convicted for insulting the government, rather than the City Marshal.
250. Id. at 574 (dealing with "epithets likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and
thereby cause a breach of the peace"). The Court cites "the appellations 'damned racketeer"' and
'damned Fascists,"' i.e., those which "call him [an] offensive name" (phrase one). But, I submit,
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emphasizes that the state court limited the reach of the statute to "the use in a
public place of words likely to cause a breach of the peace.", 25' That is just as
likely, or unlikely, to occur if someone insults another's friends, family, or
superiors, as if the insult was aimed at the addressee. "Your mother is
sexually promiscuous," addressed to an athletic young male, might be
considered to be within the purview of phrase I of the statute. So would,
"The District Attorney is a wretched public servant because he is motivated
by politics, not justice!" addressed to the DA's adoring law clerk.
The Court then reviewed the facts finding "no substantial dispute"
principally because those relied upon by Chaplinsky to prove his mission "to
preach the true facts of the Bible," the truth of the words spoken, and the
provocation by the City Marshal, were deemed irrelevant by the courts below,
and that decision was affirmed with little consideration. 2
Specifically, the Court's analysis of the intent provision of the statute and
the decision of the New Hampshire Supreme Court demonstrate the fatal
flaws of the Chaplinsky decision, and the serious problems the decision poses
for freedom of speech.253
3. Chaplinsky Was Wrong in Limiting the First Amendment Solely to the
Search for Truth, Communication of Information, or Opinion
Justice Murphy was wrong to limit First Amendment protection to speech
that furthers the search for truth. His reliance in Chaplinsky on Chafee for
this purpose is contradicted by Chafee himself in his statement that the First
Amendment added protections for the search for truth and its dissemination,
"to safeguard of political discussion.... [to] safeguard scientific and
religiousfreedom., 254 Religious freedom, for example, has nothing to do with
truth or its pursuit. Indeed, illustrations are legion that some religious
precepts are clearly not true, at least in the scientific sense of capable of proof,
for example, the existence of God. In some cases they are demonstrably false,

there was no intent to exclude the similar epithets pertaining to the other government officials for
which he was convicted and the conviction was affirmed. That is, unless it can be said that the City
Marshal was also included indirectly in the "whole government of Rochester" criticized by
Chaplinsky. Id. at 569. That would seem to run counter to Chaplinsky's plain intent to criticize
Bowering personally for not protecting the defendant's right to freedom of expression, and then to
extend the complaint to other government officials as well.
251. Id. at 573.
252. See id. at 570, 574.
253. 1 also maintain in Part I.E.A, infra, that on the intent issue alone, the Supreme Court
should have voided the state conviction.
254. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 150 (1941) (1946
printing) (emphasis added).
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such as religious stories regarding the creation of the earth and all its hosts.255
Even demonstrably untrue statements of fact may be protected speech,
contribute to the great debate, what Chafee calls
however, because they
25 6
"political discussion.,

The limitations on First Amendment protection have never been
definitively announced in any opinion of the United States Supreme Court,
and Chaplinsky would be in error in assuming that they have. The search for
truth is only one consideration and goal. Justice Brandeis' passionate defense
of freedom of expression in Whitney v. California25 7 ranges far beyond the
pursuit of truth and rejects any such limitation. He wrote, "[t]hose who won
our independence ... valued liberty both as an end and as a means... [and]
that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people. 258
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 259 squarely rejects the principle that the
First Amendment is limited to the quest for truth. "For the Constitution
protects expression and association without regard to the race, creed, or
political or religious affiliation of the members of the group which invokes its
shield, or to the truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs
which are offered., 260 New York Times protects the right to criticize the
261
government as a First Amendment core value-even if the speech is false!
Justice Brennan asserted that the First Amendment constituted "a profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement,
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public
officials. 262
In Mills v. Alabama,263 Justice Black affirmed that "there is practically
universal agreement that a major purpose of [the First Amendment] was to
protect the free discussion of governmental affairs." 264 So important is free
speech vis-d-vis the government that Justice Black would give it absolute
255. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (holding that the Biblical account of
creation is not "science," not fact, and is religion).
256. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269, 301 (1964); JOHN STUART MILL,
THE BASIC WRITINGS OF JOHN STUART MILL (Modem Library ed. 2002) (1859).

257. 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
258. Id. at 375.
259. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
260. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444-45 (1963).
261. Defendants in a libel case made misstatements of fact placed in ads in the New York
Times. The Court in a opinion by Justice Brennan held the speech protected because there was no
proof that the error was committed with actual malice. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 292.
262. Id. at 270.
263. 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
264. Id. at 218; see SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 3, at 1055.
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protection even where it consists of revealing secret documents purloined
from the government. 265 Even if obtaining the information is criminal,
protecting the government from revealing it, Justice Black asserted, "would
make a shambles of the First Amendment. ' ' 266 By comparison, Justice
Murphy's refusal to protect speech in Chaplinsky, because it allegedly was
offensive to a police chief, is constitutionally puny, and palpably absurd. The
kindest comment is that it is out-of-date, but even there the notion of
"presentism ' '267 cannot be summoned in its defense.
The First Amendment itself is apodictic in the protection of freedom of
expression and implicitly rejects any theory of free speech, which necessarily
acts as a limitation. 268 Not to read the First Amendment as written is to doubt
that its author, James Madison, knew the English language. Perhaps Justice
Black said it best when rejecting "balancing" away free speech because "the
First Amendment's unequivocal command that there shall be no abridgement
of the rights of free speech and assembly shows that the men who drafted our
269
Bill of Rights did all the 'balancing' that was to be done.,
Justice Aharon Barak, now President of the Supreme Court of Israel and a
most perspicacious and insightful scholar of the law in the grandest sense,270
has listed several theories underlying free speech in a democratic society even
without a constitution. In Kahane v. Broadcasting Authority Management
Board,2 7' the Supreme Court of Israel rejected the argument that racist speech
should not be protected because "racism is fundamentally false, and cannot
contribute to the finding of truth.2 1 72 Justice Barak, quoting widely from legal
authorities in many countries, including the United States, says that limiting
freedom of speech solely to the search for truth ignores other justifications for
that fundamental liberty, including the need for human fulfillment, and "the
existence and development of democracy. 273 As Justice Barak notes,
freedom of speech "is also the freedom to express dangerous, annoying and
265. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (Black, J., concurring).
266. Id.at 715 (Black, J. concurring).
267. That is, explicable in its time. But I contend that Chaplinsky was wrong and indefensible
when decided.
268. See Thomas 1. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the FirstAmendment, 72 YALE L.J.

878-87 (1963).
269. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 61 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting). Justice
Black added, 'I fear that the creation of 'tests' by which speech is left unprotected under certain
circumstances is a standing invitation to abridge it." Id.at 63.
270. See Aharon Barak, The Supreme Court 2001 Tenn, Foreword:A Judge on Judging: The
Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16 (2002).
271. H.C.399/85 41(3) P.D.255 (Isr. 1986).

272. Id.
273. Id.
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deviant views, which the public abhors and hates. 274 In this connection,
Justice Barak quotes Justice Jackson in West Virginia State Board of
Education: "But freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter
much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is
the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of existing order." 275 Justice
Barak continues, "[f]reedom of speech is not just freedom to express things
calmly and pleasantly. It includes the freedom to shout and hurt the
listener., 276 From this meaning of free speech, Justice
Barak concludes,
277
"democracy will emerge strengthened and more robust."
What Justice Barak and the authorities he amassed proclaim is even more
potent as applied to criticism of government and its officials. In New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan,278 Justice Brennan said that the core value of the First
Amendment is the right to criticize the government-there the police chiefand that right is so vital in a democratic society that it prevails even if the
speech is false and injures official reputations.27 9
In ranging far beyond the limitations of Justice Murphy's search-for-truth
rationale, Barak's formulation adumbrates First Amendment theory under the
U.S. Constitution. Sullivan and Gunther list at least three principle values:
"[a]dvancing knowledge and 'truth' in the 'marketplace of ideas,' facilitating
representative democracy and self government, [and] promoting individual
autonomy, self-expression, and self fulfillment." 280 Many cases illustrate each
of these theories in action. For example, Justice Brennan, in a passage
particularly applicable to Chaplinsky's criticism of the Rochester city
government and its chief of police, emphasized that, "speech about 'the
manner in which government is operated or should be operated' is an essential
part of the communications necessary for self-governance
the protection of
28
which was a central purpose of the First Amendment., 1
Limiting free speech to the revelation of truth obscures the necessary evil
it spawns, namely, it pronounces government as the arbiter of truth and its
ultimate censor, and without official imprimatur, the citizen speaker risks
prison. Nothing could be more anathema to the American democratic system
nourished by the First Amendment, and nothing could be more odious to
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
279. Id.
280. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 3, at 987-91.
281. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 156 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Mills v. Alabama,
384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)).
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"those who won our independence. 2 82
Self-realization is also a fundamental ingredient of First Amendment
liberty. "Why not view Chaplinsky's comments as a personal catharsis, as a
means to vent his frustration at a system he deemed ... to be oppressive?"
asks Redish, and "[u]nder this analysis, so-called 'fighting words' represent a
significant means of self-realization, whether or not they can be considered a
means of attaining some elusive 'truth.' 283
Even Justice Murphy's "truth" limitation implodes when he refuses to
consider the truth of Chaplinsky's substantive allegation because, Justice
Murphy says, it is provocatively posed. This must be counted among the
bitterest ironies of the case. Ascertaining truth, the Court intones, is the sole
purpose of the First Amendment freedom of speech, but when it appears, it
cannot be considered unless correctly packaged.
On its face, even if some objective standard of correctness could be
discovered, the position is fussy at best; as applied to real life, it is a
catastrophe. On any rational scale of constitutional values, truth should be
measured as one hundred and civility less than ten. In addition, when
addressed to the government, ten declines to zero.284 These considerations are
dealt with elsewhere in this Article. This space is devoted to the proposition
that Chaplinsky was "speaking truth to power," in the clearest focus of that
famed Quaker mitzvah.2 85
Bowering, as the City Marshal, was the chief law enforcement official on
the street, and as a police officer represented the power of government. For
most people and for all practical purposes, the police officer is their sole
contact with the government, thus in their eyes, he is the government.
Government is both the violator of what Brandeis termed "the right to be let
alone," and the enforcer of constitutional liberty. Here, Bowering proved to
represent the twin danger of violating both. He joined with the unruly mob in
harassing the Jehovah's Witness preacher, and added his personal touch of
venom by addressing Chaplinsky as a "damned bastard," and refusing 'to
protect his liberty. The government's agent invited a potent reprimand, and
the speaker responded in kind, choosing words that Bowering would
understand as severe criticism of egregious government misconduct. "You
are a God damned racketeer and a damned Fascist
and the whole government
286
of Rochester are Fascists or agents of Fascists.,
282. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
283. Martin Redish, The Value ofFree Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 626 (1982).
284. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); ME1KLEJOHN, supra note 74.
285. "Mitzvah" is the Hebrew word both for "command" and "good deed." Both coalesce here
in the Quaker code.
286. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 569 (1942).
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To test for truth, one must understand the meaning of the words used.
Chaplinsky certainly was not saying that Bowering was a racketeer in the
criminal sense of the word, that is, that he was violating the law in search of
financial gain. Chaplinsky had previously referred to religion as a "racket,"
which Bowering well knew because he warned the preacher that this was
angering the crowd. All understood that the word meant objectionable there,
and the same here. Nor did Chaplinsky mean by "fascists" that Bowering was
a card-carrying member of the Fascist Party. 287 Even if initially the Marshal
might otherwise have entertained such a meaning, when Chaplinsky added a
similar appellation for "the whole government," that was the pellucid signal
that the entire address was a rebuke of the government of Rochester, of which
he was the plenipotentiary on the scene.
Nor is there any evidence that Bowering understood that he was being
insulted for conduct unrelated to the performance of duty. The complaint, as
Bowering well knew, was that he, as the head of the local police charged with
the duty of protecting First Amendment rights against hostile crowds, was
contumaciously refusing to perform his duty. Indeed, Chaplinsky had
previously demanded that the Marshal arrest those interfering with
Chaplinsky's First Amendment right to speak. The argument, which led to
the words appearing in the indictment, was clearly on the subject of the right
to give an unpopular speech to a hostile crowd. Chaplinsky's assertion that
the government of the town were fascists or agents of fascists, was clearly his
way of saying that official misbehavior in Rochester was of such a magnitude
as to rival that of fascists, meaning, those contemptuous of free speech, and
the liberty in which it flourishes. Even if by bizarre extension it could be said
that either Chaplinsky said, or Bowering understood, that the accusation was
that municipal officers were fascists, whatever that may mean, Chaplinsky
said "or agents of fascists." That instantaneous gloss made it clear that the
criticism was of behavior, not party affiliation.288
Whether the United States Supreme Court finds the form of words used by
the Jehovah's Witness clergy defendant infelicitous, or reprehensible, or
offensive, there could be no doubt that properly understood, he spoke truth, as
the defendant saw it. In addition, if the Court were to deny they were words
287. As noted above, the Court always capitalizes Fascists, indicating that the term was meant
to be even more limited than a person of bad behavior, but a member of the Fascist Party. That
makes the charge strange without evidence that such was intended. See supra note 12 and
accompanying text.
288. In the 1948 Truman-Dewey campaign for president, the New York Times headline read,
"PRESIDENT LIKENS DEWEY TO HITLER AS FASCISTS' TOOL." See Bumiller, supra
note 235, at 5. "FASCISTS' TOOL" is the equivalent of Chaplinsky's characterization of the
government of Rochester as "agents of Fascists." But nothing in Chaplinsky's speech compares with
Truman's reference to Hitler.
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of truth, then the Chaplinsky case would pose an even graver danger to liberty
because the government would usurp the role of the arbiter of truth. Justice
Murphy places the government in the dilemma by asserting that the First
Amendment grants no protection to any speech that does not seek truth as the
government sees it. On this ground alone, the Chaplinsky case begs reversal.
4. Government Has No Right to Criminalize Speech to Promote "the Social
Interest in Order and Morality"
Justice Murphy denied Chaplinsky's words First Amendment protection
because "any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by
the social interest in order and morality., 289 This Section focuses on the last
seven words. There is no such restriction in the language of the First
Amendment, or in any Supreme Court opinion that I know of, and Justice
Murphy cites none. Nor does he support this linguistic ukase by any
reasoning, history, or justification as is traditional in the American legal
system. He leans solely on Chafee, and Chafee cites no authority. More
importantly, the seven words do not comport with the absolutist language of
the First Amendment.
In addition, what possible justification exists for the Supreme Court to
permit a state to criminalize speech in the name of "the social interest in order
and morality"? What do the words mean? "Order" may mean prevention of
violence, and even there, as discussed above, the government's interest
rationally and in the spirit of the First Amendment should only mean serious
violence that the speaker advocates and which is likely to occur immediately.
That is the teaching of Brandenburgv. Ohio,290 the reigning doctrine on the
subject. Both elements are required and neither is present here. However,
"the social interest in order" is another one of those vagaries that seems
designed to defy meaning. The Murphy opinion is chock full of these
confounding conundrums.
a. Morality
The enigma is compounded by the caboose: "and morality." Government
has no business punishing expression on grounds of "morality."' 291 Where did
Murphy, with or without Chafee, get such an idea? As Justice Harlan later

289. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
290. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
291. See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 3, at 1042 (citing JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST 114 (1980)). This was the kindest treatment a respectful judiciary could mete out to a

baseless notion fraught with the risk that a court of law would be transformed into an ecclesiastical
inquisition.
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confirmed in Cohen v. California,292 punishing speech on grounds of
"morality" is prohibited by the First Amendment freedom of speech clause.29 3
The Cohen holding and rationale are so fundamentally inconsistent with
Chaplinsky as to overrule it. The "emotive function... [of speech] may often
be the more important element of the overall message sought to be
communicated" and is protected
equally with the content of the message, said
29 4
Justice Harlan for the Court.
A more likely interpretation of the phrase, had Justice Murphy thought
about it, is that "order and morality" is a hendiadys meaning "moral order," a
conclusion encouraged by the "social interest" at position two and three of the
seven word phrase. In the context of the case, the Court seemed eager to
teach this Jehovah's Witness preacher a lesson in morality. In a one-two
punch, having first rejected as nonsense his claim of Freedom of Religion
under the First Amendment, Justice Murphy then swung again to teach a
lesson in "morality" to one who dared to "assault" a police chief with words.
Like a "Murphy bed," which descends to sleep two by night, and folds up
into the wall out of sight by day, the venerable Justice strikes a blow in the
Stygian dark of rhetorical babble, and is nowhere to be seen to explain what
the bright ray of day brings to light.
b. Chaplinsky's Words Pale by Comparisonto Language the Court Routinely
Protects
If there is a social interest in morality sufficiently urgent to excise
"immoral" speech from the Bill of Rights, how then can one explain the
epidemic of scurrilous utterings both before, but mainly after Chaplinsky,
protected under the First Amendment, which no one could defend on grounds
of morality? Witness the following examples:
2 95 Phonograph played to
(1) Cantwell v. Connecticut:
Roman Catholics
constituting "a general attack on all organized religious systems as
instruments of Satan and injurious to man; it then singles out the Roman
Catholic Church for strictures couched in terms which naturally would offend
not only persons of that persuasion, but all others who respect the honestly
held religious faith of their fellows. The hearers were in fact highly offended.
One of them said he felt like hitting Cantwell. 2 96

292. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
293. Id at 23 (protecting "fuck the draft" against charges of immorality).
294. Id. at 26. The First Amendment Establishment Clause also joins in prohibiting the
government from punishing speech on grounds of morality. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
295. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
296. Id.at 309.
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(2) Terminiello v. City of Chicago:297 Anti-Semitic priest referred to the

objects of his wrath as, "slimy scum," "snakes," and "bedbugs." Justice
Jackson commented that what Chaplinsky said to the police chief was "mild
in comparison to the epithets...298 [that] Terminiello hurled at an already
inflamed mob of his adversaries.,

(3) Kunz v. New York: 299 Baptist minister led public prayer meetings in
which he called Catholicism "a religion of the devil," called the Pope "the
anti-Christ," and described Jews as "Christ-killers" and "garbage that...
should have been burnt in the incinerators [of Nazi Germany]. 30 ° In dissent,
Justice Jackson said that Kunz' scurrilous attacks on Catholics and Jews were
"[e]qually inciting and more clearly 'fighting words"' than the words that sent
Chaplinsky to prison.3 °1
(4) 3 Gregory v. Chicago:30 2 Calling the Mayor "a snake" several times
over.

30

(5) Street v. New York: 30 4 African-American burned an American flag to
protest the killing of a civil rights leader while proclaiming, "[w]e don't need
no damn flag.... [i]f they let that happen., 30 5 The Court held that those
words were not fighting words likely to provoke violent reaction.
(6) Cohen v. California:30 6 Wearing a jacket in the corridor of a court
house sporting the antiwar slogan, "Fuck the Draft," held not to be fighting
words likely to provoke a violent reaction.30 7 Justice Harlan rejected the
claim that "States, acting as guardians of public morality, may properly
remove this offensive word from the public vocabulary." 308
(7) Gooding v. Wilson:309 Addressing a police officer, "White son of a
bitch, I'll kill you" and "you son of a bitch, I'll choke you to death... I'll cut
you all to pieces" held beyond the fighting words doctrine.310
297. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
298. Id.at 26 (Jackson, J., dissenting from the holding that the First Amendment protected such
provocative speech to a hostile mob while refusing to protect far less provocative language to a
police chief in Chaplinsky).
299. 340 U.S. 290 (1951).
300. Id.at 296.
301. Id.at 299 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
302. 394 U.S. 111 (1969).
303. See id.at 116.
304. 394 U.S. 576 (1969).

305. Id.at 579.
306. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
307. See id

308. Id.at 22-23.
309. 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
310. Id.at 534.
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(8) Rosenfeld v. New Jersey:311 In address to school board meeting
attended by 150 people, Rosenfeld "used the adjective m[other] f[ucking] on
four occasions to describe the teachers, the school board, the town, and his
own country. 3 12 The court vacated conviction for
"indecent" and
"offensive" language in public places "likely to incite the hearer to an
immediate breach of the peace, or ... in the light of the gender and age of the
listener and
the setting of the utterance, to affect the sensibilities of a
313
hearer."

(9) Lewis v. New Orleans:3 14 To a police officer: "G[od] d[amn] M[other]
F[ucking] police. 315
(10) Brown v. Oklahoma:316 Calling public officials, including the police,
"that black mother-fucking pig" and "mother-fucking fascists pig cops," held
not fighting words.
(11) Plummer v. City of Columbus:3 17 Cab driver's "series of absolutely
vulgar, suggestive and abhorrent, sexually-oriented statements" to a female
passenger.3' 8
3 19
(12) Papish v. Board of Curatorsof the University of Missouri:
Student

newspaper cartoon depicting rape of the Statute of Liberty by a policeman
with headline "M[other] F[ucker] Acquitted. 3 2 °
(13) Hess
v. Indiana:321 "We'll take the fucking street later" in presence
3 22
of sheriff.
324
323
(14) Eaton v. City of Tulsa: Witness used expression "chicken shit."
(15) Lucas v. Arkansas:325 Defendant said to the police, "[w]ell, there
goes the bid [sic] bad mother fucking cops .... Look at the chicken shit
mother fucker hide over there behind that sign .... Now the sorry son-of-a-

311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
violence.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.

408 U.S. 901 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 904.
Id. (quoting State v. Profac, 266 A.2d 579, 583-84 (N.J. 1970)).
408 U.S. 913 (1972).
Id.
Id. No mention that Chaplinsky condemned "fascist," let alone vvas likely to provoke
414 U.S. 2 (1973).
Id. at 3-4.
410 U.S. 667 (1973).
Id.
414 U.S. 105 (1973).
Id. at 107.
415 U.S. 697 (1974).
Id.
416 U.S. 919 (1974).
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bitch is going to come back over here. 326
327 Said to the police, "get out of my
(16) City of Cincinnati v. Karlan:
328
cops.
prick-ass
way you fucking,
329
(17) Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad.
In stage production of
"Hair," female identifying herself: "Hobbies are picking my nose, fucking,
smoking dope, I hate the fucking world, I hate the fucking winter ....Oh,
fucky, fuck, fuck! 3 30 with simulated acts of anal, frontal, heterosexual,
homosexual, and group intercourse.
(18) Collin v. Smith:331 Nazi march in community of survivors of Nazi
death camps protected speech.
(19) Board of Education v. Pico: 332 School library books containing the
following language: "There are white men who will pay you to fuck their
wives. They approach you and say, 'How would you like to fuck a white
woman?... She needs black rod"; 333 "Are the drivers on their knees fucking
their mothers?";334 "Shit, goddamn, goddamn prick, son-of-a-bitch, ass,
pissed, bastard, goddamn, bullshit"; 335 "In my prison cell I sit... With
britchesfull of shit, And my balls are bouncing gently on the floor ....Oh,
I'll never fuck a Polack any more"; 336 "We black children.., used to run to
the Jew's store and shout: ...Bloody Christ Killers. Never trust a Jew....
Crush that nigger's nuts, nigger! 3 37 These are only a few of the passages in
Justice Powell's appendix. There are many more.
(20) Texas v. Johnson:338 Burning an American flag in public not fighting
words.
(21) United States v. Eichman:339 Refusing to reconsider that burning the
flag is not fighting words.
(22) R.A. V v. City of St. Paul:340 Reversed conviction for cross-burning
under a fighting words statute against racism.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.

Id.
416 U.S. 924 (1974); 298 N.E.2d 573 (Ohio 1973).
Karlan, 298 N.E.2d at 576.
420 U.S. 546 (1974).
Id.at 566, 568.
578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978).
457 U.S. 853 (1982).
Id.at 897.
Id.at 898.
Id.at 899.
Id.at 901.

337.
338.
339.
340.

Id.at 902.
491 U.S. 397 (1989).
496 U.S. 310 (1990).
505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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(23) Virginia v. Black:34 1 Cross-burning protected unless "true threat."
All of these cases except Collin v. Smith342 were decisions of the United
States Supreme Court, and in that case, the Court denied certiorari. These
cases are discussed elsewhere in this Article and are arrayed here to indicate
that if there was any vitality to the Chaplinsky pronouncement that speech
may be curbed in the interest of "the social interest in order and morality, 3 43
and that it did not happen in any of these cases. Nor was there even a hint of
such doctrine. The Chaplinsky pronouncement on "morality" proves too
much; namely, that the entire treatment of the First Amendment in Chaplinsky
is based upon some moralistic aberration in free speech jurisprudence that
infects the entire fighting words thesis and deserves to be extirpated as a
poisonous weed in the field of the First Amendment.
In addition, of course, this misadventure into morality adds to the
argument of vagueness and overbreadth discussed above. It should also be
reiterated that Chaplinsky was decided in 1942, an age of First Amendment
somnambulance.
Whatever lesson it sought to teach about speaking
obsequiously to the man with the badge was unlearned without ceremony in
the "fuck," "motherfucker," and "mother fucker fascist pig cops" cases
decided decades later, a sampling of which is given above.
c. There Was No Possibilityof Disorder
The underlying assumption of the Chaplinsky decision was that the few
words of rebuke of the government addressed to City Marshal Bowering by
the Jehovah's Witnesses preacher were likely to provoke a violent response
and hence a breach of the peace. Yet, there was no charge in the indictment of
violent response, any prospect of it, or even any provocation of violence or
breach of the peace. The only charge was annoying, offensive, or derisive
words. Only words. There was no evidence of violence, nor any prospect of
it.
341. 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
342. 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978). Some cases listed here are also set forth in STONE ET AL.,
supranote 3, at 86-88, and some of the summaries here are taken from those pages. A similar listing
is found in WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE & ROBERT SANFORD BRUSTEIN, THE AMERICAN FIRST
AMENDMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: CASES AND MATERIALS 729 n.30 (3d ed. 2002),
with the addition, inter alia, of Skokie v. National SocialistParty, 373 N.E.2d 21 (111. 1978), as "[a]n

especially strong state case disallowing a 'fighting words' rationale even in the circumstances of
extreme provocation and targeted insult." Id.My citation in the text of Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d
1197 (7th Cir. 1978), also involving the First Amendment aspects of the Nazi march in Skokie, is to
the same point. These authors also question whether in light of subsequent cases protecting coarse
speech, Chaplinsky makes sense. I have added many additional illustrations because there is no
question in my mind that protecting speech far more offensive than Chaplinsky's in effect
undermines that case and overrules it by necessary implication.
343. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
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Justice Murphy attempted to fill the gaping void by taking judicial notice
of the highly contested and problematic assertion of provocation of violence:
"Argument is unnecessary to demonstrate that the appellations 'damned
racketeer' and 'damned Fascist' are epithets likely to provoke the average
person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace. 344 Law is
based upon evidence, not assumption, and in the annals of experience
Murphy's Law fails.
Referring to the government and the police chief as "damn racketeer"
must surely have been among the mildest and most restrained and familiar
epithets heard by the police in their daily encounter with criminals. Research
has not produced a single case in the United States Supreme Court in the
sixty-two years since Chaplinsky in which "racketeer" hurled at the police
was alleged to be fighting words.
As for the insult "damn Fascists," the Court's ipse dixit that this would
inevitably provoke a violent reaction is at best a quaint observation of a
constitutional shut-in, if not downright silly. In 1942, when the Supreme
Court decided the case, the United States was at war with Fascist Italy, Nazi
Germany, and the Imperial Empire of Japan.3 45 Perhaps, because of the
passionate patriotism engendered by such conflict, "fascists" produced a
strong reaction throughout the nation--even affecting the United States
Supreme Court. Perhaps it was influenced by the New Hampshire Supreme
Court's overheated prediction that "damned Fascists" will forever be
considered fighting words.346 But the next year, Justice Frankfurter for the
Court, characterized the accusation "fascists" as "loose language or undefined
slogans that are part of the conventional give-and-take in our economic and
political controversies" and protected speech.347 In National Ass' of Letter

344. Id.at 574.
345. One wonders whether the epithets "Jap" or "Nazi," addressed to an American, or to a
Japanese, Nisei, German, or others, would be considered fighting words. "Irishman" was claimed to
be calumny under the Alien and Sedition Act of 1798. RICHARD N. ROSENFELD, AMERICAN
AURORA 569 (1997).
346. State v. Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d 754 (N.H. 1941). The court said, "If the time may ever come
when the words damned Fascists will cease to be generally regarded as 'fighting words' when
applied face-to-face to an average American, this is not the time." Id. at 762. The assertion was
repudiated by the United States Supreme Court in 1943. See infra note 347. The New Hampshire
asseveration sounds like the model for the 2001 version of Ari Fleischer, White House spokesperson,
in his attack on Bill Maher, host of the PoliticallyIncorrectTV show. Maher said that the terrorists
who crashed planes into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon are not cowards, American long
range missilers are. Scolded Fleischer, "Americans ...need to watch what they say ... this is not
the time for remarks like that; there never is." Richard Reeves, Patriotism Calls Out the Censor,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2001, at A23.
347. Cafeteria Employees Local 302 v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293, 295 (1943).
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Carriers v. Austin, 348 the Court quoted this language with approval and
expressly held the word "fascists" to be within First Amendment protection.
In Brown v. Oklahoma,349 calling the police "mother-fucking fascists pig
cops" was held protected by the First Amendment and there was no assertion
that "fascist" constituted fighting words.35 ° It did not even draw comment that
Chaplinsky had condemned it as fighting words per se.35' Curiously, in
Feinerv. New York,352 the epithet "Nazi," when flung at the American Legion
in 1949, did not elicit the adverse judicial reaction that "fascists" did in
Chaplinsky. Yet, Feiner was decided only six years after the defeat of Nazi
Germany, the revelations of Nazi atrocities, and virtually contemporaneous
with the Nurenberg trials in which Justice Jackson was the chief American
prosecutor. 353 The opinion for the Court did not even mention fighting words
or Chaplinsky. In addition, in the Skokie litigation granting First Amendment
protection for a Nazi march in full uniform in
a community of Holocaust
354
certiorari.
denied
Court
Supreme
the
survivors,
But even assuming World War II patriotism led Justice Murphy to
condemn the expression "fascists" as malum in se, Chaplinsky uttered the
epithet in April 1940, twenty-one months before the United States got into the
war, and there was strong feeling in this country against joining the hostilities
against Germany and Italy. The Court does not mention the applicable
standard for ascertaining what expression was considered fighting words.
Under these circumstances, not to require testimony that "fascists" was
considered fighting words seems self-deriding on the part of the judiciary.
Again, no fighting words cases in the Supreme Court since Chaplinsky have
even asserted the claim that "fascists" was embraced within the circle of
fighting words.355
It is difficult to imagine a more unreal expectation, and to base upon that
fantasy a major inroad upon freedom of speech is constitutionally
348. 418 U.S. 264, 284 (1974); see Gard, supra note 6.
349. 492 P.2d 1106, 1107 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971).
350. See 408 U.S. 901, 914 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
351. Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
352. 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
353. See id.
354. Smith v. Collin, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
355. "Fascists" with or without damnation is so commonly used today that it rarely, if ever,
turns a head. It has lost the hard edge that the United States Supreme Court and the New Hampshire
Supreme Court had attributed to it. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. 568; State v. Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d 754
(N.H. 1941). In the New York Times on August 14, 2001, for example, the police of Genoa, in
dealing with demonstrators against globalization in July 2001, were accused of acting like fascists,
which is so mild an epithet that all understand that it means that the police are blamed for infringing
rights of free speech. This illustration is just another indication of how the Chaplinsky case has not
stood the test of time.
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preposterous. Who could expect the chief law-enforcement official to assault
anyone, let alone a religious preacher? One could go further and ask how
anyone could expect violence from anyone-official or not-arguing about
the right to express a religious message? Justice Murphy cited no case or
incident where such danger seemed real. Neither did the New Hampshire
courts.
Add to those doubts four additional factors. First, as Justice Powell
observed, a police official is held to a higher degree of restraint, and the logic
is that the chief of police even higher.356 Second, in criticizing the
government, as argued elsewhere, the weight of reason is that right should be
absolute no matter what the reaction. Third, the opinion invents a mythical
intelligent, reasonable man standard, and even if the municipal police chief
was a wild man and unusually susceptible of ignition, that would not qualify
under the Chaplinsky standard. Fourth, in cases involving the fundamental
liberty of freedom of expression, the burden of sustaining abridgement is
exceedingly high, akin to strict scrutiny. Chaplinsky fails all four.
The conclusion is inevitable that there was no possibility of disorder and
the entire house of cards bottomed on that possibility comes tumbling down.
5. The Government Has No Right to Criminalize Speech Because It Can Be
Said in Another (Less Offensive) Way
Another major difficulty in Chaplinsky is the puzzling rationale cited for
not protecting so-called fighting words: they are not essential to the
expression of ideas. 57 Again, the only citation for this proposition is to
Professor Chafee's Free Speech in the United States.358 And again, no cases
are cited by either the Court or Chafee to support this proposition. On its
face, the idea seems in blatant contradiction to the First Amendment. Justice
Brennan in his dissent in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation rejected outright that
the government has any right to require even a broadcasting station to use
"less offensive language, 359 citing Cohen v. Californiafor
the common sense
360
observation that "the medium may well be the message."

356. Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
357. Chaplinsky, 415 U.S. at 572.
358. Id. at 572 n.4 (citing ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 149

(1941)).
359. 438 U.S. 726, 773 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
360. Id. at 774 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1973)).

2004]

FIGHTING WORDS

a. The FirstAmendment Guarantees to the Speaker the Right to Choose What
Words Shall Be Used
The Constitution does not even entertain the hint that protection is
extended only to speech that cannot be phrased or communicated in a way
other than that chosen by the speaker. As a protector of individual rights as
against the government, the Bill of Rights guarantees that the choice of the
speaker will prevail, and nothing could be more destructive of this freedom
than putting the choice in the hands of the government. 36' This stands the Bill
of Rights on its head.
And what could the sentiment really mean? Every thought or idea may be
expressed in a myriad of ways. This includes form and substance. Instead of
marching or speaking, a protestor could write a letter. Instead of quoting
Farrakhan, a speaker could quote Martin Luther King, or even the Bible.
Even there the choices are infinite-the Hebrew prophets or the Gospel of St.
Luke? And who will be the censor as to what is less offensive? The
government? The church? If so, which one?
What if Chaplinsky had couched his objection in different words? Would
that have been less provocative, and in any event, protected speech under the
First Amendment? Suppose, for example, he had translated his message into
the following dialectic:
You and the rest of the government of Rochester have failed to protect
my right of freedom of speech. That dereliction is more injurious to a
democratic society than racketeers are because, as public servants, you
have taken an oath to protect and defend the Constitution and have
violated that sworn duty in the most shameful and sinful manner
possible because you have demonstrated to the mob that hatred will
overcome the First Amendment and that liberty is at the whim of the
police. Such official transgression is as destructive of democratic
values as fascists whom we recognize as vile enemies because with
equal cynicism, they too deprive the people of their liberties.362
Would it make any difference that such "polite" language may be more
"offensive, derisive, or annoying" because it is more effective in addressing
the violation of duty and is not simply the product of unfocused anger?
361. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24-26 (1973).
362. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 3, at 1048, pose the hypothetical alternative
formulation, "with all due respect, I find the incumbent government less than honorable." These
scholars conclude that using these words Chaplinsky would not have been convicted for fighting
words solely "because of the form their message takes." See Part II.D.6, infra.
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Would it be more inciting because it is seen as "holier than thou" coming
from the pontificating clergy of a despised discipline-Jehovah's Witnessesfor whom the City Marshal had displayed pathological enmity? 363 Suppose

the reprimand to the Marshal was, "You are a disgrace to your uniform, and
worse than fascists and racketeers because you have sworn to protect freedom
of speech of the people and have violated that oath." Or, suppose simply the
first part of the sentence without the "because" explanation? It would be
ironic that such a statement, more damning in content, would be more
protected because it was not limited to the lesser insult. Suppose instead of
the word "damned," which the Court seemed to assign unusual umbrage,3 64
Chaplinsky had spelled it out as follows, "God will punish you in the afterlife
with eternal damnation." Would that have cleansed the speech of fighting
words?
Diverting momentarily from Chaplinsky v. Bowering, consider the
following phrases addressed by husband to his wife in a bitter divorce:
"You are a God damned fucking whore."
"You are a fucking whore."
"You are a whore."
"You are a prostitute."
"You are promiscuous."
"You are an adulterer."
"You fail to observe your marital vows of fidelity."
Because under the New Hampshire statute it is not required that the insults
refer to the addressee, suppose the same class of accusations were addressed
to a loving son:
"Your mother is a God damned fucking whore."
"Your mother is a fucking whore."
"Your mother is a whore."
"Your mother is a prostitute."
"Your mother is promiscuous."
"Your mother is an adulteress."
"Your mother fails to observe her marital vows of fidelity."
I suggest that all are "annoying, derisive, or offensive," under a plain
reading of the New Hampshire statute. Which form of words would be
363. In the days of protest against the war in Vietnam, student demonstrators were keenly
aware that they were often viewed by the police as spoiled, privileged, college kids who saw the cops
as social inferiors and dimwitted protectors of the "military-industrial complex." To counter this
prejudice, one tactic was to include in demonstrations against the war signs urging higher salaries
and greater benefits for the police.
364. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942).
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considered fighting words? All of them? Only the first? First and second?
The mythical juror of common intelligence judging the reaction of the
mythical average person helps not one wit, either as to whether the words
themselves inflict injury, or whether they tend to provoke an immediate
breach of the peace. What is the focus of the Chaplinsky case: offensive
words or offensive ideas? And is there a difference of constitutional
proportions?
b. The Fighting Words Doctrine Purportingto Punish Offending Speech Has
the Effect of CensoringIdeas
In Cohen v. California,Justice Harlan warned that "we cannot indulge the
facile assumption that one can forbid particular words without also running a
substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process. Indeed, government
might soon seize upon the censorship of particular words as a convenient
guise for banning the expression of unpopular views. 365
Returning to the facts of Chaplinsky, the admonition is especially urgent
when the fighting words doctrine penalizes criticism of the government, as
well as unpopular ideas. That is the tragedy of Chaplinsky. Clearly, persons
in a democratic society are entitled to express these sentiments and to choose
the words that in their view convey the depth of feeling needed to make the
expression effective. In the days of protest against the war in Vietnam, cries
to repeal the draft and stop the war were ineffective. When the youth of the
nation screamed, "Fuck the draft!" the country took notice. Justice Harlan
recited "the usual rule that governmental bodies may not prescribe the form
or content of individual expression., 366 It took offensive, annoying, and even
insulting words and the teaching of Justice Harlan in Cohen to illustrate that
any system purporting to grace freedom of expression must permit them.
6. The "Fighting Words" Statute Violates Brandenburgv. Ohio
The New Hampshire Supreme Court rewrote the statute at issue in State v.
Chaplinksy,367 I maintain, in an attempt to cure its blatant violation of the First
Amendment. The major changes the New Hampshire court instituted were to
cast the statute as a prevention of violence, not a prohibition of speech.36 8 The
second was to create an objective standard in the form of "what men of
common intelligence would understand would be words likely to cause an

365.
366.
367.
368.

Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
Id.at 24 (emphasis added).
18A.2d754(1941).
Id.at 758.
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average addressee to fight.
I view the first change as blatantly improper, as I said above. 370 But even
if not, and that is what the state legislature had written, the enactment now
couched in the form of prevention of violence would not comply with the
First Amendment for several reasons. First, words that "tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace" 37 1 fail to meet the requirements of
Brandenburg v. Ohio.372 That decision requires that in order to deprive
speech of First Amendment protection, the government must prove that the
words advocate immediate serious unlawful action, and, in addition, it must
be likely that such action will occur immediately.3 73 Neither prong is satisfied
in Chaplinsky. Even if they were, Brandenburgwould not permit punishing
speech addressed to the police, or to criticism of the government,3 74 and in
Chaplinsky, both are present.375
Granted that Brandenburgdeals with advocacy of violence by the speaker
with the clear sense that the speaker must be at fault in advocating action
posing imminent grave danger sufficient to forfeit constitutional protection for
the words used. Some would even argue that a speaker advocating serious
violence is not really engaged in "speech" at all, and that is all the First
Amendment protects. Under this analysis, the KKK speaker advocating
violence against African-Americans and Jews-and who prevailed in
Brandenburg-deserves less protection than the Jehovah's Witness in
Chaplinsky fending off a hostile police chief who cursed him, provoking a
response in kind.376 Thus, Brandenburg is the general prevailing teaching on
the enormous harm a speaker must intentionally inflict before constitutional
protection evaporates. Applying that doctrine here, the fighting words
doctrine fails both in general, and certainly as applied to the Jehovah's
Witness preacher in Rochester, New Hampshire.
In Terminiello v. Chicago,377 the Court reversed a breach-of-the-peace
conviction of an abrasive speaker for "provocative speech" which "stirs the
public to anger, invites dispute, brings about a condition of unrest, or creates a
disturbance. 3 78 If Terminiello, the vicious and racist speaker provoking a
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.

Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573.
See infra, Part II.E.2.
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
395 U.S. 444 (1969).
Id.
Id.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942).
Id. at 570.
337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
Id.
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crowd to anger, deserves First Amendment protection, a fortiori, so does the
Jehovah's Witness preacher pleading with the police chief for First
Amendment protection.
Some scholars attempting to explain the opposite result succeed only in
demonstrating why it does not make sense. Dean Kathleen Sullivan and the
recently deceased Gerald Gunther suggest two differences between fighting
words and hostile audience cases, such as Terminiello and Feiner v. New
York.3 79 First, fighting words are treated as offensive because of the form of
the message, and they posit that Chaplinsky would not have been convicted if
he had said "with all due respect, I find the government less than
honorable., 380 That would also include the case where the police chief found
that patronizing language mocking and more provocative than "fascists" or
"racketeer." Second, in "hostile audience" cases, "because it is not the form
of speech which is pivotal ...decisions
have addressed the problem through
38
balancing rather than categorization., '
The explanation is descriptive, at best, and not prescriptive because it not
only makes no sense, but is more persuasive in reverse. No fundamental
liberty can stand on legs so flaccid. The second factor-the difference
between balancing and categorization-is bottomed on Chaplinsky's
conjuring up the notion that certain categories of speech deserve no First
Amendment protection. As discussed in Part II.D.1, this is an invention
without any support in the language of the First Amendment. Brandenburg,
the reigning authority on free speech and provocation to violence, is just as
concerned with those two classic elements as Chaplinsky.382 More so in light
of the deep flaws which plague the 1942 Supreme Court opinion as shown in
this Article. The most that can be said for Chaplinsky is that it is a relic of
yore when a desiccated sense of etiquette and hollow formalism substituted
snobbism for realism in free speech jurisprudence.383 Brandenburgis rightly
the current doctrine and Chaplinsky teaches us nothing but its age.
In addition, Brandenburg,coming five years after New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,384 would not permit punishing speech addressed to the police,385 or

379. 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
380. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 3, at 1048.
381. Id.

382. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969).
383. See Gard, supra note 6.
384. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
385. See infra Part 1II.D. Another reason for excluding addresses to the police from the
fighting words doctrine is that they are trained not to respond in violence no matter how provocative
the words. See Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 134 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
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to criticism of the government; in Chaplinsky, both are present. 8 6 As is
obvious, Brandenburg is designed to be speech-protective and was reached
after half a century of sad experiences beginning with Schenck v. United
States,8 7 where anyone with an idea the government did not like ended up in
jail.
Frothy mouthings and evanescent safeguards turned the First
Amendment into a danger zone and ineffective to measure up to the majestic
importance of free speech in a democratic society-no matter how offensive
or dangerous the message. Brandenburg is the beacon of light announcing
that dissenting opinions of Holmes and Brandeis are finally accepted as
standards of the First Amendment, meaning that even the most worthless of
messages with no claim to merit
are protected unless "an immediate check is
38 8
required to save the country.
7. Chaplinsky Punishes the Speaker for the Possible Violent Reaction of the
Audience
Perhaps the basic defect in the entire fighting words doctrine is that it
punishes the speaker for the violence of the hearer. The language of the First
Amendment plainly protects the right of the speaker and just as plainly omits
any right of the listener to stop the speaker. The omission is not inadvertent.
If a hostile reaction--even one that results in violence-can abridge the right
of speech, the First Amendment fails where it is needed most. In effect, such
a result nullifies the right of free speech.
The adverse effect on freedom of speech is especially devastating here
where, as Tribe points out, the Supreme Court merely accepted the legislative
judgment that epithets produce violence. 38 9 There was no evidence to support
that highly dubious assumption and the Court in Chaplinsky said none was
needed.390 This must surely be the nadir in the American law of free speech
protection!
The "hostile audience" jurisprudence is bottomed on this fundamental
principle. This is not a case where the speaker advocates violence, or other
unlawful action in order to achieve some social or political objective and in
386. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 569 (1942).
387. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
388. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). In fuller text,
Holmes said, "[W]e should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions
that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate
interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to
save the country." Id.; see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., and
Holmes, J., concurring); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes, J., and Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
389. TRIBE, supra note 166, at 850.
390. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573-74.
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some sense therefore it may be said that the speaker is "responsible" for
violation of the law. As Meiklejohn admonishes, freedom of speech is so
essential in a representative democracy where "We the People" bear the
responsibility for speaking out, such speech must be protected no matter what.
Meiklejohn would protect even the speaker inciting immediate, serious,
unlawful conduct . 39 After fifty years of finding its way-from Schenck v.
United States to Brandenburg v. Ohio-the Court arrived at the double
protection for protecting even the inciter of violence by requiring the
government to prove that the speaker advocated immediate, serious, unlawful
acts-and,in addition-itwas likely that such illegal act would occur now. 392
Punishing the speaker for the violence committed against the speaker is totally
at odds with such essential American jurisprudence. It sounds the death knell
to free speech.393
Terminiello394 is only one of many illustrations where the Supreme Court
has affirmed this position and other examples are listed in Part II.D.4 of this
Article. The Skokie case was the most appealing of all the pleas to stop
hideously offensive and provocative speech likely to cause violence, and the
courts ruled in favor of First Amendment protection. 395 The refusal of the
Supreme Court to review the court of appeals opinion should be taken as
affirmation of this inevitable view of the free speech clause.396 The many
cases where the Court protected people who cursed police officers in the vilest
language stand as a refutation to the Chaplinsky case. In each case, the Court
should have seized the opportunity to declare the conviction of a Jehovah's
Witness preacher a historical oddity and a relic of the mistaken past.
Instead, the Court took a different path by refusing to affirm a single case
on the ground of fighting words for the sixty-two years after Chaplinsky. I
maintain that together with extending First Amendment protection to speech
far worse than answering in kind the City Marshal of Rochester, New
Hampshire,39 7 this refusal to affirm should be interpreted to mean that the
fighting words doctrine is over in all but name and the Court should formally
overrule it.
The speaker is punished even when a police officer, in dereliction of his
duty to protect the speaker, provokes the speaker. Even if there is ever a case
where reaction to speech is "justified" by some extreme provocation, this is a
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.

Meiklejohn, supra note 74, at 255.
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969).
See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1948).
337 U.S. 1, 8 (1949).
Id.
Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.1978), cert. denied439 U.S. 916 (1978).
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 569 (1942).
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far cry from the facts in Chaplinsky, where the undisputed facts are that the
City Marshal provoked a person trying to exercise his right of free speech, and
where the Court rejected defenses based on that provocation, and the truth of
the speech.3 98 This is explored further elsewhere, but is mentioned here again
because of its patent relevance to punishing the speaker for the sins of the
government acting in the person of its chief of police. And, as said
throughout this Article, even if Walter Chaplinsky was dead wrong in what he
said to the City Marshal, it falls within the refuge of criticism
of the
3 99
government that should merit absolute protection, even if false.
The fighting words doctrine is an inherently dangerous concept in general,
as explained above. When applied to addresses to government, it is
devastating. It is an offering to the authorities, especially the police-the
average person's most ubiquitous contact with government-to abridge
speech and stifle criticism. As Justice Powell observed in City of Houston v.
Hill04 0 and Coates v. Cincinnati,4°1 it "contains an obvious invitation to
discriminatory enforcement,,4 0 2 granting the police discretion to arrest on the
basis of the content of speech which is particularly repugnant given "[t]he
eternal temptation ... to arrest the speaker rather than to correct the
conditions about which he complains.,, 40 3 "The freedom of individuals
verbally to oppose or challenge police action without thereby resisting arrest
is one of the principal characteristics by which we distinguish a free nation
from a police state." 40 4 Moreover, "[t]he Constitution does not allow such
speech to be made a crime.'4 0 5 This is an intolerable result under the Bill of
Rights, described by Justice Brandeis "as against the Government, the right to
be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men." 40 6 It is especially iniquitous when it penalizes criticism of the
government and the citizen40 right
"to speak truth to power," to use the
7
symbolism.
Quaker
powerful
Under the theory underlying Chaplinsky, Biblical prophets rebuking kings
of Israel could be convicted of fighting words in excoriating regal sin.40 8
398. Id.at 570.
399. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 375 U.S. 254 (1964); Meiklejohn, supra note 74.
400. 482 U.S. 451, 465 (1987).
401. 402 U.S. 611,615-16 (1971).
402. Hill, 482 U.S. at 465, n.15 (quoting Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611,615-16).
403. Id.(quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 65 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
404. Id.at 462-63.
405. Id.at 462.
406. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
407. Under Chaplinsky, the Biblical prophet would be convicted of fighting words because
truth and provocation were not permissible defenses.
408. Prophet Nathan rebuked King David for seducing Bathsheba and ordering her husband
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Under both Prong 1-words themselves inflict-and Prong 2-provoking a
violent response by a "reasonable" person-and certainly, a "reasonable
absolute monarch," guilt-and punishment, too-would be certain. Neither
truth nor justification would be defenses and neither would be criticism of the
government!
In obvious contrast, I suggest that, realistically speaking, in Chaplinsky,
there was no danger of breach of the peace from defendant's criticism of
Bowering and the government of which he was a part, nor from any mythical
reasonable man. The most realistic appraisal of Justice Murphy's opinion in
Chaplinsky is that what is intended is an admonition to the people not to "talk
back" to the police, and the subsequent history of fighting words in the courts
reinforces this message, especially in the state courts.409
Shades of the despised Sedition Act of 1798 have resurfaced in the name
of fighting words. Just as Congress erased the ignominious legislation that it
penned, the Supreme Court ought to extirpate the fighting words doctrine that
it planted. The only category of "words... which by their very utterance
inflict injury," which come to mind are "the libelous," in the sense of the
concept at common law that certain expressions were libelous per se. Truth
was no defense, and conceivably made the injury more grievous. 410 Even if
that was what Justice Murphy was reaching for, the entire idea has been
overruled in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and PhiladelphiaNewspapers v.
Hepps,4 11 which require the plaintiff in a libel action to prove, inter alia, that
the statement is both defamatory and untrue as a matter of federal
constitutional law.412
8.The Court's Reliance upon Chafee is Misplaced
Justice Murphy relies solely upon Professor Chafee's Free Speech in the
Uriah the Hittite to the front in the war with the Amonites so that he would be killed in battle. "Ata
ha-ish!" ("That man is you!"), hurled the prophet to the king. 2 Samuel 12:7. In 1 Kings, Chapter
21, the Prophet Elijah castigated King Ahab for the murder of Naboth, engineered by his evil wife
Queen Jezebel in order to take his vineyard adjacent to the palace. In one of the most wrathful of
Biblical indictments, the Prophet Elijah uttered words that by themselves inflicted injury, "God has
said, Would you murder and take possession? In the very place where the dogs lapped up Naboth's
blood, the dogs will lap up your blood too." 1 Kings 21:19; see DANIEL FRIEDMANN, To KILL AND
INHERIT (Hebrew) (2000); Burton Caine, "The Liberal Agenda": Biblical Values and the First
Amendment, 14 TOURO L. REV. 129, 134 (1997).
409. See infra Part Il1.
410. For example, if with intent to destroy the reputation of a rival, one asserts that his daughter
is the product of an adulterous affair unknown to his wife, the injury is greater if true than if it were
false. See generally LEONARD LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS
IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY (1960).

411. 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
412. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 278; Hepps, 475 U.S. at 767.
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United States as authority for the holding in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.4 13
The Court's reliance is misplaced. Properly understood, I believe that Chafee
refutes the Chaplinsky rationale. If I am wrong, whatever incidental
sentiments may be plucked from Professor Chafee's book cited in support of
the Chaplinsky holding are themselves highly problematical or unsound, and
have been rejected by subsequent Supreme Court decisions.
Justice Murphy writes, "[t]here are certain well-defined and narrowly
limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never
been thought to raise any Constitutional problem., 414 There is no citation to
any supporting authority. 415 But since the illustrations that follow are
attributed to Chafee, it would seem that Justice Murphy also meant to cite
Chafee for this general principle.
Chafee makes no such claim and warns against vagueness and the
prosecution for unorthodox ideas.4 6 The importance for First Amendment
analysis is that vague and overbroad proscriptions violate the First
Amendment. Such claims were made by the defendant in the case and the
Court rejected them. 417 Chafee-and only Chafee-is cited to support the
illustrations, which in the language of the Court, "include the lewd and
obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' wordsthose which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace. 41 8 Chafee lists "obscenity, profanity, and
gross libels upon individuals," but omits fighting words, the category for
which Justice Murphy cites Chafee. 419 Neither the Court nor Chafee defines
any terms or cites any cases defining terms.
Chafee is remarkably cavalier in his discussion, giving illustrations not
identified as to category and which seem doubtful in the extreme. For
"obscenity and profanity," Chafee says that "[t]he man who swears in a
streetcar is as much of a nuisance as the man who smokes there. 420 Another
example: "Adulterated candy is no more poisonous to children than some
books. Grossly unpatriotic language may be punished for the same reasons.
The man who talks scurrilously 421 about the flag commits a crime.., because
413. 315 U.S. 568, 572, nn. 4-5 (1942) (citing CHAFEE, supra note 254, at 149-50).
414. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72.
415. Id. The only citation is to Near v. Minnesota, 203 U.S. 647 (1931), for the proposition that
the First Amendment is not limited to prior restraint. Id. at 571-72. Because that was never raised,
one wonders why citation for the important issue at hand was never supplied.
416. See CHAFEE, supra note 254, at 150-51.
417. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 574.
418. Id, at 572.
419. See CHAFEE, supra note 254, at 149.
420. Id. at 150.
421. Thomas Jefferson was offended at the "surrilities" of Jimmy Callender, journalist of the
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' ' 22
the effect resembles that of an injurious act such as trampling on the flag. A
This language ignores the entire purpose of the First Amendment, which is to
distinguish between speech, which is protected-and conduct, which may not
be protected. Remarkably, Professor Chafee seems utterly oblivious to this
fundamental point. If Chafee's "effect" test were ever to become law, it
would obliterate the First Amendment.
No cases support Chafee's
illustrations and none could. It was only a matter of time until the Court in
Street v. New York 423 held that verbally desecrating the flag was protected
speech, and the Supreme Court extended the rationale of protection to
physical desecration of the national symbol.424 One might wonder whether
Chafee is simply reporting what he terms in the next sentence "absurd and
unjust holdings,25 or is defending results that certainly must have seemed so
even in 1941, the date his treatise was published.
Chafee continues, "Insults are punished like a threatening gesture, since
they are liable to provoke a fight., 426 This is the closest reference to Justice
Murphy's "fighting words"-a term Chafee never uses-but Chafee does not
say that insults may themselves inflict injury, an essential ingredient of the
Chaplinsky doctrine.4 27 Nor does Chafee indicate that all insults are
unprotected speech, presumably only those that are liable to provoke a fight.
Chafee also diffuses his thesis by giving uncertain alternative consequences to
certain expressions he would indict. 428 However, his illustrations differ from
Justice Murphy's. Chafee opines that "profanity and indecent talk and
pictures" are not protected because "[t]he harm is done as soon as [the words]
are communicated, or is liable to follow almost immediately in the form of
retaliatory violence.,A29 He does not say which, or if there is a difference of
constitutional magnitude. It should be noted that Chafee insists on immediacy
of violence while Justice Murphy
is satisfied if the words "tend to incite an
43 0

immediate breach of the peace.,

newspaper Aurora, for his excoriation of the reputation of public figures. Yet, the third President
pardoned the slanderer for violation of the Sedition Act of 1798 because Jefferson believed that the
Act violated freedom of speech. Congress repealed the Act during Jefferson's term of office. See
ROSENFELD, supra note 345, at 900-01.
422. See CHAFEE, supra note 254, at 150.
423. 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
424. See also United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Texas v Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
(1989).
425. See CHAFEE, supra note 254, at 150.
426. Id.
427. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
428. See CHAFEE, supra note 254, at 150.
429. Id.
430. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 574.
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Reading the cited references in the Chafee book in their context, one must
have serious doubts that they serve the purpose for which the Chaplinsky
court employs them. It should be reiterated that Professor Chafee in the
passages cited nowhere even mentions "fighting words." The section referred
to is entitled The Normal CriminalLaw of Words, and the gist is that criminal
laws are normally aimed at "acts" which cause "actual injuries.

'43

'

But the

law also punishes a few classes of words like obscenity, profanity, and gross
libels upon individuals, because the very utterance of such words is
considered to inflict a present injury upon listeners, readers, or those defamed,
or else to render highly probable an immediate breach of the peace.432
Chafee warns that such common law "verbal crimes" must be severely
limited because the First Amendment added protections for the search for
truth and its dissemination, the safeguard of political discussion, and the
preservation of scientific and religious freedom.433 There is nothing to
indicate that even these protections were exhaustive because Chafee's
essential message is that "[t]he absurd and unjust holdings in some of these
prosecutions for the use of indecent or otherwise objectionable language
furnish a sharp warning against any creation of new verbal crimes.4 34 Since
Chaplinsky cites no cases of "fighting words," Justice Murphy should have
heeded Chafee's admonition against creating a new verbal crime.
Chafee further admonishes that "[t]his breach of the peace theory is
particularly liable to abuse when applied against unpopular expressions and
practices. 435 It makes a man a criminal simply because his neighbors have no
self-control and cannot refrain from violence.43 6 That would seem to apply
compellingly to the facts in Chaplinsky where the defendant was preaching
the doctrine of Jehovah's Witnesses, a virtual poster child for unpopular
speech.437 Chaplinsky's message that organized religion is a "racket" so
angered the crowd on the street that they attacked him. The hostility
prompted City Marshal Bowering to join in the assault or to deny police
protection for Chaplinsky's speech. More significant, the police chief called
the speaker a "damned bastard." That provoked defendant to retaliate with
the words that sentenced him to prison. To imply that Chafee would have
concurred in the conviction is to turn white into black.
CHAFEE, supra note 254, at 149.
432. Id.
433. Id.
434. Id at 150.
435. Id.at 151.
436. Id.
437. See, e.g.,
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306-07 (1940); Watchtower Bible &
Tract Soc'y v. Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002).
431.
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There is an even more compelling reason why Chafee would have never
have upheld convicting Chaplinsky for anything he said to the Rochester City
Marshal. Chafee was an exponent of free speech, especially against the
government, and the 1941 revision of his earlier work, Freedom of Speech,
emphasized that the First Amendment was designed to "make...
prosecutions for criticism of the government without any incitement to lawbreaking, forever impossible." 438 Justice Murphy cites no language of Chafee
supporting a conviction for talking back to the police, or any other criticism of
the government. The "incitement to law breaking" Chafee excepts from his
general rule of protecting the speaker refers to seditious utterances, which
Chafee would not protect only when the speaker urges and purposely incites
others to take action-violent action-to achieve unlawful goals, and there
exists a clear and present danger of accomplishing that result.439
Here again, as seen from the above-quoted selection of his 1941 volume,
Chafee was staunchly opposed to criminalizing speech because of the reaction
it produced--even.by "neighbors," that is, those with no duty to protect the
exercise of constitutional rights. A fortiori, he would have choked to see his
sentiments contorted to permit imprisoning a speaker-and particularly one
intoning "unpopular ideas"--where the hostile reaction came from the City
Marshal, the chief law enforcer bound by the constitution to protect freedom
of speech who abdicated that obligation and joined the mob.
Chafee's aversion to punishing the speaker because of hostile audience
reactions registers a deep sentiment that unless this type of speech in
particular is vigorously protected, the First Amendment means nothing. It is
one thing to punish one who advocates serious violence and is held
responsible if there is a "clear and present danger" that it will occur.440 If,
however, the threat of violence results from the hostile reaction to an idea
peacefully advocated, unless the speaker is protected and the angry crowd is
restrained, or punished, the First Amendment is a booby trap and the liberty
for which it stands is eviscerated. 44 1
438. See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 3, at 986.
439. See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Free Speech: And Its Relation to Self-Government, 62 HARV. L.
REV. 891 (1949) (reviewing ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH: AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT (1948)).
440. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes so
interpreted defendant's antiwar utterances and announced the rule that speech is not protected if it
creates the clear and present danger of action which the government has the right to prohibit, in
Schenck, interference with the draft in World War I. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516-17
(1951), probably the nadir of First Amendment protection for speech, convicted leaders of the
Communist Party for conspiring to form the Party, which would then advocate the overthrow of the
U.S. Government by force and violence.
441. Nat'l Socialist Party v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977). Later, injunction against the march of
the Nazis made permanent by the Supreme Court of Illinois, 373 N.E.2d 21 (1978).
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Fleshing out the idea that a violent response must not limit speech, Tribe
says, "government may not justify the suppression of speech because its
content or mode of expression is offensive to some. ' 442 He cites Chafee for
the proposition that "the duty of the police ordinarily must be to protect the
speaker's right of expression-whatever the reaction." 443 A fortiori,Bowering
must not be the cause of any such reaction, even if the facts of the case had
shown that Bowering did react with violence. They do not.
Survivors of Nazi death camps learned that the First Amendment requires
that they tolerate Nazi storm troopers in full regalia, urging Hitler to finish
annihilating the Jews. Yet, a municipal police chief in New Hampshire who
violates his duty to protect the First Amendment of a preacher and thus earns
the opprobrium of having his government called fascists and racketeers or
agents of fascists, can send the speaker to jail. This startling contrast must
teach that this sweet land of liberty has gone mad!
Terminiello v. Chicago44 4 afforded First Amendment protection to hate
speech of an anti-Semitic priest because the statute punishing speech that
"stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, brings about a condition of unrest, or
creates a disturbance" violated the First Amendment. 44 5 Justice Douglas
praised what the statute condemned, holding that speech that provokes and
creates unrest contributes to the very public debate the First Amendment
seeks to promote. 446 He recognized Chaplinsky for the proposition that not all
speech is protected, and by that stroke, missed the opportunity to overturn a
ruling that might be read to condemn speech held praiseworthy in
Terminiello.44 7
In Gregory v. Chicago,448 epithets hurled at demonstrators far more
offensive than anything in Chaplinsky, were held protected under the First
Amendment. The Court in Feiner v. New York, 449 ruled 5-4 that when a
speaker incites to riot, First Amendment protection vanishes. The case is
highly problematic and has been criticized and distinguished to the point
where its validity is dubious. 450 To the extent that it also punished speech for
442. TRIBE, supra note 166, at 852 (emphasis added).
443. Id. "The sound constitutional doctrine is that the public authorities have the obligation to
provide police protection against threatened disorder." Id. at n.18 (quoting CHAFEE, supra note 254,
at 425 (erroneously cited by Tribe as 245)).
444. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
445. Id. at 3.
446. Id.
447. Id.
448. 394 U.S. 111 (1969).
449. 340U.S. 315 (1951).
450. Feiner, 340 U.S. at 328. Justice Black's powerful dissent warned that the "holding means
that as a practical matter, minority speakers can be silenced in any city." Id. (Black, J., dissenting).
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the reaction it produced, it claims some common ground with Chaplinsky.
However, the fact that serious violence was an immediate danger and only
two police officers were present, persuaded the majority that stopping the
speaker who had already delivered his message was better than spilling blood
on the First Amendment. 451 The majority opinion does not cite Chaplinsky
nor mention fighting words, even though defendant called the American
Legion "a Nazi Gestapo," President Truman "a bum," and denounced ward
leaders as "corrupt politicians. 4 52 In the world of insults, could there be a
principled difference of constitutional proportions between these ungenerous
453
references and "damned Fascists or agents of Fascists" and "racketeers"?
As to the palpably ridiculous possibility adverted to in Chaplinsky that the
Jehovah's Witness minister's words to the City Marshal could have caused a
reaction in violence, as Justice Black pointed out in his Feiner dissent,
Professor Chafee warned, "A charge of using language likely to cause a
breach of the peace is a convenient catchall to hold unpopular soapbox
orators. '' 4
Even if Professor Chafee's 1941 Free Speech in the United States might
be pressed into service to provide some support for convicting the Jehovah's
Witness preacher of unlawful fighting words, it must be remembered that
Chafee wrote from the perspective of 1941 before most of the important free
speech cases were decided by the Supreme Court.455 Yet, even then Chafee
was cautious enough to warn against expanding the obscenity cases beyond
their limited holding.45 6 Because Chafee does not even mention "fighting
words," one should wonder whether he would subscribe to its thesis.4 57
Moreover, Professor Chafee cites no cases in support of his limited suggestion
that profanity and indecent talk and pictures are not essential to the expression
of ideas while citing instances where such prosecutions clearly inhibit
ideas.458

451. Id. at 321.
452. Id. at 330 (Black, J., dissenting).
453. Feiner, 340 U.S. 315. The concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter and the dissents of
Justices Douglas and Minton both cite Chaplinsky as proscribing the incitation of a breach of the
peace by fighting words. Id. None finds the case relevant to Feiner. Id.
454. Id at 325 n.6 (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting CHAFEE, supra note 254, at 524).
455. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) is the landmark case protecting the
right to criticize the government. C.f Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (these and other cases
will be discussed infra).
456. CHAFEE, supra note 254, at 149.
457. Research has failed to reveal whether Chafee ever expressed approval or disapproval of
Chaplinsky. From the quotations of Chafee throughout this Article, disapproval is more likely.
458. CHAFEE, supra note 254, at 150-51.
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9. The Right to Criticize the Government is the Core Value of the First
Amendment and is Protected No Matter How Offensive the Language
A fundamental principle of First Amendment jurisprudence is that a
speaker may never be punished for criticizing the government. This is an
absolute implied in the Constitution from the very first words of the
document--"WE THE PEOPLE"-that the people are the master and the
government the servant and the people must always be free to criticize the
servant without any limitation whatsoever. Meiklejohn makes it apodictically
clear that this principle admits of no exception on the ground that it is the rock
upon which the American constitutional system is founded. 45 9 That
fundamental right was confirmed anew in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan in
the landmark opinion of Justice Brennan for a unanimous Court. 4 60 There is
no Supreme Court case since Chaplinsky that affirms a conviction for
criticizing the government no matter how vicious the language, or how untrue
the charge.46 1
Chaplinsky was convicted of criticizing the government in explicit terms,
462
"the whole government of Rochester are Fascists or agents of Fascists."
Even had the criminal conviction been limited to calling Bowering "a God
damned racketeer and a damned Fascist," without specifying the government
context, that would not change the fact that the government was the object of
the criticism because Bowering was the police chief acting in his official
capacity in denying the speaker the right to speak.
Confirming that Chaplinsky was criticizing government officials, not as
individuals, 463 but qua government, he made it plain that the government,
acting through its officials, as it must, including the police chief, was
459. Meiklejohn, supra note 74.
460. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 292.
461. It was on this basis that Judge Fullam dismissed the libel action brought by the City of
Philadelphia against the Washington Post, claiming that the report of police brutality was false and
libelous. City of Philadelphia v. Wash. Post, 482 F. Supp. 897 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
462. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 568.
463. How could he? There is no evidence that Chaplinsky even knew who the government

officials were. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the Supreme Court held as a
matter of constitutional law that accusations aimed at public officials must identify individuals by
name, or other specific details that all understand refer to individuals, in order for public officials to
bring a libel case. Thus, Sullivan, head of the local police force about which false statements were
made, was barred by the First Amendment from bringing suit for defamation because he could not
show that the reference was to him individually. Id.Although, the case is usually cited for the
proposition that public officials in libel cases must prove that false statements made about them are
made with actual malice. The crucial factor in dismissing the case at the Supreme Court level was
that the police chief was not specifically named or identified. The teaching here is that City Marshal
Bowering should have lost the case because he could not have proven that Chaplinsky targeted him
as an individual.
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betraying constitutional values by failing to protect freedom of speech
because the content of the message was not approved. This is dereliction 'of
official duty in its most egregious form. There is no other possible reading of
Chaplinsky's message.
Because Chaplinsky was addressing "an important representative of the
Rochester city government," comments Rutzick, 464 Chaplinsky's epithets
must be viewed as "a sharply-expressed form of political protest against
indifferent or biased police services in the enforcement of his right to free
speech. 'A 65 In a series of cases where protests against the police ranged from
"loud... boisterous, and... annoying '4 66 to scatological execrations all
infinitely less justifiable than Chaplinsky's meek cri de coeur, all were held
protected speech by the Supreme Court.467
In addition to seeking protection from a hostile audience, as discussed
above, the most important substantive difficulty with the Supreme Court
decision is that it either overlooks or fails to appreciate that Chaplinsky was
engaged in the most protected genre of speech, namely criticizing the
government. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,468 the Court held this to be
the core value of the First Amendment and took under its wing even false
statements made about public officials as long as they were not made with
actual malice. Here that value is enhanced exponentially because the criticism
was aimed at the City Marshal for failing to protect the speaker's right of free
speech. Here protection should be at its highest in a democratic society.
Meiklejohn would add another level of protection because Chaplinsky was
speaking on a public issue-government refusal to protect First Amendment
liberty.469 In the view of this scholar, such speech is entitled to absolute
protection, no matter what.
When government behaves in such a
reprehensible manner it earns the bitterest excoriation the victim can dish out,
and in the case of the abusive Marshal Bowering, the words of Walter
Chaplinsky did not even come close. 470 To focus on the language of rebuke,
rather than the destruction of First Amendment values that led to it, is to reject
464. Rutzick, supra note 6, at 1.
465. Id.
466. Norwell v. City of Cincinnati, 414 U.S. 14, 16 (1973).
467. See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 528 (1972); Lewis v. New Orleans, 408 U.S.
913 (1972); Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914 (1972).
468. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
469. Meiklejohn, supra note 74, at 264-66.
470. As Arnold Loewy characterizes Chaplinsky's address to Bowering, defendant wished to
inform the marshal what he thought of him "in a way which was not only unquestionably clear, was
all too clear." Arnold H. Loewy, PunishingFlag Desecrators: The Ultimate in Flag Desecration,49
N.C. L. REV. 48, 82 (1970); see JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES
599-600 (9th ed. 2001).
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Einstein's Theory of Relativity because the hair of the inventor was
uncombed. Even if it could be said that the fighting words doctrine had merit
in a barroom brawl or a domestic quarrel, it had none in the public forum
where official insouciance as to fundamental freedom was reprimanded in
language suited to get the attention of the real culprit in the piece.
Justice Murphy's citation of the dictum in Cantwell v. Connecticut that
"epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of
information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution ' 471 is added to bolster
the unsupportable assertion that that is all the First Amendment protects. As
pointed out above, there is no such limitation in the Bill of Rights, which
would stand in stark contradiction to Madison's universal protection for
speech. It would add an unreal specter chilling the exercise of free speech as
nothing else that could be imagined by jailing those who are brave enough to
exercise the liberty of expression even under friendly circumstances. Free
speech is a precious right but fragile, too. Most are reluctant, or even fear to
speak now. To add the threat that punishment awaits the speaker who offends
could easily be the death knell for all practical purposes to our "profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,... includ[ing] vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. ' '4 2
In modem life, the limitation on expression proposed by Chaplinsky's
fighting words doctrine is even more jarring. The July 25, 2003 confrontation
by a crowd to the police officer alleged to have killed seventeen-year-old Jose
Luis Ives, Jr., in Weehawken, New Jersey, is far more offensive, derisive, and
annoying than anything said to City Marshal Bowering:
"Jaramillo You
Murdered a Seventeen Years Old Boy.... You don't Deserve the Badge you
Wear.... Weehawken is Backing a Killer ' 47 3 Would anyone dare to suggest
that the author of this message should be prosecuted for fighting words and
sentenced to the penitentiary?
To anyone watching television and especially cable television, where
"Fuck You!" and similar personal epithets are de rigueur, it would be startling
to entertain the proposition that any repetition in real life is criminal. And the
distinctions that a prosecutor might make between "fuck that" and "the
government is fascist," the first permitted and the second not, is too bizarre to
contemplate. Compound the example by the consequence that truth is no
defense, and George Orwell's 1984 is superseded.

471. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S 568, 572 (1942) (quoting Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1940)).
472. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270.
473. Youth's Death Sparks Protest,N.Y. TIMEs, July 26, 2003, at B4.

FIGHTING WORDS

2004]

There are at least three additional reasons for denying the Cantwell
citation significance, or even respect. First, at most the quoted words are
obiter dicta. In that case just two years before Chaplinsky, the holding was
that another Jehovah's Witness-Jesse Cantwell-was shielded by the speech
clause for offending listeners to such a degree that they were prepared to
respond with violence.474 Second, the resounding rhetoric in Cantwell in
favor of unpopular, offensive, and even insulting speech, was laced with
judicial language that such speech "resorts to... vilification of men...
prominent in church or state, and even false statement ' '475 is protected by the
First Amendment. That sentiment presents itself as a harbinger for supreme
protection later proclaimed for public speech, including, at its epicenter,
criticizing government officials. That is the case of Walter Chaplinsky, even
if it was not needed for the vindication of Jesse Cantwell who offended
private persons, not vicars of official authority. Third, Cantwell cited no
cases at all in support of its dictum, let alone convictions based upon the
excerpt extracted by Justice Murphy. Finally, Cantwell ended with the
admonition that "in the absence of a statute narrowly drawn to define and
punish specific conduct as constituting a clear and present danger to a
substantial interest of the State," speech is vouchsafed by the constitution.476
The argument ends where it begins: The government shall make no law
abridging the freedom of speech. Although, the constitutional command is
not always vindicated when evanescent compelling circumstances appear, in
"it is the duty of the Court to be the last, not
the words of Justice 7Jackson,
7
first, to give [it]

up.

4

10. Denial of the Defense of Provocation Is Irrational, Has No Basis in First
Amendment Law, and Undermines It
If provocation is the supervening consideration and trumps all others, why
is provocation by the police that prompts the speaker's reaction deemed
irrelevant, exposing only the citizen response to criminal punishment?
The First Amendment theory that values political speech above all was
justified by Professor Alexander Meiklejohn as central to the notion of a selfgoverning representative democracy.478 That is, free speech is the vehicle by
which the people, as master, convey their wishes and criticisms to the
government, as servant. Accordingly, Meiklejohn attributed to the authors of
474. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1940).
475. Id. at 310.
476. Id. at 311.
477. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 655 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
478. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 74.
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the First Amendment the intention to extol and defend speech on public issues
and to grant it absolute protection without exception. In contrast to "political
speech," all other speech, Meiklejohn continued, gets lesser protection under
the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.4 7 9 That is,
government may suppress, abridge, or punish nonpolitical expression, if it
acts reasonably. Applied to Chaplinsky, whatever criticism defendant leveled
at the police, chief would be protected no matter how offensive, provocative,
or false. However, Meiklejohn need not go so far to rescue the Jehovah's
Witness preacher. It would be enough to say that even under the less
protective due process standard, government may not punish strong language
provoked by an abusive City Marshal using equally harsh talk. More
fundamentally from the point of view of the constitution, the criticism was
clearly justified to shock the public official out of his settled contempt for one
who insists on his First Amendment liberty of freedom of expression.
Chafee would hardly disagree. His disagreement with Meiklejohn is
largely nibbling at the edges, protecting public speech less than absolutely,
nonpublic speech more, and both under the First Amendment. In sum, it is
inconceivable that Professor Chafee meant to convict a citizen protesting
sharply to a mean spirited law enforcement officer that the government failed
to protect his First Amendment right to convey an unpopular message.4 8 °
In a single sentence, Justice Murphy rejected as "open to no Constitutional
objection," important and highly relevant evidence of provocation.48 1 Thus,
the Court affirmed the determination by the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire that provocation is "immaterial. ' ' s2 One might get the impression
from this cavalier dismissal that there was no evidence to support the defense.
Nothing of the kind turns out to be the case, at least if the brief for Chaplinsky
in the United States Supreme Court is to be believed. Neither the New
Hampshire Supreme Court opinion nor the brief for New Hampshire in the
United States Supreme Court seriously disputes Chaplinsky's version of the
facts.483 Perhaps, only because the statute makes no exception for provocation
and the courts take the position that precludes a challenge based on the U.S.
479. That is, the Fifth Amendment applying to federal restrictions and the Fourteenth
Amendment applying to state action.
480. See Chafee, supra note 439.
481. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942).
482. State v. Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d 754, 758 (N.H. 1941).
483. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569-70. Rejecting provocation as a defense, the New Hampshire
Supreme Court said, "[t]he defendant admittedly called the Marshal a damned racketeer and Fascists
in exchange, as the defendant says, for the Marshal's calling him a damned bastard. Either
appellation, applied directly to the other on the street, would clearly be a breach of the statute."
Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d at 759. This passage is cited with approval by the state as appellee in its brief.
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. 568; CHAPLINSKY'S BRIEF, supra note 14, at 20.
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Constitution. That seems plainly wrong on its face because no statute can
determine constitutionality. Just as Justice Murphy deals-albeit cursorilywith the question of whether the statute is too vague under the First
Amendment, whether the police provoked defendant into replying in kind, is
also of constitutional concern.
The facts are rehearsed here because they are highly relevant, if not
determinative. Chaplinsky was endeavoring to exercise his constitutional
right of freedom of speech. The exercise was all the more precious because
the speech was unpopular and the speaker was clearly entitled to call upon the
government to protect that right. The First Amendment is designed to protect
individual rights against the government and the majority of the people who
elect it, and to say that certain speech is unpopular, that is that the people are
against it, is to certify the need for constitutional protection. Only when
speech is unpopular is the protection of speech needed. Popular speech needs
no militia and no First Amendment either. If preservation and defense of
unpopular speech is not among the prime duties of government, the First
Amendment is a nullity and so is the oath to preserve and defend it.
Chaplinsky's version of the facts is as follows. Walter Chaplinsky was'
"an ordained minister of Jehovah God and one of Jehovah's Witnesses. ' ' 484
While distributing Biblical literature entitled "Watchtower," "Consolation,"
and others, can the street in the center of town in Rochester, New Hampshire,
he was assaulted by a man who was accompanied by a police officer, and the
police refused Chaplinsky's request to arrest the assailant.485
Then
Chaplinsky was set upon and beaten by a mob and, according to defendant,
the police joined in.486 The police then started to take Chaplinsky on foot 488
to
487 He was roughly handled by the police.
the police station a block away.
It was in this context-the defendant attempting to exercise his right to
freedom of speech and the hostile police chief in brazen violation of his duty
to protect that right-that Bowering, in further' 48 9aggravation of official
misconduct, called the minister "a damned bastard.
Twice City Marshal Bowering told Chaplinsky to stop and when instead
he demanded that the government protect him in the exercise of his First
Amendment right, Chaplinsky testified, Bowering called him a "bastard" and
this provoked Chaplinsky to resort to the language for which he was

484.
485.
486.
487.
488.
489.

Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. 568; CHAPLINSKY'S BRIEF, supra note 14, at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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charged.490 The basis of the conviction was that Chaplinsky used language
that provoked the average person to fight, that is, engage in violence. 491 If
provocation is the rationale for affirming the conviction, this is hardly the
provocation the law could have in mind because Chaplinsky was not the
provocateur, but the respondent. He did not provoke the police officer but
was provoked by him. Justice Murphy agrees with the New Hampshire
Supreme Court that these facts are irrelevant.4 92 But, how could they be?
They refute the basis upon which the speaker was convicted.
The observation prompts two others. First, a contradiction in the Court's
reasoning: If provocation to violence is the underlying rationale of the
fighting words doctrine, why is it relevant only when a person provokes a
police officer, but not the reverse? It stands the First Amendment on its head
by converting this proud liberty into a liability. Even if the theory is that the
police officer and the civilian are both guilty of fighting words, and the
officer's crime does not excuse the citizen response-which seems to be the
rationale of the New Hampshire Supreme Court-that too undermines the
First Amendment, which is a right of the individual as against the
government. The government has no First Amendment right. Moreover, if
the police action causes the reaction, the reactor cannot be the provocateur.
Second, if, as the New Hampshire Supreme Court seems willing to
concede and the United States Supreme Court accepts, the City Marshal
struck first by calling Chaplinsky a bastard-and even joined the mob attack
upon him-then under the Court's reasoning, the Jehovah's Witness preacher
could have responded in violence with impunity. Yet, he chose to respond
with words and faced criminal charges as a result. The result is absurd and
impeaches the logic upon which the decision is founded. It also turns the First
Amendment into a joke!
Although the New Hampshire Supreme Court rewrote the statute to
provide that fighting words must incite a breach of the peace, and Justice
Murphy enacted his own amendment as the primary meaning of fighting
words, namely, the "very utterance inflict[s] injury, ' 493 Justice Murphy never
states which of the two alternative violations Chaplinsky committed. The
Justice's emphasis on the aim of the statute to punish a breach of the peace
would seem to imply that Bowering, or a reasonable person in his shoes,
would have been incited to respond with violence.49 4 But there is no finding
490. Id.
491. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 579 (1942).

492. See id.
at 572.
493. Id.at 571.
494. Unless Justice Murphy was just intent on copying extensive passages from the New
Hampshire Supreme Court opinion as a means of affirming the conviction, the New Hampshire
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that Bowering did any such thing, and it is unlikely that he did, or would, not
only because he was a police officer, but also because he provoked the
response that he received and would be highly unlikely to aggravate his crime
by adding actual violence to the charge of provoking it. This is especially true
in a public place where the police officer's conduct would be for all to see.
The Chaplinsky Court failed to mention the subject at all.
As Justice Powell recognized thirty years later, even if epithets to an
average addressee might provoke a violent response, "the situation may be
different where such words are addressed to a police officer trained to
exercise a higher degree of restraint than the average citizen., 495 In a parallel
context, Justice Brennan, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, admonished that
government officials "are to be treated as 'men of fortitude,' able to thrive in a
hardy climate" and even if their critics are untruthful, "caustic and...
unpleasantly sharp," their verbal barbs, no matter how virulent, are protected
by the First Amendment. 496 The observation is especially pertinent where the
police officer initiated the provocation.497
11. The Effect of the United States Supreme Court Rewriting the Statute to
Add a New Criminal Offense of Speaking Words That By Their Very
Utterance Inflict Injury Defeats The New Hampshire Court's Rationale, Is
Constitutionally Inconsistent, and Is Ex Post Facto.
a. Defeat of the New HampshireSupreme Court's Rationale
The Supreme Court decision in Chaplinsky also contradicts and
undermines the New Hampshire interpretation of the statute, which that court
maintained is essential to save the law from being unconstitutionally vague.498
As Justice Murphy emphasizes, "the state court declared that the statute's
purpose was to preserve the public peace, no words being 'forbidden except
such as have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to
bench not only did not include the Murphy amendment, but would have found the statute as so
amended in violation of the First Amendment. See Part I.D. 11 .a., infra.
495. Lewis v. New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913, 913 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring). In Rosenfeld v.
New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 904 (1972), Lewis, 408 U.S. at 913, and Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S.
901, 913, 914 (1972), the Court overturned convictions for use of offensive language that makes the
fighting words in Chaplinsky look like a Sunday School sermon. Justice Rehnquist would have
affirmed convictions under Chaplinsky. These cases are discussed supra at notes 311-16, 356, and
elsewhere.
496. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270, 273.
497. If the theory is that Bowering is also subject to prosecution or has been indicted and/or
convicted for addressing fighting words to Chaplinsky, there is no mention of any such facts. That
makes it unlikely to have occurred. More likely, Bowering denied that he provoked Chaplinsky, and
that was the end of it.
498. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573.
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whom, individually, the remark is addressed. ' 499 Justice Murphy goes
further and says, "[e]ven if the interpretative gloss placed on the statute by the
court below be disregarded, the statute had been previously construed [to the
same effect] ....

Appellant need not therefore have been a prophet to

understand what the statute condemned." 500
Yet, Justice Murphy radically reformulates the fighting words doctrine
upon which the New Hampshire Supreme Court based Chaplinsky's
conviction by inserting as Prong 1501 a new crime: to speak "words... which
by their very utterance inflict injury." That relegates to second place, and
perhaps of subsidiary relevance, the sole New Hampshire basis for conviction:
incitement to violence. That is now Prong 2. Thus, it is fair to assume that in
Justice Murphy's view, the conviction is based upon speech without any
provocation to, or possibility of violence. Because there is no indication that
Chaplinsky's conviction was not based on the offense that was primary in
Murphy's mind, presumably it was. Otherwise, it would have been irrelevant
to mention it.50 2 It is also true that neither prong fits because a finding on

Prong 2, as explained in plentitude in Part II.D.4.c is palpably absurd.5 °3
In either event, speech itself was the cause of conviction504--an
intolerable result under the First Amendment. Justice Murphy's creation of
the "words

. .

. themselves inflict injury" 50 5 offense creates constitutional

havoc because he professed to adopt as a principle of law that he is bound by
the state court interpretation of the New Hampshire statute, whereas he
499. Id.
500. Id. at 574 n.8.
501. Referred to previously as Category 5(a), and Prong 2 as 5(b). See supra, Part II.D.2.b and
notes 169-74.
502. There is also no indication whether the other categories of exceptions (lewd-obscene,
profane, and libelous) themselves inflict injury or tend to create a breach of the peace. But
presumably Chaplinsky was not charged with these categories of utterance.
503. Justice Murphy's footnote eight, in maintaining a one-category definition of fighting
words, also contradicts his own theory of a two-prong category and adds substance to my contention
that the definition of what is prohibited is too vague to be constitutional.
504. Van Alstyne suggests a third theory based upon a concept of municipal immunity. That is,
police officers are not required to tolerate an "unmitigated amount of verbal abuse as part of their
work and must refrain from striking back," or, the interest of not "provoking the ... officer or
subjecting him to personal humiliation... would justify the restriction [on First Amendment rights]."
VAN ALSTYNE & BRUSTEIW, supra note 342, at 727, n.23. It seems that in an effort to solve a minor
and artificial problem, Van Alstyne creates a major one. Exempting those government officials most
likely to confront individuals from the most vigorous-even provocative-criticism from the people
would be a betrayal of the core value of the First Amendment. It calls to mind the wisdom of Justice
Harlan in Cohen v. Californiain rejecting "the self-defeating proposition" that in an effort to prevent
censorship by others, "States may more appropriately effectuate that censorship themselves." 403
U.S.15, 23 (1971).
505. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
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blatantly contradicted it. Murphy quoted extensively from the opinion of the
Supreme Court of New Hampshire on the ground that the state court
"authoritatively construed" the statute, and that construction is binding on the
United States Supreme Court.5 °6 The New Hampshire court repeatedly
emphasized that the New Hampshire statute was limited to words that have
the "direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the persons to whom,
individually, 50 7 the remark is addressed., 50 8 The lynchpin of the New
Hampshire decision that the legislation was not unconstitutionally vague is the
assurance, "[w]e have never applied the statute otherwise., 50 9 On this basis,
New Hampshire rejected defendant's contention that the statute "is so vague
and indefinite that one coming within its purview may not know what is
prohibited ' 5 0 because all the defendant had to do was to read the opinions in
512
5 11
In footnote 8, Justice Murphy concurs.
previous cases.
Obviously, what was vexing the New Hampshire justices was that the
statute staring them in the face was written to punish speech pure and simple.
As said above, legislators know how to write "breach of peace" or "violence"
when they want to.51 3 Obviously, the prosecution understood that the crime
was speaking words that offend, deride, or annoy because that is what the law
said, and the indictment followed the statutory language and charged such
speech without a hint of violence or breach of the peace.5 14 The statute just as
plainly was a textbook example of transgression of the First Amendment. It
was this pit that the New Hampshire jurists were attempting to arch. Imagine

506. Id.
507. If provocation of responsive violence is the basic fear of the so-called "fighting words"
limitation on speech, it seems inconsistent, if not passing strange, to punish only words addressed to
an individual. Inciting a mob, or any crowd of people, is more likely to produce a violent response
than inciting only one person. There is no such limitation in the general law of incitement. See, e.g.,
Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
508. State v. Chaplinsky, 48 A.2d at 758; Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573. In a paraphrase of
which words violate the statute, the New Hampshire court adds ambiguity compounded by vagueness
with the phrase "and other disorderly words, including profanity, obscenity, and threats" without the
breach-of-the-peace enclitic. State v. Chaplinsky, 48 A.2d at 762. In the text of this Article, the U.S.
Supreme Court compounds the ambiguity and elevates it to the level of unconstitutionality by
deleting the seven-word quarantine that the New Hampshire Supreme Court imposed as imperative to
avoid unconstitutional infection.
509. State v. Chaplinsky, 48 A.2d at 762 (emphasis added).
510. Id.
511. Despite the monomania to convince that breach of peace is a sine qua non, the New
Hampshire Supreme Court creates ambiguity with words condemning defendant's speech as
"offensive as a matter of law," id., without the essential element, breach of peace. One has to pick-up
that predicate from language strewn on the landscape.
512. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 574 n.8.
513. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518; see also supra notes 196-99 and accompanying
text.
514. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569.
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their shock when they read that the supreme guardians of our liberties jumped
in to criminalize words without prospect of disorder.
It is more than curious that although Justice Murphy quotes extensively
from the New Hampshire opinion, including both the sentence before and
after the passage "[w]e have never applied the statute otherwise," these
crucial seven words are omitted.5 15 Not only is no explanation given for the
excision, but the clear impression is conveyed by Justice Murphy, explicitly
previously, and thereafter implicitly reaffirmed, that the New Hampshire
interpretation is adopted, and on this basis the conviction is affirmed.
It is important to emphasize that if fighting words varied one iota from the
breach-of-peace rationale, the New Hampshire Supreme Court would have
reversed the conviction of Walter Chaplinsky. That would include the
Murphy amendment, which I have designated Prong 1, namely, "words...
which by their very utterance inflict injury." The New Hampshire Supreme
Court obviously never uttered these words. Justice Murphy added them
without any notice that, in this important respect, he was deviating crucially
from the New Hampshire definition of fighting words that he purported to
adopt in total. Nor did he give notice that he was bowdlerizing the New
Hampshire opinion by excising the seven ineffable words italicized above that
admonished that only by limiting
the statute to breach of the peace could it be
16
considered constitutional.
As shown above, Justice Murphy cites Chafee as the sole authority for
Prong 1 and that is unjustified. 517 Reliance upon Chafee is misplaced.518
Because the 1941 update of Chafee's popular 1925 treatise was published
after the New Hampshire opinion, perhaps it came to Murphy's attention at
that time. But because the same passage appeared in the prior edition of
Chafee available to the New Hampshire courts and none cited it, it is a fair
inference that it was rejected as inconsistent with New Hampshire's
interpretation of its statute. 519 The Murphy invention does more than add
515. Id. at 572 (citing CHAFEE, supra note 93, at 149).
516. Murphy's Law posits no violence or breach of the peace, nor any prospect thereof, New
Hampshire finds it essential.
517. See supra Part II.D.8. Since the 1941 update of Chafee's popular 1925 treatise, Free
Speech in the United States, was published after the New Hampshire Supreme Court handed down its
decision, perhaps Chafee came to Justice Murphy's attention at that time. But since the same
passage appeared in the prior edition of Chafee and the New Hampshire courts did not cite it, it is a
fair inference that it was rejected as inconsistent with the state's interpretation of its own statute. It
surely was. The Murphy invention does more than add an additional prong to New Hampshire's
fighting words doctrine, it contradicts it. In addition, as pointed out in Part II.D.8 of this Article,
neither Chafee not Justice Murphy cited any cases in support of such a radical evisceration of the

First Amendment.
518. See supra Part II.D.8.
519. As pointed out in Part II.D.8 of this Article, neither Justice Murphy nor Chafee cited any
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another strand to the fighting words doctrine announced by the state tribunal.
It undermines and contradicts it. Murphy's Law posits no violence or breach
of the peace; New Hampshire finds it essential.
b. ConstitutionalInconsistency
Conceptually speaking, Murphy in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire betrays
a fundamental inconsistency in constitutional reasoning by approving
"words ...[whose] very utterance inflict[s] injury, 5 20 without the necessity
of provoking violence, while approving the words chosen by the state
legislature-"offensive, derisive or annoying"-only when they do. The
contradiction undermines the Supreme Court's constitutional reasoning in
creating the fighting words exception to the First Amendment. The attempted
reconciliation is opportunistic-what is needed to sustain the conviction, for
"offensive, derisive or annoying" are too vague and overbroad to withstand
First Amendment examination and have to be reinvented as provocation to
violence in order to sustain the conviction and imprisonment of the Jehovah's
Witness daring to criticize the government and its police. At the same time,
the case provided the predicate for what Justice Murphy really had in mindpunishing "lower value speech," an expression that did not fit within his
cramped view of the First Amendment. Thus, the Murphy revisions, both
addition and subtraction, betray the true motive of the entire fighting words
invention.
As such, the "words-themselves-inflict-injury" prong of
Chaplinsky is a loose cannon to be picked up and fired upon whatever speech
is opposed.
Thus, for example, Professor Thomas Grey wrote a speech code for
Stanford University bottomed on the authority of the "very-utterance-inflictinjury" prong of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.521 In June 1990, the
University adopted a provision prohibiting:
Speech or other expression ...(a) intended to insult or stigmatize an
individual or small group of individuals on the basis of their sex, race,
color, or handicap, religion, sexual orientation, or national and ethnic
origin; and (b) is addressed directly to the individual or individuals
whom it insults or stigmatizes; and (c) makes use of 'fighting' words
or non-verbal symbols. In this context, insulting or 'fighting' words
or non-verbal symbols are those 'which by their very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace,' and which
cases in support of such a radical evisceration of the First Amendment.
520. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
521.
Thomas C. Grey, Responding to Abusive Speech on Campus: A Model Statute,
RECONSTRUCTION, Winter 1990, at 50, 53.
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are commonly understood to convey direct and visceral hatred or
contempt for human beings on the basis of their sex, race, color,
522
handicap, religion, sexual orientation, or national and ethnic origin.
In Corry v. Stanford,523 the provision was invalidated as a violation of a
California statute applying the First Amendment to private universities. The
court held the provision overbroad under Chaplinsky because it was not
limited to immediate violence. 524 Thus, the first prong of Chaplinsky was not
followed by the state court, and because the decision
was not appealed, the
5 25
Court.
Supreme
States
United
the
reached
never
issue
Even if one accepts arguendo Justice Murphy's proffered rationale that the
danger of breach of the peace is the motivation for punishing the defendant's
speech, the attempt to justify conviction on the ground that the police chief
would hit the Jehovah's Witness clergyman for calling him a damn fascist or
racketeer is too feeble for refutation. The lameness of the effort is further
proof that the real5 holding
of Chaplinsky is to bar people from "talking back"
26
officer.
police
a
to
Van Alstyne, apparently sensing the fragility of this rationale offers
another. That is, "whether police officers must accept an unmitigated amount
of verbal abuse as part of their work and must refrain from striking back, or
whether... subjecting him to personal humiliation in the circumstances
would justify the restriction on [the speech] of the citizen., 527 The theory
abandons the expectation of violence, and one wonders whether if grabs hold
on to the "words-themselves-inflict-injury," or whether it is more likely a new
exception to the First Amendment based upon exempting public employees
from the risks of their trade. If the latter, it certifies the danger that
Chaplinsky has opened the floodgates to yet more insidious-but wellintentioned 528-"category"-inspired abridgements of freedom of speech. In
522. See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 3, at 1050-51.
523. No. 740309 (Cal. Super Ct. Santa Clara Co. Feb. 27, 1995) (order granting preliminary
injunction). Stanford University did not appeal the decision.
524. Id.
525. The Stanford speech code was also invalidated as content-based under R.A. V v. St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377 (1992), discussed below. Grey persists in believing that Chaplinsky Prong 1 is
available to censor speech without expectation of a violent response. See Thomas C. Grey, How to
Write a Speech Code Without Really Trying: Reflections on the Stanford Experience, 29 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 891, 911-17 (1996).
526. This concept is further explored in Part III, infra, where state courts use the fighting words
doctrine to limit speech directed toward police officers. As shown in that Part, the United States
Supreme Court and most lower federal courts do not convict for fighting words; state courts do.
527. VAN ALSTYNE & BRUSTETN, supranote 342, at 727, n.23.
528. As Brandeis admonished, "Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect
liberty when the . . . purposes are beneficent.... The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious
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either case, it prods the fertility of the imagination on criminalizing speech
found offensive.5 29
The desire on the part of Justice Murphy to escape the obvious is laid bare
by the injury that words may inflict. And speech may hurt. James Madison
understood that. So did Lenin when he preached that free speech is dangerous
because criticism prevents government or society from doing what it believes
is right.530 Because the First Amendment protects all speech, the Chaplinsky
premise must be that some technique must be devised to punish speech that
the people do not like, and fighting words is the 1942 effort.53'
c. Ex Post Facto
Another major constitutional objection to the Chaplinsky opinion is that
criminalizing at the Supreme Court level for the first time "words... which
by their very utterance inflict injury''532 is tantamount to legislating a new
crime. The language was not contained in the New Hampshire statute of
which the Jehovah's Witness preacher was convicted, the indictment, nor the
opinion of the New Hampshire Supreme Court that affirmed the conviction.
It is in essence an ex post facto law prohibited by Article I, Section 9, clause 3
of the United States Constitution, when enacted by Congress, and by Article I,
Section 10, clause 1.1, when enacted by a state. Tribe points out that
"although the ex post facto prohibition applies of its own force only to
legislative acts rather than to judicial decisions, unforeseeable judicial
enlargements of criminal statutes have been struck down as violative of due

encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding." Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
529. In addition to Grey, supra note 507, other academics would punish speech without the
prospect of violence. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993); MARI J. MATSUDA
& CHARLES R. LAWRENCE III, WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE
SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993). The various theories designed to escape the First
Amendment absolute "no law abridging the freedom of speech" basically start from Justice Murphy's
opinion and emphasize again and again the risk that opinion poses to our most fundamental of
liberties. For a stalwart in defense of the First Amendment, not limited to the context of this Article,
see NADINE STROSSEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEECH, SEX, AND THE FIGHT FOR
WOMEN'S RIGHTS (1995); Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest
Proposal?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 484; Nadine Strossen, Regulating Workplace Sexual Harassment and
Upholding the FirstAmendment-Avoiding A Collision, 37 VILL. L. REV. 757 (1992).
530. In 1920 in Moscow, Lenin said, "[w]hy should freedom of speech and freedom of the
press be allowed? Why should government which is doing what it believes to be right allow itself to
be criticized?... Ideas are more fatal than guns." WILLIAM J. SMALL, POLITICAL POWER AND THE
PRESS 31 (1972).
531. Cynicism would call to mind George Santayana's "There is no God, and Mary is his
mother!" Robert Lowell, For George Santayana,in LIFE STUDIES, ROBERT LOWELL 51 (1959).
532. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
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process when applied retroactively."53' 3 Although it seems more familiar and
therefore acceptable when the Supreme Court strikes down a statute 534 or
reverses a lower court opinion as transgressing constitutional precincts, the
Court also reverses its own decisions when a more perspicuous understanding
of the document ushers in a new dawn. That is precisely what is required
here. As Tribe suggests, when a reviewing court creates a new crime,
technically the constitutional violation is characterized as due process of law,
rather than the ex post facto clause. Nevertheless, a serious constitutional
violation is nonetheless registered.
E. The U.S. Supreme Court Should Have Reversed the New Hampshire
Supreme Court on Other Grounds, Thus Avoiding the Fighting Words Issue
1. Intent
The Supreme Court did not sufficiently address the issue of the requisite
intent in the statute. Justice Murphy simply noted that the complaint charged
that Chaplinsky:
with force and arms, in a certain public place in said city of Rochester,
to wit, on the public sidewalk on the easterly side of Wakefield Street,
near unto the entrance of the City Hall, did unlawfully repeat, the
words following, addressed to the complainant, that is to say, 'You are
a God damned racketeer' and 'a damned Fascist and the whole
government of Rochester are Fascists or agents of Fascists'
the same
535
being offensive, derisive and annoying words and names.
There was no elaboration or explanation of the meaning of "with force
and arms," and the reason this language is quoted is never explained.
A fair reading of the statute would seem to require "intent to deride,
offend or annoy," when the offense is addressing "any offensive, derisive, or
annoying word," to another. Yet, the New Hampshire Supreme Court limited
the requirement of intent to the second part of the statute only, i.e., making
noise. Chaplinsky was not charged with the second part of the statute; thus,
533. TRIBE, supra note 166, at 632 (citations omitted).

534. See, e.g., Strogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (2003).
535. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569. Because Justice Murphy upstaged the New Hampshire
Supreme Court rationale by adding that fighting words primarily include words which themselves
inflict injury, the provocation to violence would seem relegated to secondary significance, if not
rejected outright. See supra Part ll.D. 11. This glaring inconsistency has prompted some scholars to
suggest that subsequent Supreme Court decisions have silently deleted Justice Murphy's
"augmendment" (my portmanteau neologism). See TRIBE, supra note 166, at 850. The news has not
reached Justice O'Connor, who most recently cited it in Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
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intent was not an issue. Moreover, since that reading of the statute is so
peculiar and is so much of a piece with the judicial replacement of the statute
criminalizing words by one provoking violence, it bears repeating here that
intent was never charged. The criminal complaint merely recited that
Chaplinsky "unlawfully" said the offending words, and perhaps that was
meant to allude to "intent," and, perhaps, "with force and arms" was supposed
to aim in the same direction.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court seemed to be proceeding upon the
assumption that it was necessary to define "intent" in the statute, and in doing
so, interpreted it to mean intent to say the words, not intent to offend, deride,
annoy, or insult.53 6 But, that seems contradicted by the statement that the
statute translates into "fighting words" those words uttered "without a
disarming smile. 53 7 That curious lexicographical invention would seem to
require intent to inflict the injury that the statute envisions, and in this sense is
a direct contradiction of the Court's insistence to the contrary. But, nothing
can be taken for certain in an opinion shrouded with fog 538 perhaps because
the New Hampshire court realized that clarity would betray the
unconstitutionality of a statute that the court mightily struggles to rescue.
Moreover, the reading that no intent is required to do the evil prescribed in
the statute is plainly at variance with the only legislative definition of intent in
the statute and therefore contradicts its plain meaning: "No person shall
address any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any other person.., with
intent to deride, offend or539annoy him, or prevent him from pursuing his lawful
business or occupation."
The statute defines intent, and the New Hampshire court limits it to the
latter part of the sentence pertaining to noises, but not to the first part of the
sentence pertaining to the three offending words. That is irrational. But it is
not surprising because the New Hampshire Supreme Court's interpretation of
the entire statute is obviously an effort to sustain a conviction in face of the
statute and the evidence.
Therefore, it is fair to characterize the whole effort as a judicial invasion
of the legislature, which, as I contend in the next Section, should not have
been permitted by the United States Supreme Court. The New Hampshire
Supreme Court's interpretation also virtually reads intent out of the statute.
536. State v. Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d 754, 758 (N.H. 1941) ("[Tlhe only intent required for
conviction under the first part of the section was an intent to speak the words.").
537. Id. at 762. This phrase is adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Chaplinsky, 315
U.S. at 573, and compounds the vagueness as explained supra, Parts II.D.2 and 11.
538. In constitutional terms, the statute both on its face and as refashioned by the Court is
vague and overbroad, as argued supra, Parts II.D.2 and 11.
539. State v. Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d at 757.
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This interpretation raises the further question under both criminal law and
constitutional law, especially under the First Amendment,540 whether
criticizing a public official without intent to offend, deride, or annoy is
unconstitutional on its face.54'
Yet, Justice Murphy never deals with the issue. 542 Nor do the facts in the
record or any reasonable inferences therein fill the void. There is no evidence
that the Jehovah's Witness preacher knew City Marshal Bowering, or of him,
or that there was any history of past dealing between the two. Therefore,
Chaplinsky had no desire, motive, or intent "to offend, deride, or annoy"
Bowring or provoke Bowering in any way. He intended only to speak, and
therefore he was entitled to the law's protection. Chaplinsky was intent upon
delivering his message, unpopular as it was, that Jehovah's Witnesses
condemn what he termed the "racket" of organized religion, and upon
persuading the people to adopt the beliefs and practices of his sect.
Furthermore, when denied official protection and faced instead with crude
police complicity in the assault of the mob, Chaplinsky still could not be
charged with forming the intent to do the evil that the statute portended. His
intent was simply to voice his displeasure at the breakdown of constitutional
order and aim it directly at the Marshal who was responsible for the municipal
dereliction.
In the years since Chaplinsky, as shown in Part II.D.9, the Court has
recognized the importance of the right to speak out against the government.
543
Even if the intent "to offend, deride, or annoy," whatever that may mean,
were proven, the right to speak on public issues, including "an expression of
grievance and protest" against "government and public officials," must
triumph. 544 For example, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Court
extended First Amendment protection to false statements criticizing official
540. In Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 362-63 (2003), the Court emphasized that the
government, consistent with the First Amendment, may only ban cross-burning if carried out with the
intent to intimidate. Id. The emphasis on intent there is instructive here.
541. It also raises a question under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
whether one can be convicted of a crime without evil intent. Whether criticism will provoke a
violent reaction because of the message, no matter how mild the words, will be dealt with later on.
542. Whether intent is required with respect to the second effect of noise, i.e., "to prevent [the
addressee] from pursuing his lawful business or occupation," is not clear. Because this effect is in
the disjunctive, introduced by the word "or," and without the specific inclusion of "intent" as in the
prior phrase, one can only guess. It can be argued either way. This is a subquestion of the general
query whether the intent clause is a catch-all and applies to both parts of the statute, i.e., words and
names as well as noises, or whether it is only required when one makes noise "to deride, offend, or
annoy." Justice Murphy does not say.
543. And neither the United States Supreme Court nor the New Hampshire Supreme Court
even attempts to say. See infra Part II.E.2.
544. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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conduct that diminishes the reputation of city officers. 45 In Cantwell v.
Connecticut, the conviction of a Jehovah's Witness for offending listeners to
the point of violent reaction was reversed where "inten[t] to insult or affront"
was lacking.546 Where, however, the evil intent specified in the statute is
absent, and that intent to speak is alone enough to send the speaker to jail, the
First Amendment becomes a slave's shackle, not a liberty of the free.
2. The Court Should Not Have Permitted the New Hampshire Supreme Court
to Rewrite the Statute Converting It from a Punishment of Speech to a
Prevention of Violence
As argued above, the statute enacted by the New Hampshire legislature
was constitutionally indefensible because it clearly criminalized speechspeech that offends, derides, and annoys, but speech nevertheless. There is no
hint of violence, breach of the peace, or disorder, in the language of the
statute, and to read that into the law as the intent of the legislators is to accuse
them of not knowing the English language! Ten years after Chaplinsky,
Justice Black characterized the statute as "making it an offense to direct
insulting words at an individual on a public street. Chaplinsky had violated
that law by calling a man vile names 'face-to-face.' ' 547 There is no mention of
violence or provoking a fight. The prosecutors also understood that the crime
was words, and words alone, because the indictment charges Chaplinsky with
speaking, without any hint of the potential for violence. 548 Nor was there any
such proof, obviously, because that was not considered an element of the
offense.
Yet, the New Hampshire Supreme Court changed the statute from a crime
to speak to a crime to provoke violence. Even if the change of direction from
punishing the perpetrator of violence to punishing the speaker could pass First
Amendment scrutiny-and I contend that it cannot-the entire effort was
beyond the power of a state court, and the United States Supreme Court
should never have permitted it under any circumstances.
The First
Amendment protection against government interference with speech is
enunciated in such apodictic terms in the Bill of Rights that the judges are
primed to extend extraordinary protection, not to search for means of
suppression.
That the United States Supreme Court permitted the New Hampshire
Supreme Court to replace the state ban on speech by substituting legislation,
545. Id.at 290-92.
546. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308-09 (1940); see also MEIKLEJOHN, supra note
74.
547. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 272 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting).
548. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569.
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which the state court composed for the purpose of surviving First Amendment
inquiry, is cause enough to repudiate Chaplinsky and the doctrine for which it
stands. In other words, what the state court did was to replace a blatant
legislative abridgement of speech5 49 with an enactment attempting to pass as
prevention of violence. The latter, the thought was, could be disguised as
conduct and thus escape First Amendment detection. The United States
Supreme Court should never have permitted such judicial invasion of the halls
of the legislature. 550
Although the dogma has been that in interpreting a state statute, federal
courts defer to the state judiciary, in the cause of freedom of expression there
have been notable exceptions. In my view, the United States Supreme Court
should have examined the statute itself to seek its plain meaning as the Court
did thirty years later in Gooding v. Wilson. 551 There, a Georgia statute
provided that whoever "shall, without provocation, use to or of another...
opprobrious words or abusive language, tending to cause a breach of the
peace," was guilty of a misdemeanor. 2 The language of the statute was more
synchronous with the definition of fighting words than the New Hampshire
legislation, and because it excused words provoked by another, it had a better
claim to constitutionality than the New Hampshire statute. The Georgia
Supreme Court upheld the validity of the statute, as well as the conviction of
antiwar protesters who screamed to a police officer, inter alia, "White son-ofa-bitch, I'll kill you .... I'll choke you to death... I'll cut you all to
pieces! ' '553 Justice Brennan, for the Court, disregarded the interpretation by
the Georgia Supreme Court of the statute, saying, "[w]e have, however, made
our own examination of the Georgia cases... [and conclude that] the Georgia
appellate decisions have not construed the [statute] to be limited in
application, as in Chaplinsky,554 to words that 'have a direct tendency to cause
549. And so the prosecution understood because, as stated above, the indictment never charged
violence, breach of the peace, or any potential for either. The charge was. merely that defendant said
the words "the same being offensive, derisive and annoying words and names." Id. at 569.
550. In Israel, where the separation of powers doctrine is nowhere written, and in the absence
of a formal constitution, and where the Supreme Court of Israel is called upon to interpret British
Mandatory restrictions as applied to the Israeli democracy, there is more reason to expect the
judiciary to "interpret" regulations by revising them. See Schnitzer v. Chief Military Censor, 42 P.D.
(4) 617 (S.Ct. Israel 1988) (Hebrew), reproduced in English translation in 9 SELECTED JUDGMENTS
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL, 1977-90, at 77 (1995). Justice Aharon Barak, now President of
the Supreme Court of Israel, ruled that speech that the British Mandatory regime prohibited was now
protected as demanded by "autocratic rule ... replaced by democracy." See VICKI C. JACKSON ET
AL., COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 334 (1999).

551.
552.
553.
554.

405 U.S. 518 (1972).
Id. at 519.
Id. at 520.
The reference to Chaplinsky, I understand, was formulaic and not to sanction the practice
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acts of violence by the person to whom, individually, the remark is
addressed." 55 5
Gooding invalidated a state statute, which-albeit far more limited than
the New Hampshire statute in Chaplinsky-was read by the Court in a manner
contrary to the state interpretation, and did not defer to the state reading.5 56
Following that practice, and on the authority of Gooding, Justice Brennan in
Lewis v. City of New Orleans again ignored the state court interpretation of a
statute protecting police officers from "opprobrious" and abusive language.5 57
In Lewis, the Louisiana Supreme Court limited the statutory prohibition to
said that the plain words of the statute were
"fighting words" but the majority 558
broader and unconstitutionally so.

In City of Houston v. Hill,559 again the Court rejected the plea to deter
ruling on a city ordinance barring interrupting a police officer in the
performance of duty until it could be narrowed to First Amendment
dimensions.560 Justice Brennan cited settled law that "[w]here there is no
ambiguity in the state statute, the federal court.., should proceed to decide
the federal constitutional claim," and especially where the state law abridges
freedom of expression. 561 Because the ordinance was "plain and its meaning
unambiguous," the Court permitted no state court interpretation and struck it
down as a violation of the First Amendment. 562 In an analogous First
Amendment context, in United States v. American Library Association,
Inc.,563 Justice Souter dissented from the majority holding that Congress could
require libraries receiving federal funds to filter computers. The Court's
holding was based on the ground that the statute violated the First
Amendment and on the Solicitor General's assurance at oral argument that it

because the issue was not raised.
555. Gooding, 405 U.S. at 524.
556. See also Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 148 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting), where
Justices Brennan, Marshal, and Stevens refused to accept the state court's limitation of a child
pornography statute barring possession of "nude" photographs to those "constitut[ing] a lewd
exhibition or involv[ing] a graphic focus on the genitals." In dissent, the three Justices found the
statute overbroad and would reverse the conviction for possession of child pornography. Id.at 12835 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
557. Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 134 (1974).
558. In dissent, Justice Blackmun reiterated his argument, first made in Gooding, that the Court
should abide by the state court interpretation of the state statute. Id. at 136-38. (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
559. 482 U.S. 451 (1987).
560. Id.
561. Id. at 468.
562. Id.
563. 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
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was "government policy" not to enforce that statute as written. 564
Had Justice Murphy in Chaplinsky read the New Hampshire statute and
ignored the New Hampshire "born-again" formulation, 565 he would have had
no choice but to declare it in violation of the First Amendment. In the service
of free speech,566 I submit that was what the United States Supreme Court was
bound to do.567
Had that been done, as I have explained above, the New Hampshire
statute would have been ruled to be both overbroad and vague in violation of
the First Amendment. Even more troubling is that there is a clear likelihood
that the more apt the criticism of the public official, the sharper the sense of
offense, derision, and annoyance.
III. ALTHOUGH THE COURT HAS NEVER UPHELD A CONVICTION FOR
FIGHTING WORDS SINCE CHAPLINSKY, THERE IS DANGER THAT THE CASE
WILL DETER SPEECH, LARGELY CRITICIZING THE POLICE AND THE
GOVERNMENT

A. No Fighting Words Convictions Upheld
Although the United States Supreme Court has never upheld a conviction
for fighting words in the sixty-two years since Chaplinsky, and has protected
speech vastly more offensive than the mild protest in Chaplinsky, the case is
cited widely with no consensus on what the doctrine is, thus presenting the
danger of prosecution which may deter speech, largely in criticism of the
police and the government. The Court has never upheld a conviction for
fighting words under either Prong 1, "those which by their very utterance
inflict injury," or Prong 2, "tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace. 5 68 I know of no other case where the Court has invented a doctrine
564. Id. at 232. The majority relied upon the Solicitor General's assurance that upon request by
adults, librarians could unblock computers. That, Justice Souter said, would "tak[e] the curse off the
statute." But it was the duty of the Court "to review the statute" that gave no such permission and
thus violated freedom of speech. Id. at 232-33.
565. Or, in the words of Justice Brennan in Hill, quoting in part from Shuttlesworth v.
Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 153 (1969): "[I]t is doubtful that even 'a remarkable job of plastic
surgery upon the face of the ordinance' could save it." City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 469
(1987) (quoting Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 153 (1969)).
566. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 489-90 (1965).
567. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), where the Supreme Court ignored the Florida Supreme
Court's interpretation of a Florida statute and stopped the recount of votes in the presidential election,
effectively giving victory to George W. Bush, stands as a monument to the determination of the
Supreme Court to pursue its own interpretation of a state statute when the motivation to do so is
sufficiently compelling.
568. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
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and never upheld it. One might conclude that because both prongs are so
problematical constitutionally as explained in this Article, six decades of
inaction can safely be interpreted to signal its demise. But the Court cites
Chaplinsky not infrequently-both prongs-and in modem contexts and that
is hardly consistent with a death notice. Moreover, the references are so
disparate, they demonstrate that there is no consensus on what the fighting
words doctrine is.
B. No Consensus On What the Doctrine Is
The Court is not of one mind in what Chaplinsky stands for. Because the
Supreme Court has never upheld a conviction for fighting words since the
1942 decision in Chaplinsky, which created the category of speech not
protected by the First Amendment, the Court's understanding of the doctrine
must be gleaned from opinions of the various Justices who have mentioned
either the decision or the doctrine in their opinions. That is not an easy task
because most of the references or citations are for the proposition that not all
speech is protected.
Because Chaplinsky is still cited, that is some evidence that the fighting
words doctrine remains on the minds of the Justices. Even there we cannot be
sure. In the opinion of Justice Kennedy in Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White, 569 where he reiterated his view that "content-based speech restrictions
that do not fall within any traditional exception" should be held invalid per se,
in listing those exceptions, fighting words is not mentioned. At best, it would
have to be assumed under some general reference, such as "incitement to
lawless action," although that seems inapt because that category is classically
framed to point to cases of the criminal syndicalism variety, such as
Brandenburgv. Ohio,57 ° where the speaker advocates violent means to effect
political and economic change. Less likely is Justice Kennedy's additional
exception, i.e., speech "calculated or likely to bring about imminent harm the
State has the substantive power to prevent.', 571 Is omission to cite Chaplinsky
a hint that at least in the mind of Justice Kennedy, fighting words has
disappeared from the categories of unprotected speech?
The cases show that where there is a specific mention of Chaplinsky, it
seldom reveals whether it fits into any of the ten possible interpretations of
Justice Murphy's opinion in Chaplinsky listed above in Part II.C. 1. The
reason is that these opinions recite different passages from Chaplinsky without
any sense that they are to be emphasized, and others excluded. Nor are later
569. 536 U.S. 765, 793 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
570. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
571. 536 U.S. at 793 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Justices always sensitive to the fact that different passages of Justice
Murphy's Chaplinsky opinion convey vastly different messages.
I have posited in Part II.C. 1 that there are at least ten possible readings of
Justice Murphy's opinion, limited to individual face-to-face confrontations in
a public place. That seems to me to be the thrust of the opinion and indeed
some justices, such as Justice Brennan in Texas v. Johnson 72 and Justice
Harlan in Cohen v. California,573 distinguish Chaplinsky on that ground that it
does not apply where the addressee or audience consists of more than one
person, such as a crowd, or the public. But the implication, if not the express
language, of opinions of other Justices do not agree, or appear not to agree.
For example, then Justice Rehnquist dissenting in Texas v. Johnson appears to
be saying that flag-burning in public constitutes fighting words, or is like it.
He does not .make clear which.574 Justice O'Connor joins in this opinion
without comment that would inform specifically to what she subscribes.575
In Rosenfeld v. New Jersey,57 6 defendant addressed a school board
meeting attended by 150 people and "used the adjective 'm[other] f[ucker]'
on four occasions to describe the teachers, the school board, the town, and his
own country." He was convicted of "indecent" and "offensive" language in
public places "likely to incite the hearer to an immediate breach of the peace,.
or... in the light of the gender and age of the listener and the setting of the
utterance, to affect the sensibilities of a hearer., 577 The conviction was
reversed.5 78 Justices Burger, Blackmun and Rehnquist in dissent said the

572. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
573. 403 U.S. 15 (1973).
574. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 421-36 (1989). Although Chief Justice Rehnquist's
dissent is apparently based upon the ground that burning the flag constituted fighting words, different
passages implicate at least four different theories. Three spring from the sentence, "[t]he public
burning of the American flag... was no essential part of any exposition of ideas [Chaplinsky], and at
the same time it had a tendency to incite a breach of the peace." Id.at 430. That is, the following
three categories forfeit First Amendment protection: One-ideas which can be expressed differently,
meaning more gently, and therefore are not "essential"; Two-words which tend to incite a breach of
the peace (5(b) above); and Three--One and Two expressed in public, contradicting the holding in
Chaplinsky limiting fighting words to those that "have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by
the person to whom, individually, the remark is addressed." Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573. One is
repeated as the predicate for the Chief Justice's conclusion, "[a]s with 'fighting words,' so with flag
burning, for purposes of the First Amendment." Johnson, 491 U.S. at 431. Four-There is also the
statement that flag burning is "conduct," which is not protected under the First Amendment, id.at
433, contrary to Rehnquist's earlier characterization as "expression," id.,
which is. I conclude that the
Chief Justice is saying that flag burning in public constitutes fighting words under Chaplinsky. As
explained elsewhere, that is a metastasis that further debilitates freedom of expression.
575. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 421.
576. 408 U.S. 901 (1972).
577. Id at 904 (Powell, J., dissenting).
578. Id.at 901.
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speaker was guilty of fighting words. 579 There, too, the dissent stretches the
requirement
of
face-to-face-confrontation-in-a-public-place
individual
Chaplinsky to the arena of a public meeting.
In Virginia v. Black,580 Justice O'Connor cites in dictum the all-purpose
language of Chaplinsky that not all speech is protected while the main purpose
of her opinion is to hold that cross-burning with specific intent to intimidate is
a "threat" not protected by the First Amendment. This prompts a reversal of
the dismissal by the Virginia Supreme Court, which ruled that the crossburning proscription on its face violates freedom of speech. 581 Because
Justice O'Connor does not say that Chaplinsky is limited to individual face-toface encounters, and cross-burning is usually not limited to a single addressee
in a public place, one could read her view as not restricting Chaplinsky to
individual face-to-face encounters. Indeed, one could argue that her
concurrence in Rehnquist's 1989 opinion condemning flag-burning in Texas
v. Johnson 82 now reveals that she so intended all along.
Moreover, it is even possible to read O'Connor in the cross-burning case
to mean that intimidation in its general sense is a new category of fighting
words or other Chaplinsky categories not protected by the free speech clause
of the First Amendment. If so, that could result in the first holding since 1942
affirming a conviction for fighting words.
As noted above, some scholars have speculated that Prong 1 of the
Murphy opinion-words themselves inflict injury-has desiccated 583 even if
Prong 2-provocation to violence-has not. Apparently, the word has not
reached Justice O'Connor for she evidences no such awareness. Crossburning is cited for the fear of violence that it instills in the object of the threat
or intimidation, and as such, if it is an illustration of fighting words, it falls
more likely under Prong 1-words or expression which themselves inflict
injury. That would have the unique effect of breathing life for the first time
into the Murphy amendment, a first in the annals of Supreme Court
jurisprudence. Of course, this reading of Justice O'Connor's opinion in
Virginia v. Black flies in the face of Justice Murphy's insistence in Chaplinsky
that fighting words is limited to provocation of violence by the individual
579. Id. at 909 (Burger, C.J., Blackmun, J., and Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
580. 538 U.S. 343, 388 (2003).
581. Id. at 347-48.
582. 491 U.S. at 421.
583. See, e.g., SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 3, at 1043 (stating that Cohen v. California
"undermined the notion that there is any unprotected category of 'words that by their very utterance
inflict injury'), 1047 (citing John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of
Categorizationand Balancing in FirstAmendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1975) for the
proposition that Cohen "limited the unprotected category of 'fighting words' to 'an unambiguous
invitation to a brawl').
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addressed, but so does his "word-themselves-inflict-injury" creation itself.184
This is hardly the way constitutional law should be made and in the
sensitive area like the First Amendment new exceptions to the guarantee of
freedom of expression should not be oozed through the interstices of a
hibernating jurisprudence.
Other citations of Chaplinsky limit it as a cork tossed upon a raging sea.
Cohen v. California,585 for all practical purposes overrules it and FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation586 resurrects it as a monster from the deep.
Justice Harlan in Cohen protects "Fuck the Draft" on a jacket visible to
the public in a sweeping opinion declaring that the speaker decides what
words are to be used-not the government-and no matter how offensive,
coarse, or vulgar, that choice is protected. 587 Harlan dismisses Chaplinsky as
limited to individual face-to-face address inapplicable to a public statement,
but the more meaningful point is that government may not act as "guardians
of public morality '588 to "prescribe the form or content of individual
expression., 589 It is a matter of "individual dignity and choice upon which our
political system rests., 590 It is essential to protect "even offensive utterance"
in order to guarantee "the right to criticize public men and measures...
[including] freedom to speak foolishly and without moderation." 591 The
opinion is a paean to the principle that "the Constitution leaves matters of
taste and style to the individual" and the danger that "governments might soon
seize upon the censorship of particular words
as a convenient guise for
592
banning the expression of unpopular views."
Justice Harlan's sweeping opinion in Cohen v. California sinks
Chaplinsky and the "morality" it preaches. Blackmun, Burger, and Black in
dissent cite Chaplinsky clinging to that morality and even extending it beyond
face-to-face encounters to the public at large.593
Seven years later, the dissenters won out: Chaplinsky breaks out into the
public broadcasting forum in what may be its most extravagant stretch. The
584. The contradiction is of Justice Murphy's own making. In Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 574 n.8,
the Justice says that the fighting words statute is limited to "provok[ing] the person against whom it
was directed to acts of violence." Yet, his Prong 1 criminalizes words without violence. Id. at 572.
585. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
586. 438 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978).
587. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 22.
588. Id.
589. Id at 24 (emphasis added).
590. Id.
591. Id. at 26 (quoting Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 673-74 (1944)).
592. ld. at 25-26.
593. See id. at 271 (Blackmun, J., Burger, J., and Black, J., dissenting) (citing Chaplinsky, 315
U.S. at 572).

2004]

FIGHTING WORDS

opinion for the Court in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation594 holds that the FCC
may ban the broadcasting of George Carlin's famous monologue "Filthy
Words," at least during daytime. Justice Stevens, writing for himself, Burger
and Rehnquist, cites for its authority the most problematic language of
Chaplinsky: "Such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas,
and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may
be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality. 595
This extends Chaplinsky to its most dangerous bloat-censorship at will.
Carlin's message was to teach an essential point, namely, that government
permits only language it approves. As Justice Brennan points out in his
dissent, speakers who do not so confine their expression are not legitimate and
are excluded from the public airwaves.5 96 The approach not only violates the
First Amendment but is, in the opinion of Justice Brennan, also racist because
597
ordinary vocabulary of blacks, for example, is not sanctioned.
Moreover, Carlin's utterances are essential to the exposition of this idea
for the need is to attract attention to a drastic infringement on First
Amendment speech. Limp language and jejune jingoism will be ineffective
and the message will be disregarded. The lesson taught by Cohen v.
Californiawas brutally cast aside. Carlin chose his words "as much for their
emotive as their cognitive force... the more important element of the overall
message," and the government "seize[d] upon the censorship of particular
words 59as8 a convenient guise for banning the expression of unpopular
views. 5
As a practical matter, Cohen overruled Chaplinsky, and Pacifica
resurrected it to overrule the First Amendment itself. Because Pacifica
banned free speech about free speech on the public airways at the risk of
terminating a broadcasting license, it is no exaggeration to say that it imposes
capital punishment for speaking on the airways and is the nadir of protection
for freedom of speech. It is important to keep in mind that the authority
claimed for this devastation is Chaplinsky that has now proved itself as a
loose cannon for the purpose of unlimited censorship.599
Both cases cannot exist on the same planet, and in the interest of freedom
of speech, both Chaplinsky and Pacifica must go. Other citations of
594. 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978).
595. Id. at 746 (citing Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572).
596. Id. at 772 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
597. Id. at 776.
598. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26.
599. See also New York v. Ferber,458 U.S. 757 (1982), where Chaplinsky is cited to permit the
state to ban child pornography not obscene and not defined and without any cited limit.
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Chaplinsky further serve to emphasize the troublesome quarrels the case has
caused on the meaning of the decision.
In Lewis v. New Orleans (Lewis 1)600 and Lewis 11, 601 the Court reversed a
conviction where the lower courts ruled that a defendant could not "wantonly
. . curse or revile or ... use obscene or opprobrious language" to a police
officer on duty on the ground that "opprobrious" is not limited to fighting
words.6 °2 Justice Powell, concurring, made a powerful argument that police
are trained to exercise a greater degree of restraint than the ordinary civilian
and are charged by the Model Penal Code to do SO. 60 3 Otherwise, the law
would "confer on the police a virtually unrestrained power to arrest and
charge persons with violation.... Indeed, the language used need not be
addressed directly to the officer since the ordinance is violated even if the
objectionable language is used 'with reference to any member of the city
police.' 60 4 Justice Powell says that it is unlikely that a police officer would
react in violence to the words of a middle aged woman no matter how vile or
provocative the language.60 5 A fortiori, the City Marshal who called the
Jehovah's Witness minister a bastard, and heard the word returned, would
not-and as far as the evidence in the case shows, did not-"react in
violence." The Powell view is a complete renunciation of Chaplinsky and
would extirpate the case completely.
In Lucas v. Arkansas,60 6 Blackmun, Burger, and Rehnquist, dissenting,
read Chaplinsky to permit conviction for words to the police "calculated to
arouse to anger the person about or to whom, it is spoken or addressed, or to
cause a breach of the peace., 60 7 Defendant addressed the police, "Well, there
goes the bid [sic] bad mother fucking cops.... Look at the chicken shit
mother fucker .... Look at the chicken shit mother fucker hide over there
behind that sign .... Now the sorry son-of-a-bitch is going to come back over
here., 60 8 Petitioners were arrested and convicted of breaching the peace, in
violation of Arkansas law. 60 9 The dissenters apparently felt that any of the
alternatives-such as arousing anger-without provoking violence-satisfied
Chaplinsky. That would extend the fighting words doctrine beyond
*

600.
601.
602.
603.
604.
605.
606.
607.
608.
609.

408 U.S. 913 (1972).
415 U.S. 130 (1974).
Id. at 132.
Id. at 134-35 (Powell, J., concurring).
Id.at 135-36.
Id.
416 U.S. 919 (1974).
Id. at 920.
Id.
Id. at 919.
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recognition.
City of Houston v. Hill6 1° and Coates v. Cincinnati1 follow the Powell
approach in denying the application of the fighting words doctrine to the
police. Both proclaim that statutes making it unlawful to "annoy" police and
' 61 2
the like "[contain] an obvious invitation to discriminatory enforcement
granting the police discretion to arrest on the basis of the content of speech,
which is particularly repugnant given "[t]he eternal temptation ... to arrest
613
the speaker rather than to correct the conditions about which he complains."
"The freedom of individuals verbally to oppose or challenge police action
without thereby risking arrest is one of the principal characteristics by which
we distinguish a free nation from a police state.' ,,614 Moreover, "[t]he
Constitution does not allow such speech to be made a crime. ,,615 In my view,
this is the proper view of free speech, especially vis-A-vis the police and the
sentiments expressed repeatedly in these and other cases undercut the basis of
Chaplinsky.
There are many other cases that cite Chaplinsky, but those discussed
above offer a fair sample of the cross-currents the case has engendered. It is a
sixty-two year career of controversy on major points. R.A. V. v. City of St.
Paul616 includes virtually the entire array alluded to above.
In R.A. V., the Court reversed the conviction under an ordinance making it
a crime to burn a cross that arouses anger in others on the basis of race.617
Justice Scalia, accepting the state court interpretation that the ordinance
penalized only "fighting words," nevertheless held that it was facially invalid
as content-based because only certain offensive expressions were made
criminal and not others.618 Justice Scalia adopted the concept of Chaplinsky
that offensive expression, which was not essential to the communication of
ideas was not protected under the First Amendment. 6 19 He conceded that
fighting words did express ideas but not only were they not essential but were
also outweighed by the interest in order and morality. 620 No mention was
made of the Chaplinsky assertion that the First Amendment was limited to the
610. 482 U.S. 451, 480-81 (1987).
611. 402 U.S. 611,615 (1971).
612. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 465 n.15 (quoting Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615-16 (1971)).
613. Id. at 465 n.15 (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 65 (1971) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting)).
614. Id. at 462-63.
615. Id. at 462.
616. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
617. Id.
618. Id.
619. Id. at 383.
620. Id.
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search for truth. Nor does he say whether the city may criminalize crossburning on public property as such, whether it comes under fighting words or
not. That was not an issue in the case.
Scalia quotes the language from Chaplinsky, which encompasses both
Prong 1 (speech itself tends to cause injury) and Prong 2 (speech tends to
cause an immediate breach of the peace), but as in Chaplinsky itself, the Court
does not say which prong would be involved. Because there is no talk of
violence, cross-burning as expression would by its very utterance presumably
cause injury. As to whether fighting words have to be face-to-face, Scalia
does not say. Here, although the cross is burned on the property of the victim,
one could argue that it is face-to-face to the family. But it is not face-to-face
as in Chaplinsky where no one other than the individual police officer could
witness the expression. Scalia does not say whether it is more like a statement
to a crowd and not an individual as Chaplinsky envisioned.
White, Blackmun, O'Connor, and Stevens in part,62 1 say the ordinance is
overbroad and reject Scalia's notion of under-inclusiveness and that makes it
a regulation of certain speech based on content. They adopt both prongs of
Chaplinsky and seem to indicate that Prong 1 is involved because they say
that the insults and offense here are not the injury Chaplinsky had in mind.
They agree that the speech has to be individually addressed and there is no
indication that that is satisfied here.622
Stevens,623 White, and Blackmun approved Chaplinsky as a categorical
approach, and Stevens quoted the language of limitation of classes of speech
not essential to search for truth outweighed by order and morality. 624 He
favors categorization of classes of speech 625 and notes, "[c]ore political speech
occupies the highest, most protected position '' 626 in "the hierarchy in the
constitutional protection of speech" but does not relate that to the Chaplinsky
speech directed to government misfeasance. Justice Stevens "do[es] not
believe that fighting words are wholly unprotected by the First
Amendment, ' 627 and that this subject matter regulation is valid if the
ordinance is not overbroad. Here, burning a cross on the property of a family
628
trapped in its home "was nothing more than a crude form of intimidation,,
621. Id.at 397 (White, J., concurring).
622. Id.at 415-16 (finding no First Amendment objection to punishing race-based fighting

words).
623.
624.
625.
626.
627.
628.

Id.at
Id.at
Id.at
Id.at
Id.at
Id.at

416 (Stevens, J., concurring).
417.
428.
422.
428.
432.

FIGHTING WORDS

20041

and were fighting words, which "by their very utterance inflict injury." One
may burn a cross on public or private property so long as it "is not so
threatening and629so directed at an individual as to 'by its very [execution]
inflict injury. ,,

The variety of opinions in R.A. V. alone, and in conjunction with other
cases mentioned, many inconsistent and many having very little to do with the
Chaplinsky facts, and even the opinion, show that the entire doctrine is in
disairay. In the cause of freedom of expression, in my view, they call for the
overruling of a doctrine that was ill conceived because it violated fundamental
precepts of the First Amendment and has been troublesome and threatening to
free speech values ever since.
C. Language ProtectedIs Vastly More Offensive Than
the Mild Protest In Chaplinsky
In Parts II.D.4 and III.B, I cited many Supreme Court cases after
Chaplinsky that protected speech which was significantly more offensive,
derisive, annoying, and provocative than the mild protest of Walter
Chaplinsky, the Jehovah's Witness preacher.
Since Chaplinsky, the Court has protected speech so much more
scurrilous, vicious, annoying, offensive, and derisive than the words that sent
the Jehovah's Witness preacher to jail, one might contend that this
jurisprudence is tantamount to declaring the 1942 decision stillborn.
The Court has extended First Amendment protection to virtually a lexicon
of coprolalia, language mainly excoriating government, principally the police.
The cases and the expressions are listed in Part II.D.4.a. 630 Accordingly, I
have advanced the position that it is improper as a matter of constitutional law
631
to justify Chaplinsky on the basis of "morality," as Justice Murphy asserts.
In addition, many cases were cited that held that the words in the New
Hampshire statute were unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. These
decisions sink Chaplinsky into oblivion as far as scurrilous language is
concerned, and extend First Amendment protection beyond anything that the
author of Chaplinsky could have dreamt of. That alone has quarantined the
case and explained why it has not spawned a single Supreme Court decision
affirming a conviction for fighting words.
The cases protect not only sexual and racist language but other

629. Id.at 436.
630. See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949), and Kuntz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290,
303 (1951), where the Court commented that the language was far worse than the language in
Chaplinsky.
631. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
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contemning, negative, or unpopular references as well. It bears repeating here
that the word "fascist"-which ignited the ire of the New Hampshire and
United States Supreme Courts and was the "big bang" which gave birth to the
fighting words doctrine-was declared protected speech a year after
Chaplinsky in Cafeteria Employees Local 302 v. Angelos 632 and again in
Letter Carriersv. Austin. 633 And in Brown v. Oklahoma,634 "mother-fucking
fascist pig cops," was protected. The Court paid no heed to the Chaplinsky
l
condemnation of "fascist" as fighting words for eternity. 631 And for all
practical purposes, protection for "fascist" was affirmed again in Smith v.
Collin,636 when the Court denied certiorari in the Skokie litigation holding that
the Nazi march in a Jewish community of Holocaust survivors was protected
by the First Amendment. If there ever was a case of speech that is "offensive,
derisive, and annoying" and designed explicitly to provoke a violent reaction,
this was it. 637 Never again did the Court deny the word "fascist" free speech
protection.
The teaching here is that the First Amendment is not designed to censor
words to the level of the King James version of the Bible, or "only what is fit
for children," 638 but to protect speech as it is spoken by the people whose
liberty is the design of the Bill of Rights.6 39 Chaplinsky was wrong when
decided and wrong now. 64 0 Freedom of speech demands that speech be free
and not subject to the Sword of Damocles hanging over the head of a wouldbe speaker to be wielded by some prosecutor acting as censor. Because words
directed to the police present the greatest risk of punishment, when in our
hierarchy of values they should be the most protected, Chaplinsky needs to be
extinguished explicitly, not only in spirit but also in name.

632. 320 U.S. 293, 296 (1943).
633. 418 U.S. 264 (1974).
634. 408 U.S. 914 (1972) (referring to Brown v. State, 492 P.2d 1107, 1107 (Okla. Crim. App.
1971)).
635. In Chaplinsky, the New Hampshire Supreme Court doubted that "damn Fascist" would
ever cease to be fighting words. State v. Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d 754 (1941).
636. 436 U.S. 953 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
637. Cross-burning, and to some, flag-burning, may claim membership in the category of
exceedingly reprehensible or hateful expression constitutionally protected, except when amounting to
a direct threat of immediate bodily harm. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003); see United States
v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). For that reason those
cases are also included in supra Part II.D.4.b.
638. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26
(1971).
639. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 761 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
640. Citing Justice Kennedy for the Court in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), in
overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), that held that homosexuals have no right to
privacy.
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D. Dangerof Not OverrulingChaplinsky
It would be unwarranted to conclude that there is no danger to freedom of
speech on the theory that Chaplinsky has been quarantined and the fighting
words doctrine rendered lame. As long as the virus remains viable, even
though dormant, it will chill speech, and that is enough to require that the
danger be eradicated. As is said in many ways in this Article, in the area of
freedom of expression, arguably our most precious liberty, it is easily the most
fragile. People are reluctant to speak even where there is no danger of
prosecution. When there is a danger, speech is an act of heroism where few
will venture. For most, it is of little comfort to know that in the face of a
criminal prosecution the First Amendment may be brandished as a shield.
Even if a defendant in a prosecution based on alleged fighting words is
ultimately victorious, the time and expense of a criminal trial incurs a cost.
How many employers have policies allowing their employees time off to go
defend themselves in a criminal prosecution?
How many personal
relationships survive unscathed while one of its participants endures a
criminal trial? And if success in an action ultimately requires resort to the
appellate courts, it will be years before a defendant has final resolution. The
individual might win the battle but lose the war. This is why the threat of
prosecution must be eliminated in its entirety and Chaplinsky be overruled.
1. Threat of Prosecution For Criticizing the Police and the Government
The danger is especially acute, I have emphasized, when a police officer is
offended whether or not there is any justification for police action.
64 1
In Hess v. Indiana,
for example, in an antiwar demonstration on a

college campus, Gregory Hess was telling his compatriots to postpone a
march on the street as the police had demanded. He said, "[w]e'll take the
fucking street later [or again]." The sheriff was within earshot and was
offended by the choice of words, and indictment followed on the transparently
spurious ground that the language "was intended to incite further lawless
action. ' 6 2 The Supreme Court summarily reversed. 64' This is one of many
state prosecutions for words-just words-listed in this Article, principally in
Part II.4.b, where state courts convicted and the United States Supreme Court
reversed on First Amendment grounds.
None of these cases would have ever made it even to the grand jury if the
Supreme Court had made it crystal clear that words, no matter how offensive,
are protected speech. This lesson comes with special force where-as in most
641. 414 U.S. 105, 107 (1973).
642. Id.at 108.
643. Id. at 109.
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of the cases cited-words are spoken to the police-the most frequent contact
persons have with government. As long as Chaplinsky stands, words to the
police, either "offensive" to, or critical of the addressee or third parties, run
the risk of prosecution! The Supreme Court cases cited certify the danger,
which is intolerable in a society where freedom of speech is the supreme law
of the land!
2. States Cannot Be Relied Upon to Obey Supreme Court to Protect Speech
What must be kept in mind is that all of these cases came from state courts
where the speaker was convicted and the U.S. Supreme Court reversed on the
basis of the First Amendment. This sorry state of affairs has not gone
unnoticed. Justice Douglas placed the blame squarely on the state courts for
refusing to follow the decisions of the Supreme Court. In Karlan v.
Cincinnati,644 Douglas dissented from the decision to remand such cases and
called for outright dismissal required by the First Amendment:
Under our constitutional scheme, federal courts were not designed as
the only protectors of federal rights. Article VI, cl. 2 expressly directs
that the 'Constitution, and the Laws of the United States ...shall be
the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding.' Thus '[s]tate courts are bound equally
with the federal courts' to protect federal rights. Public Service
Commn' v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 247 (1952). The decisions of
this Court are to guide state courts in the exercise of this duty. But
experience has shown that such guidance is often unheeded. The duty
of the States in this area has long been clear. After Chaplinsky, federal
intervention in Terminiello should have been unnecessary. After
Chaplinsky and Terminiello, Gooding should have been unnecessary.
Yet after them all, the State Supreme Court in Lewis, or
reconsideration in light of Gooding, again failed to narrow the
ordinance and affirmed a conviction which we found necessary to
reverse. The principle in Lewis was not new; it was not new in
Gooding, nor in Terminiello, nor even in Chaplinsky.6 45 State courts,
however, have consistently shown either inability or unwillingness to
apply its teaching. I thus see nothing to be gained by state court
reconsideration in light of Lewis. I would reverse these judgments out
644. 416 U.S. 924, 928 (1974).
645. "See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). Nor were Gooding and Lewis,
the only recent instances of its reaffirmance. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971);
Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564, 567 (1970); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969)."
Id. at 928 n.4 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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of hand.646
In Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad,647 Douglas again stressed
that state courts cannot be trusted to stop censoring and start obeying the First
Amendment.
The lesson learned from the Lewis cases is especially instructive. In
Lewis J648 the Court reversed a conviction under a statute making it unlawful
"to curse or revile or to use obscene language toward ...any member of the
city police" where a mother protesting the arrest of her son called the officers
"G[od] d[amn] m[other] flucking] police." As noted above, Justice Powell
concurred on the ground that police are required to exercise a higher degree of
restraint than others and therefore addresses to the police are entitled to a
higher degree of protection under the First Amendment.6 49 On remand, the
state again convicted, and in Lewis J,650 the Supreme Court reversed again on
the ground that "the state may not punish such words on the theory that police
6 51
officers deserve greater respect than the average citizen. ,
Justice Douglas was right. The teaching cannot be missed: state courts
will continue to convict for words unless the Supreme Court tells them
unequivocally not to.
652
An especially telling illustration is the recent case of State v. Robinson
where the Montana Supreme Court upheld a conviction for "fighting words"
for cursing a police officer. Defendant saw the officer sitting in his car and
called him a "fucking pig., 653 The policeman then parked his car, pursued

defendant on foot, and asked him what he wanted to say.654 Defendant
responded, "[fluck off, asshole." 6 " Defendant claimed First Amendment
protection for criticizing the police, citing the decision of the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United States. v. Poocha.656 The Montana
Supreme Court refused to follow the Ninth Circuit, saying that it was not
bound by lower federal court decisions even though the Ninth Circuit in
Poocha relied upon an array of Supreme Court decisions cited in this Article,
646.
647.
648.
649.
650.
651.
652.
653.
654.
655.
656.

Id at 928 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
420 U.S. 546, 563 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the result).
408 U.S. 913 (1972).
Id.at 913.
415 U.S. 130 (1972).
Id.at 132 n.2.; see TRIBE, supra note 166, at 849-50 n.2.
82 P. 3d 27 (Mont. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S.Ct. 2106 (2004).
Id.at 28.
Id.at 28-29.
Id.at 29.
259 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2001).
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including, City of Houston v. Hill,657 that cursing police is protected speech,
citing Lewis v. City of New Orleans;658 Gooding v. Wilson;659 and New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan,66 among others.
As the appendix to this Article documents, although federal courts largely
follow the Supreme Court in not upholding convictions for fighting words,
state courts do, mainly to punish ordinary people-principally racial
minorities-for talking back to the police. Cases cited in this Article confirm
the hint of racial profiling.
3. The Practical Lesson Chaplinsky Teaches: Don't Talk Back to the Cops!
Most defendants cannot afford the expense of litigating even a single trial,
let alone appeals. For most, the end of the line is when the police officer
reacts to speech either with a blow of a police baton, reprimand, or arrest.
Upon indictment, most defendants plead guilty. The message taught at this
level is, "[d]on't talk back to the cops!"'661 And especially if the defendant is a
racial minority. The modem term is racial profiling. What a cynical
mistranslation of the Bill of Rights, and it finds support in Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire. The Supreme Court is as distant as the farthest star. But, as
Justice Jackson admonished, "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in... matters of opinion,' 662 and the right of the individual to
choose the form of expression is the essence of such liberty.663

657. 482 U.S. 451, 461 (1987).
658. 415 U.S. 130 (1974).
659. 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
660. 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964). The passage quoted from the New York Times included, "[I]t is
a prized American privilege to speak one's mind, although not always with perfect good taste, on all
public institutions, and this opportunity is to be afforded for 'vigorous advocacy' no less than 'abstract
discussion."' Id. at 269 (citation omitted). The Ninth Circuit in Poocha said, "the area of speech
unprotected as fighting words is at its narrowest, if indeed it exists at all, with respect to criminal
prosecution for speech directed at public officials." Poocha, 259 F.3d at 1081. In response to a
police directive to move on, defendant in Poocha "clench[ed] his fists, st[u]ck out his chest, and
yell[ed] 'fuck you."' Id. at 1079. The Ninth Circuit held that this was protected speech. Id. at 1081.
661. In preparation for this Article, students, principally Edmond J. Ghisu and Scott Elwell,
prepared a survey of lower court cases, state and federal, involving fighting words, together with
legal analysis and comments. It supports the conclusion I have stated here by adding to those state
cases reversed by the United States Supreme Court and which I have cited. The survey of lower
court cases that did not reach the Supreme Court shows that state courts do convict for fighting
words, while lower federal courts largely follow the Supreme Court and do not. The survey is
attached as an Appendix to this Article. It ends in 1999 and therefore does not include more recent
cases such as Robinson v. State and U.S. v. Poocha, cited supra,Part III.D.2.
662. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
663. Cohen, 405 U.S. at 25-26.
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IV. CONCLUSION

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire should be overruled explicitly and the
fighting words doctrine to which it gave birth repealed. Sixty-two years of
error is enough! The decision was ill-conceived in an opinion which
endangers freedom of expression. Felix Frankfurter's classic shield for
reversing erroneous judgments is, as I have said, "Wisdom too often never
comes, and so one ought not reject it merely because it comes late.''664 What
Justice Murphy was thinking in handing down this unwise and surely
catastrophic opinion, is now buried in the dust of history. It is for us, the
living, to bury the judgment itself. As President Aharon Barak wrote in his
magisterial Harvard Law Review article, The Supreme Court, 2001 Term,
Foreword. A Judge on Judging: The Role of A Supreme Court in a
Democracy, if judges admit their mistakes, it will strengthen public
confidence in the judiciary.665
In other fields of law, perhaps erroneous judgments become transformed
into meaningless benignity. But with respect to freedom of expression, where
the First Amendment absolutist language is counterintuitive anyway, and
fertile minds never cease the search for limitations on speech,666 ancient land
mines present themselves for the purpose. In defense of such an essential
freedom, extraordinary protections pertaining only to freedom of expression
have to be constructed, for example, the doctrines of overbreadth that permit
challenging laws that can be validly applied to a party to a lawsuit or criminal
prosecution, but not to other potential, mythical speakers. In such an
environment, the fighting words doctrine makes no sense and even though no
conviction based on it has ever been upheld by the United States Supreme
Court, that is no assurance that it may not spring from the dicta of opinionsnot all dissenting-breathing vitality into the inert menace.
In reality, in my opinion, the Supreme Court itself has worn down the
fighting words doctrine into a shadow of itself. Some scholars have argued
that what I have termed Prong 1-words whose very utterance inflict injuryhas been so ignored so as to be abandoned.66 7 That would leave only Prong
2-words tending to create an immediate breach of the peace. The Court has
664. Supra note 229.
665. 116 HARV. L. REv. 61 (2002). Barak takes issue with Justice Jackson's "[w]e are not final
because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final." Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.
443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). Barak says, "The finality of our decisions is based on our
ability to admit our mistakes." Barak, supra, at 61.
666. NAT HENTOFF, FREE SPEECH FOR ME-BUT NOT FOR THEE 1 (1992) (quoting Phil Kerby,

editorial writer for the Los Angeles Times: "Censorship is the strongest drive in human nature; sex is
a weak second!").
667. See TRIBE, supra note 166, at 850.
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never said that and in the recent Virginia cross-burning case, Virginia v.
Black,668 one could interpret the decision to say that Prong 1 has been cloned
into a new exception to freedom of speech protection. But, why do intelligent
people have to guess at what our basic liberties mean? It is enough that the
Court keeps citing Chaplinsky as if it still lives. Why must we wait to find out
when the chill it poses under present doctrine alone demands univocal repeal?
The First Amendment demands no less.

668. 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
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APPENDIX
I. FEDERAL COURTS LARGELY FOLLOW THE SUPREME COURT IN NOT
UPHOLDING CONVICTIONS FOR FIGHTING WORDS, BUT STATE COURTS

Do,

MAINLY TO PUNISH RACIAL MINORITIES FOR TALKING BACK TO THE POLICE

A. Introduction and Overview
Eighty-nine fighting words cases 669 were thoroughly examined and
analyzed for the purpose of this survey. From April 1996 to September 2001,
there were thirty-nine federal cases
and fifty state cases 67 1 concerning the
669. For the purpose of this survey, the appellation "fighting words case" refers to any case in
which: (1) a court determined whether particular speech constituted fighting words; (2) a challenge
was made against a statute punishing speech as fighting words; (3) a court mentioned fighting words
and accompanying penalties regardless of the speech at issue in a specific case; or (4) in rare
instances, a court cited Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), the seminal fighting
words case. In no case in the survey, however, did the court state specifically that conviction was
based on the fighting words doctrine, or Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire. Conviction technically may
have been based on a statute such as disorderly conduct, or offensive uttering, and in this respect it
followed the New Hampshire state court in Chaplinsky.
670. The federal cases included in this survey are: McCurdy v. Montgomery County, 240 F.3d
512 (6th Cir. 2001); Lewis v. Wilson, 253 F.3d 1077 (8th Cir. 2001); U.S. v. McKinney, No. 003228, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 10839 (10th Cir. May 25, 2001); Gulliford v. Thrash, No. 00-35005,
2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 7844 (9th Cir. April 25, 2001); Saxe v. State College Area Sch. Dist., 240
F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2000); Kapadia v. Tally, 229 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2000); U.S. v. Woodlee, No. 997154, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 13019 (10th Cir. June 9, 2000); Posr v. Court Officer Shield #207, 180
F.3d 409 (2d Cir. 1999); Whelan v. Blakeslee, No. 97-7735, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 12615 (2d Cir.
May 1, 1998); Gulliford v. Pierce County, 136 F.3d 1345 (9th Cir. 1998); Spiller v. City of Tex. City,
130 F.3d 162 (5th Cir. 1997); Clarke v. Stalder, 121 F.3d 222 (5th Cir. 1997); Gold v. City of Miami,
121 F.3d 1442 (1 th Cir. 1997); Carroll v. Jaques Admiralty Law Firm, P.C., 110 F.3d 290 (5th Cir.
1997); Sandul v. Larion, 119 F.3d 1250 (6th Cir. 1997); Locricchio v. Richards, 94 F.3d 652 (9th Cir.
1996); Walker v. Briley, 140 F. Supp. 2d 1249 (N.D. Ala. 2001); Baskin v. Smith, No. 1:99-CV-846,
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7018 (W.D. Mich. May 22, 2001); Ancheta v. Watada, 135 F. Supp. 2d 1114
(D. Haw. 2001); Abrams v. Walker, 165 F. Supp. 2d 762 (N.D. I11.2001); Sons of Confederate
Veterans, Inc. v. Holcomb, 129 F. Supp. 2d 941 (W.D. Va. 2001); Tigrett v. Rector & Visitors of
Univ. of Va., 97 F. Supp. 2d. 752 (W.D. Va. 2000); Thompson v. Town of Front Royal, No.
5:98CV00083, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3876 (W.D. Va. March 16, 2000); Tatton v. City of
Cuyahoga, 116 F. Supp. 2d 928 (N.D. Ohio 2000); Smith v. Metro North Commuter R.R., No.
98Civ.2528 (RWS), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14168 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2000); Russoli v. Salisbury
Township, 126 F. Supp. 2d. 821 (E.D. Pa. 2000); Nichols v. Chacon, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1099 (W.D.
Ark. 2000); Dallas v. City of Okolona, No. 1:98cv254-D-D, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16696 (N.D.
Miss. Aug. 30, 2000); Anderson v. Milbank School District, 2000 DSD 49; U.S. v. Popa, 187 F.3d
672 (D.D.C. 1999); Scroggins v. City of Topeka, 2 F. Supp.2d 1362 (D. Kan. 1998); Johnson v. City
of Chester, 10 F. Supp. 2d (E.D. Pa. 1998); In re Sanders, 234 B.R. 818 (M.D. Ala. 1998); Sons of
Confederate Veterans v. Glendening, 954 F. Supp. 1099 (D. Md. 1997); U.S. v. McDermott, 971 F.
Supp. 939 (E.D. Pa. 1997); Keith v. Shuh, No. l:96cv39-D-D, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10560 (N.D.
Miss. July 14, 1997); Brooks v. N.C. Dep't of Correction, 984 F. Supp. 940 (E.D.N.C. 1997);
Brockway v. Shepherd, 942 F. Supp. 1012 (M.D. Pa. 1996); Heller v. Hodgin, 928 F. Supp. 789
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fighting words doctrine either explicitly, which was the case in very few
instances, or implicitly via related legal devices, which was the norm.
Specifically, this survey comprised all federal cases (excluding United States
Supreme Court cases) dealing with fighting words in some related fashion
from April 1996 to September 2001; it also included all state Supreme Court
cases, all lower court state cases from Georgia and New York, as well as a
small number of randomly-chosen lower court state cases from other locales,
such as Florida and Minnesota, during the same time span.
While the number of federal fighting words cases occurring during this
time span certainly was not minuscule, it was substantially dwarfed by the
plethora of state cases either directly referring to the fighting words doctrine
or employing its related techniques.
In addition, the ratio of federal courts
(S.D. Ind. 1996).
671. The state cases included in this survey are: Exparte N.W., 748 So. 2d 190 (Ala. 1999); In
Re Julio L., 3 P.3d 383 (Ariz. 2000); Johnson v. Arkansas, 343 Ark. 343 (2001); Shoemaker v.
Arkansas, 38 S.W.3d (Ark. 2001); Bailey v. Arkansas, 972 S.W.2d 239 (Ark. 1998); Aguilar v. Avis
Rent A Car Sys., 980 P.2d 846 (Cal. 1999); Connecticut v. Szymkiewicz, 678 A.2d 473 (Conn.
1996); Miller v. Florida, 780 So. 2d. 197 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Jack v. State, 536 S.E.2d 235
(Ga. Ct. App. 2000); Woodward v. Gray, 527 S.E.2d 595 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000); Evans v. State, 525
S.E.2d 780 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999); Lundgren v. State, 518 S.E.2d 908 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999); Tucker v.
State, 504 S.E.2d 250 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998); Anderson v. State, 499 S.E.2d 717 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998);
Hope v. State, 486 S.E.2d 658 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997); Carroll v. State, 481 S.E.2d 562 (Ga. Ct. App.
1997); In re D.A.D., 481 S.E.2d 262 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997); Nunn v. State, 480 S.E.2d 614 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1997); Remeneski v. Klinakas, 473 S.E.2d 223 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996); Johnson v. Indiana, 743
N.E.2d 755 (Ind. 2001); Allen v. Indiana, 716 N.E.2d 449 (Ind. 1999); Whittington v. Indiana, 669
N.E.2d 1363 (Ind. 1996); Iowa v. Button, 622 N.W.2d 480 (Iowa 2001); Iowa v. Milner, 571 N.W.2d
7 (Iowa 1997); Maine v. York, 732 A.2d 859 (Me. 1999); Minnesota v. Tomlin, 622 N.W.2d 546
(Minn. 2001); Kelly v. City of Minneapolis, 598 N.W.2d 657 (Minn. 1999); Minnesota v. Machholz,
574 N.W.2d 415 (Minn. 1998); Minnesota v. Ihle, No. C5-00-1262, 2001 Minn. App. LEXIS 385
(Minn. Ct. App. April 17, 2001); Montana v. Nye, 943 P.2d 96 (Mont. 1997); Montana v. Granby,
939 P.2d 1006 (Mont. 1997); Nebraska v. McKee, 568 N.W.2d 559 (Neb. 1997); Nebraska v.
Hookstra, 630 N.W.2d 469 (Neb. 2001); In re Spivey, 480 S.E.2d 693 (N.C. 1997); New York v.
Tichenor, 680 N.E.2d 606 (N.Y. 1997); New York v. Livio, 187 Misc. 2d 302 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 2000);
New York v. Yablov, 183 Misc. 2d 880 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 2000); New York v. Henderson, 177 Misc.2d
672 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1998); New York v. Barbara, 173 Misc.2d 669 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1997); EspositoHilder v. SFX Broadcasting, Inc., 171 Misc. 2d 286 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1996); New York v. Prisinzano,
170 Misc.2d 525 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1996); In re Lutseck, No. 99-T-0130, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 6219
(Ohio Dec. 29, 2000); City of Kent v. Dawson, No. 2000-P-0094, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 2576
(Ohio June 8, 2001); Ohio v. Karle, 759 N.E.2d 815 (Ohio 2001); Pennsylvania v. Hock, 728 A.2d
943 (Pa. 1999); Pennsylvania v. Hendrickson, 724 A.2d 315 (Pa. 1999); Ste-Marie v. Texas, 32
S.W.3d 446 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000); Washington v. Williams, 26 P.3d 890 (Wash. 2000); Wisconsin v.
Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d 725 (Wis. 2001); Wisconsin v. A.S., 626 N.W.2d 712 (Wis. 2001).
672. In none of the cases included in this survey was a defendant convicted of "fighting words"
per se. This survey revealed that the classical doctrine of fighting words, under which certain speech,
wholly outside of First Amendment protection and defined in Chaplinsky by Justice Murphy as either
those words "which by their very utterance inflict injury" or those which "tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace," does not exist in such a pure form today; simply put, not one court in this
survey convicted a defendant solely based on the Chaplinsky holding. Instead, this survey revealed
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failing to protect speech per the number of actual cases was dramatically
much lower than the state courts' failure to protect. 673 In fact, at the state
level people were actually criminally convicted for what they said. This
disproportion of state convictions underscores the need for elucidation from
the United States Supreme Court on the conundrum surrounding the fighting
words doctrine: no conviction from the nation's highest court for fighting
words since 1942's Chaplinsky case.
However, despite the sixty-year silence from the United States Supreme
Court, the doctrine of fighting words, albeit bastardized, thrives in the states
in a somewhat esoteric manner. The root of this problem lies in the fact that
court convictions for offensive speech, commonplace in the states, invariably
stem from statutes that have vaguely incorporated selected parts of the
Chaplinsky holding without citing the case, or from arguably overbroad
statutes in which no mention of the fighting words doctrine exists. 674 In
defiance of the Supreme Court, states do what they want when it comes to
suppressing speech. Justice Douglas lamented in a 1974 dissent that the
"decisions of [the Supreme Court] are to guide state courts," yet "such
guidance is often unheeded." 675 This is indeed true in regard to state
suppression of speech.
Out of the thirty-nine federal cases, not one person was criminally
convicted of a speech-related offense. However, eight district courts and two
circuit courts (specifically the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits 676) failed to
that disorderly conduct or breach of the peace statutes were the most commonly encountered vehicles
through which fighting words, and so-called "offensive" speech in general, were punished. E.g., GA.
CODE ANN. 16-11-39 (1993); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-2904(A)(1) (1994). Statutes dealing with
terroristic threats and harassment, moreover, are also utilized to punish fighting words. E.g., IOWA
CODE § 712.8 (1995). While state courts never convict someone simply on the basis of the fighting
words doctrine found in Chaplinsky, a few state disorderly conduct or breach-of-the-peace statutes
reviewed substantially reproduce the holding in Chaplinsky or, in extremely rare instances, copy it
verbatim. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, 501 (West 1983 & Supp. 1998).
673. Failure to protect speech differs completely from actual convictions. In the federal courts
portion of this survey, there were no criminal convictions for speech. Instead, a fine against
offensive speech was upheld by one appellate court in Carroll v. JaquesAdmiralty Law Firm, P.C.,
110 F.3d 290 (5th Cir. 1997), and wronged defendants whose speech initially led to outrageous
arrests and who unsuccessfully sought federal relief as plaintiffs in various § 1983 actions at the
district court level represented the federal cases in which speech was not protected. At the state
level, however, there were many defendants who were criminally convicted for their speech.
674. See, e.g., Russoli v. Salisbury Township, 126 F. Supp. 2d. 821 (E.D. Pa. 2000). The
Pennsylvania disorderly conduct statute in this case includes "unreasonable noise, obscene language,
[and] obscene gestures," but does not contain any mention of fighting words or even language from
Chaplinsky, such as "tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
5503(a) (2003).
675. Karlan v. City of Cincinnati, 416 U.S. 924, 928 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See
supra note 644 and accompanying text.
676. Kapadia v. Tally, 229 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2000); Gold v. City of Miami, 121 F. 3d 1442
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protect speech
.... by denying
677 relief actions involving wrongful arrests for speech,
while the Fifth Circuit upheld a lower court imposition of a $7000 fine on a
defendant-lawyer for using "vile language' ' 678 during a deposition. In striking
contrast, the fifty state cases reviewed yielded thirty-six convictions or
affirmations of lower court convictions, while only fourteen cases were
dismissed or reversed.
Perhaps more alarming were the theories (or lack thereof) the state courts
in this survey employed to explain convictions or affirmations of convictions
for fighting words or offensive speech, which, in many instances, were simply
critical words against authoritative bodies.
Without any mention of
Chaplinsky or the fighting words doctrine, many state courts strongly
maintain that certain kinds of speech have been universally proscribed from
the beginning of a mythical time; these courts rely on a "pseudo-divine"
speech code that every reasonable person should know. In other words, many
state courts, without employing a legal theory, divide speech into simple
categories of right and wrong, and demand that society as a whole trust them,
not the First Amendment, as arbiters of an inexplicable moral-speech
standard. For example, in Whittington v. Indiana,679 Indiana's highest court,
in upholding a defendant's conviction, held that defendant's outbursts of
"fuck this shit" during police questioning constituted an "abuse of the right to
speak or was, in other words, a threat to peace safety, and well-being" of the
interrogating police officers. This rejection of the First Amendment by state
courts does not stop at the perversion or omission of applicable legal theories
used to convict. States empower police forces to punish any form of verbal
criticism directed towards "authority" as fighting words, thereby rendering in
many instances a subsection of our government immune from constitutionally
protected opinions of everyday people living in America.
The data from this survey show that nationwide police forces are given
carte blanche to punish speech that presents any kind of unfavorable view of
police even when there is no immediate threat of physical violence to the
680
officer, which might be used by the police as an excuse to suppress speech.
For example, in Connecticut v. Szymkiewicz, 68 1 the court held that defendant's
yelling of "fuck you" to a police officer during an intimidating questioning
( lIth Cir. 1997).
677. Carroll v. Jaques Admiralty Law Firm, P.C., 110 F.3d 290, 294 (5th Cir. 1997).
678. The court in Carroll claimed that the words "slimy son-of-a-bitch," "damn right," and
"goddamn," along with the question "where the fuck is this idiot going?" uttered by a defendantlawyer, who was testifying during a videotaped deposition, constituted "vile language." Id at 292.
679. 669 N.E.2d 1363, 1371 (Ind. 1996).
680. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1973); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
681. 678 A.2d 473, 479 (Conn. 1996).
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session of the defendant, regarding the theft of two bags of imitation seafood
and a packet of cocktail sauce "constituted 'fighting words' that had a
tendency to incite imminent violence," and thus was punishable under the
breach of the peace statute. How could this situation satisfy the Brandenburg
"clear and present danger" requirement? As stated before, states do not
follow what the Supreme Court says.
Such abuse of power is precisely what Justice Powell rejected in a 1974
concurrence 682 involving a facially overbroad New Orleans ordinance that
made it unlawful and a breach of the peace for any person "wantonly to curse
or revile or to use obscene or opprobrious language toward ... any member of
the city police."' 683 Powell argued that the ordinance conferred "on police
' 684a
virtually unrestrained power to arrest and charge persons with a violation."
Under the ordinance, Powell claimed, "[a]ll that was required for conviction
was that the court accept the testimony of the officer that obscene or
opprobrious
language had been used toward him while in performance of his
, 685
duties."
This "fascist" police power, moreover, has given rise to racial profiling by
which minorities, most notably African-Americans, are deliberately targeted
and taunted by police officers who then arrest the suspect for fighting words
due to his reaction to the unwarranted provocation.
It should be noted that while a large portion of these abuses occur at the
state level, federal courts are not immune from undermining the First
Amendment, especially in regards to gross police suppression of free speech
of the person arrested. The majority of federal cases that failed to protect
speech in this survey were the result of confrontations with police.
This survey analyzed the selected fighting words cases to determine: (1) a
breakdown of fighting words cases by addressee, in an effort to shed light on
whether protection of speech differed based on who the addressee was; 6 87 (2)
whether protection differed on the type of speech used; 688 and (3) how police
camouflage racial profiling by exploiting the fighting words doctrine.

682. Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 134 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
683. Id. at 132.
684. Id. at 135.
685. Id.
686. The officer's verbal provocation leads to a violent reaction, as in Chaplinsky.
687. In particular, the survey analyzed whether the speech at issue was addressed to an
individual or a crowd. Additionally, the survey analyzed whether the addressee was: (a) a police
officer; (b) an individual not part of the government; or (c) a number of addressees all affected by the
speech at once.
688. The survey analyzed whether the speech at issue was characterized as: (a) sexual in nature;
(b) a racial expression; (c) profane; or (d) some other miscellaneous expression.
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B. Breakdown of Fighting Words Cases by Addresseel. Confrontations with
police officers
This study revealed that a very large percentage of both federal and state
fighting words cases involved confrontations between individuals and police
officers. Moreover, the majority of fighting words cases in all courts
examined involved confrontations with police officers. 689 This is disturbing
because speech directed at a police officer, a public official who usually
serves as the sole contact most citizens have with the government, often
contains underlying political speech. 69 Such high numbers of fighting words
cases concerning confrontations with police officers highlight the suspicion
that police officers claim for themselves an unlimited power whereby they are
rendered immune from criticism.
a. The FederalPolice Cases
Out of the thirty-nine federal cases examined, 56% involved
confrontations with police officers. While 68% of these federal courts
protected the defendant's speech, the sheer number of cases exhibits a
common practice of police arresting people for their speech. Regardless of
the acquittals at the federal level, those arrested are required to expend
substantial money, time, and energy in defending themselves for an act
purportedly protected by the First Amendment. Accordingly, this is a classic
example of chilling free speech.
This survey revealed that courts differ at the federal level in how they
determine whether a defendant's speech should be protected when directed
towards a police officer. The analysis yielded three ways in which courts deal
with fighting words when police are involved.
First, instead of explicitly dealing with the speech at issue, some federal
courts that protected a defendant's speech to a police officer did so out of lack
of evidence that the actual speech occurred. For instance, some courts, such
as the Second Circuit in Posr v. Court Officer Shield No. 207,691 held that
there was insufficient evidence to show that the plaintiff, who had been
accused of yelling at a court officer, was guilty of fighting words. The court,
with its decision, avoided addressing the key issue of whether plaintiffs
alleged speech was fighting words or whether the speech was protected

689. See Gard, supra note 6, at 565 (The courts' invocation of the fighting words doctrine in
circumstances in which an individual addresses a police officer is "wholly inappropriate"). What
does Chaplinsky stand for then? Is it still relevant?
690. See Rutzick, supra note 6, at 10 ("[A]II speech to public officials, including police officers,
contains intellectual political content, no matter how personally abusive the speech is.").
691. 180 F.3d 409, 415-17 (2d Cir. 1999).
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because it was directed towards a police officer.
Second, other federal courts that protected a defendant ignored the fact
that the addressee was a police officer. For instance, in Brockway v.
Shepherd,692 the court held that defendant's pointing of his middle finger
toward a police officer was not sufficient to constitute fighting words. 6 93 In
the legal analysis, the694court made no mention that the confrontation occurred
with a police officer.
The third technique specifically took into account the police factor. In
Locricchio v. Richards,695 the Ninth Circuit held that the defendant's vulgar
speech directed at a police officer did not constitute fighting words vis-a-vis a
police officer because it did not contain an additionally required element
needed to strip it of its First Amendment protection. The court reasoned that
abusive speech directed at a police officer "loses First Amendment protection
only when speech that would constitute fighting words if directed at a member
of the public
also is accompanied by 'outrageous conduct,"' which it failed to
96
6

define.

Similarly, the court in Smith v. Metro North Commuter Railroad,697 held
that verbal criticism of a police officer 698 was entitled to a higher level of
protection than it would be vis-a-vis an average citizen. 699 Moreover, the
court held that the defendant's speech "certainly did not transgress
the wide
' 70
protective boundary regarding speech directed at authorities." G
Some federal courts that did not protect a defendant's speech cited
Chaplinsky's test of whether the words or other expressive activity at issue
tended
incite an immediate breach of the peace." 70 1 In Tatton v. City of
Cuy" "to 702
Cuyahoga, the court, in not protecting a protester's right to carry a large
692. 942 F. Supp. 1012 (M.D. Pa. 1996).
693. Id. at 1017.
694. In a case not involving the police, a Texas state court by a 2-1 vote reversed a conviction
for fighting words where one motorist flicked the finger to another, the majority holding that there
was no immediate likelihood of violence. Coggin v. Texas, 123 S.W.3d 82 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003); see
supra note 182.
695. 94 F.3d 652 (9th Cir. 1996) (unpublished disposition).
696. Id.
697. No. 98Civ.2528 (RWS), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14168 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2000).
698. A passenger on a train, who was being kicked off with his group of friends, asked a police
officer in an aggressive tone "why are we getting kicked off the train?" The police officer arrested
the passenger after inflicting serious eye and facial injuries on the passenger, purportedly in response
to his antagonistic query. Id. at 5.
699. See City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987); Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130
(1974).
700. Smith, No. 98Civ.2528 (RWS), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at 16.
701. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
702. 116 F. Supp. 2d. 928 (N.D. Ohio 2000).
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sign displaying a color photograph of an aborted fetus during his town's
Memorial Day parade, held that the police officer who arrested the protester
for disorderly conduct reasonably "determined that Tatton's [protester] protest
tended to incite an imminent breach of the peace."' 703 Moreover, the court in
Baskin v. Smith, 7 4 claimed that defendant's loud verbal requests that a police
officer give defendant his badge number, while the officer arrested a third
party, "could be construed as 'fighting words' that could have tended to incite
a breach of the peace," and therefore was not protected speech70 5because it
interfered with a police officer while in performance of his duties.
b. The State Police Cases
Out of the fifty state fighting words cases analyzed, 46% involved
confrontations with the police. While the percentage of state cases involving
police confrontations is lower than the federal number of 56%, the percentage
of state cases that failed to protect a defendant's First Amendment rights were
dramatically higher. Only 21% of state cases involving police confrontations
protected a defendant's speech, compared with a 68% protection rate at the
federal level. Additionally, many of the courts that failed to protect speech at
the state level proffered weak theories not grounded in solid constitutional law
(such as United States Supreme Court
precedents) 706
as to why the speech was
•.
not protected. For example, in Bailey v. Arkansas, the defendant screamed
to the arresting officer "fluck you, nigger" and "fuck you, too" to another
arriving officer. The Arkansas Supreme Court, in affirming a lower court
conviction, simply held that the defendant's words constituted "threatening
behavior," and therefore were punishable. 707 The court failed to provide a
thorough constitutional law analysis; the court cited neither Chaplinsky nor
any other fighting words case. Instead, the court deemed the words
to be
70 8
threatening to the police officers, and branded them fighting words.
In many instances in state cases dealing with police confrontations, courts
skirted around the issue of speech by combining the speech in question with a
703. Id. at 934.
704. No. 1:99-CV-846, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7018 (W.D. Mich. May 22, 2001).
705. Id.at 27. This is precisely what Justice Powell warned against in his concurrence in Lewis
v. New Orleans. The police use speech to arrest someone "only where there is no other valid basis
for arresting an objectionable or suspicious person." Lewis, 415 U.S. at 136.
706. 972 S.W,2d 239, 241 (Ark. 1998).
707. Id. at 245.
708. This is akin to the situation in Norwell v. City of Cincinnati, 414 U.S. 14 (1973). In that
case, the Court, in reversing a conviction, claimed that the defendant was "arrested and convicted
merely because he verbally and negatively protested" the police officer's poor treatment of him. Id.
at 16. The Arkansas Supreme Court, however, did not see the similarities between Bailey and
Norwell.
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nonverbal action, punishing the two together. For instance, in New York v.
Tichenor,709 New York's highest court affirmed a lower court's conviction for
disorderly conduct of a defendant who spat on the ground near a police officer
while yelling curse words. The court held that while the state disorderly
conduct statute did not include pure speech directed at an individual, it did
prohibit words and utterances coupled with intent to create a risk of public
disorder. 7 1 The court in Tichenor employed a very weak argument in
rationalizing the proscription of critical speech against a police officer. By
combining the speech with an act, in this case spitting near a police officer,
the court absolves itself from having to protect the speech, and instead
punishes "conduct." The court ignored the fact that spitting was symbolic
speech that alone commands protection, and in combination with words
critical of the police, surely does. Additionally, on the basis of Street v. New
York, 71 1 where speech was accompanied by conduct-burning the flag-the
Court should have focused on the words as the essence of the protest and that
should have led to an acquittal based on freedom of expression.
Tichenor is not an aberration. Out of the state convictions or affirmations
of lower court convictions involving confrontations with police in this study,
68% used this "combining" technique employed by the Tichenor court to curb
speech directed at police. A majority of the remainder of state cases involving
police confrontations used vague rationales, akin to Bailey, to punish the
speech directed at a police officer.
The five state cases 7 12 that protected a defendant's speech directed
towards a police officer dealt strictly with the words spoken; the fact that the
speech involved a confrontation with a police officer did not figure into these
courts' analyses. For instance, in Pennsylvania v. Hock,7 13 Pennsylvania's
Supreme Court held that the lower court had erred by holding that the
defendant's statement of "fuck you, asshole" constituted fighting words
because the remark contained words that "by their very nature, inflict
injury. ,,714 The state Supreme Court held that the comments did not constitute
fighting words because "a trier of fact could not reasonably find that
[defendant's] comment risked an immediate breach of the peace.
The fact
709. 680 N.E.2d 606, 611 (N.Y. 1997).
710. Id. at 610.
711. 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
712. Miller v. Florida, 780 So. 2d 197 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 2001); Minnesota v. Tomlin, 622 N.W.2d
546 (Minn. 2001); Kelly v. City of Minneapolis, 598 N.w.2d 657 (Minn. 1999); Ohio v. Karle, 759
N.E.2d 815 (Ohio App. 2001); Pennsylvania v. Hock, 728 A.2d 943 (Pa. 1999).
713. 728 A.2d 943 (Pa. 1999).
714. Id.at 945.
715. Id. at 947.
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that the defendant made the comment to a police officer did not figure into the
court's analysis. Moreover, in Ohio v. Karle,716 the court held that a
defendant's speech that included telling a police officer to "get the fuck off of
[his] property" did not rise to the level of fighting words. The court made no
mention of the fact that the speech was directed towards a police officer.
Similarly, the courts in the other three cases protecting speech did not take
into account that the speech in question was directed towards a police officer.
2. Confrontations with other individuals
Next to instances in which a police officer was addressed, most fighting
words cases involved words addressed to a wide variety of individuals.
Examples of such encounters include: (1) an attorney calling a deposing
attorney a "slimy son-of-a-bitch; '7 17 (2) an employee telling his former
employer "[m]otherfucker you better give me my check" and "[d]on't make
me strap your ass;
(3)an estranged husband asking his wife "did you get
enough dick today?;" 7 (4) a high school student who told his gym teacher to
"suck his dick" and called him a "motherfucker;" 720 and; (5) a defendant who
721
yelled "vulgar language" at a ten-year-old girl while he drove by her house.
The protection afforded addressed individuals, other than police officers, did
not vary based on who the addressee was.

716.
717.
718.
719.
720.
721.

759 N.E.2d 815, 817 (Ohio App. 2001).
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